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ABSTRACT 
 
Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the Degree of Ph.D. in Economics  
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI AND FPI IN THAILAND:  
USING THE GRAVITY MODEL 
By Sutana Thanyakhan 
 
Thailand has been one of significant recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) among 
developing countries over the last 30 years, and has recorded rapid and sustained growth 
rates in a number of different industrial categories.  Thailand has shown a clear policy 
transition for foreign investment over time from an import-substitution regime to an 
export-oriented regime.  Before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (1985-1996), Thailand had 
the fastest growing level of exports in manufactured goods among Asian economies.  FDI 
plays a significant role in the Thai economy.  Thailand has been pursuing different foreign 
investment policies at different times depending on the development objectives and 
economic situation in the country.   
 
The main objective of this research is to evaluate the determinants of FDI and foreign 
portfolio investment (FPI) in Thailand using the extended Gravity Model.  Panel data is 
used to estimate and evaluate the empirical results based on the data for the years 1980 to 
2004.  It also examines the FDI flows between different locations and their geographical 
distances in Thailand.  The primary research question addresses what factors motivate, 
attract, and sustain the FDI and FPI in Thailand.  In addition, this study also examines the 
effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on the inflows of FDI and FPI into Thailand. 
 
The results show that the inflows of FDI in Thailand, which are supply-driven, are 
significantly influenced by its 21 largest investing partners.  The 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis has no impact on the determinants of the inflows of FDI into Thailand, but positively 
influences the inflows of FPI into Thailand.  Our results also show that increases in GDP 
and trade between investing partners and Thailand potentially attract more FDI and FPI 
into Thailand.  Investing partners closer to Thailand draw more portfolio investment into 
 iii 
Thailand than distant partners – emphasising that distance has a negative impact on the 
portfolio investment but a negligible impact on the FDI. 
 
Key words:  FDI, FPI, portfolio investment, Gravity Model, Asian Financial Crisis, 
regional integration 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows grew strongly in the 1990s, giving rise to 
almost 54,000 transnational corporations, and have since grown rapidly at a rate above 
global economic growth rates.  Recorded global inflows grew by an average of 13% a year 
during 1990-1997, compared with the average rates of 7% both for world exports of goods 
and nonfactor services and for world GDP at current prices (Carson, 2003; Mallampally 
and Sauvant, 1999).  Because of the large numbers of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), these inflows increased by an average of nearly 50% a year during 
1998-2000, reaching a record of US$ 1.388 trillion in 2000 (see Table 1-1).  Inflows 
declined to US$ 559.6 billion in 2003, mostly as a result of the sharp drop in cross-border 
M&A amongst the developed countries.  In addition, the value of cross-border M&A 
declined from the record US$ 678.8 billion in 2002 to about US$ 559.6 billion in 2003 
(IMF, 2003). 
 
Developed countries have major influences over the FDI inflows and outflows, accounting 
for 94% of outflows and over 70% of inflows in 2001 (IMF, 2003).  Inflows of FDI to 
developing countries grew by an average of 23% a year during 1990-2000 (see Figure 1-1).  
In 2001, the inflows declined by 13% to US$ 215 billion (IMF, 2003).  The decline, 
however, was mostly accounted for by the decline in FDI inflows in three (developing) 
economies – Hong Kong, Brazil, and Argentina.  This was due to the failure of government 
economic policies in Brazil and Argentina, and the outbreak of the illness severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Hong Kong (UNCTAD, 2004).  Excluding these three 
economies, FDI inflows into developing countries increased by about 18% in 2001 (IMF, 
2003).  During 1998-2001, FDI inflows to developing countries averaged US$ 225 billion 
a year (see Table 1-1).  
 
According to Kumar (2003, p. 6) “FDI usually flows as a bundle of resources including, 
besides capital, production technology, organizational and managerial skills, marketing 
know-how, and even market access through the marketing networks of multinational 
 2 
enterprises (MNEs) who undertake FDI”.  These skill-resources tend to spill over to 
domestic enterprises in the host country.  Therefore, FDI is expected to contribute more 
economic growth than domestic investment in the host country.  Consequently, FDI has 
become an important source of private external financing (besides the source of funds from 
internal saving) for developing countries with minimal capital.  FDI is also a means of 
transferring production technology, skills, innovative capacity, and organizational and 
managerial practices between locations as well as accessing international marketing 
networks (see Mirza and Giroud, 2004). 
 
Figure 1-1: FDI Inflows, Global and Groups of Economies, 1980-2004 
 (Billion of US Dollar) 
 
 
 
Note:  CIS (Commonwealth and Independent States) consists of 11 former Soviet  
  Republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  
  Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
Source: World Investment Report, UNCTAD, 2005 
 
Foreign investor orientation toward the domestic market frequently has close links with 
indigenous firms and, as the world’s most competitive firms, they provide useful know-
how and other basic technology to indigenous firms.  Because these foreign firms produce 
goods and services for the local market, which meet world standards, they can indirectly 
help indigenous firms to become more competitive in world markets, thereby enhancing 
the export potential of indigenous firms (Thomsen, 1999). 
 
Year 
Billion of US Dollar 
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Mallampally and Sauvant (1999) adapted Dunning’s framework (Dunning, 1998, p. 53), 
which attempted to summarize the differences between the kind of variables posited to 
influence the locational decision of MNEs (see Table 1-2).  Table 1-2 presents the reasons 
for making a foreign investment in the host countries.  Given the potential role of FDI in 
accelerated growth, economic transformation, and contribution to economic development, 
developing countries are strongly interested in attracting FDI.  They are taking steps to 
improve the principal determinants and the location choice of foreign direct investment.  
Mallampally and Sauvant (1999, p. 36-37) suggested that “countries have begun 
liberalizing their national policies to establish a hospitable framework for FDI by relaxing 
rules regarding market entry and foreign ownership, improving the standards of treatment 
accorded to foreign firms, and improving the functioning of markets.  However, equally 
important, with FDI policy frameworks becoming more similar, countries interested in 
encouraging investment inflows are focusing on measures that facilitate business.  These 
include investment promotion, investment incentives, after-investment services, 
improvements in amenities, and measures that reduce the ‘hassle’ costs of doing 
business”.  
 
There are many studies about FDI advantages/disadvantages in the host countries, impact 
of FDI on economic growth, and the effects of FDI netflow (see Agarwal and Ramaswami, 
1992; Loungani and Razin, 2001; Ismail and Yussof, 2003).  Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992) showed the effects of FDI interrelationship, which implied that firms would like to 
establish a market presence in the foreign countries through direct investment.  However, 
the firms’ abilities were constrained by their size and multinational experience.  In 
addition, the firms used investment modes only in high potential markets. 
 
Loungani and Razin (2001) suggested that FDI could contribute to investment and growth 
in host countries through various channels such as technology transformation, human 
capital development by employee training programmes, and corporate tax revenues.  
Moreover, developing countries should focus on improving the investment climate in all 
kinds of capital, domestic as well as foreign, to attract FDI.  Ismail and Yussof (2003) 
showed the result with regard to labour market competitiveness; different countries may 
require different policy recommendations in order to attract FDI inflows into the countries.  
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 5 
Brooks et al. (2003) studied the trends, effects, and likely issues for the WTO negotiations 
of FDI in developing countries in Asia.  The authors suggested the accomplishment of the 
multilateral agreements not only extended to new areas of services and intellectual 
property rights, but also integrated trade/investment in goods, services, and technology, 
and established a strong enforcement mechanism.   
 
In summary, the potential benefits to host countries from encouraging capital inflows 
include: (1) foreign firms bring superior technology; (2) foreign investment increases 
competition in the host country; (3) foreign investment typically results in increased 
domestic investment; (4) foreign investment enhances export markets; and (5) foreign 
investment can aid in bridging a host country’s foreign exchange gap.   
 
Table 1-2: Host Country Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
Host country determinants Type of FDI classified 
by motives of firms 
Principal economic determinants 
in host countries 
Policy framework for FDI 
 Economic, political, and social stability 
 Rules regarding entry and operations 
 Standards of treatment of foreign affiliates 
 Policies on functioning and structure of 
markets (especially competition and policies 
governing mergers and acquisitions) 
 International agreements on FDI 
 Privatization policy 
 Trade policy (tariffs and non tariff barriers) 
and coherence of FDI and trade policies 
 Tax policy  
 
 
Economic determinants 
 
Market-seeking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource/asset-
seeking 
 
 
 Market size and per capita income 
 Market growth 
 Access to regional and global 
markets 
 Country-specific consumer 
preferences 
 Structure of markets 
 
 Raw materials 
 Low-cost unskilled labour 
 Skilled labour 
 Technological, innovative, and 
other created assets (e.g. brand 
names), including as embodied in 
individuals, firms, and clusters 
 Physical infrastructure (ports, 
roads, power, telecommunications) 
Business facilitation 
 Investment promotion (including image-
building and investment-generating 
activities and investment-facilitation 
services) 
 Investment incentives 
 Hassle costs (related to corruption and 
administrative efficiency) 
 Social amenities (e.g. bilingual schools, 
quality of life) 
 After-investment services 
 
Efficiency-seeking  
 
 Cost of resources and assets, 
adjusted for labour productivity 
 Other input costs, such as transport 
and communication costs to/from 
and within host economy and other 
international products  
 Membership of a regional 
integration agreement conductive to 
the establishment of regional 
corporate networks 
Source: Beamish, 2000; Dunning, 1998; Mallampally and Sauvant, 1999 
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1.2 Definition and Types of FDI 
The International Monetary Fund (1993) defines FDI as a category of international 
investment that reflects the objectives of a resident in one economy (the direct investor or 
source economy) obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy 
(the direct investment enterprise or host economy).  The lasting interest implies the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment 
enterprise, and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of the 
enterprise.  The ownership of at least 10% of the ordinary shares or voting stock is the 
criterion for the existence of a direct investment relationship.  Ownership of less than 10% 
is considered a portfolio investment.  FDI comprises not only mergers, 
takeovers/acquisitions (brownfield investments) and new investments (greenfield 
investment), but also reinvested earnings and loans and similar capital transfers between 
parents and affiliates (Adam et al., 2003; Jansen and Stokman, 2004).   
 
The pattern of FDI can be divided into two types, horizontal FDI and vertical FDI.  
Horizontal FDI is the investment in the same industry abroad as in the home country or it 
occurs when the multinational produces the same product or service in multiple countries.  
Aizenman and Marion (2004, p. 126) pointed out that “Horizontal FDI may increase 
income in each country with minor distributive impact”.  Vertical FDI begins when the 
production of a multinational firm proceeds internationally, locating each stage of 
production in the country where it can be done at the least cost.  Vertical FDI has two 
forms: backward and forward.  Backward FDI is the investment in an industry which 
supplies the firm in home country.  Forward FDI is the investment in an industry which 
buys from the firm in home country.  Therefore, vertical FDI is the way to establish sales 
and service centres for the products in new markets in different countries (host countries).  
 
An alternative type of foreign investment is Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI).  This is 
considered an indirect investment by individuals, firms or public bodies (such as national 
and local governments) in foreign financial instruments.  The distinction between FDI and 
foreign portfolio investment is that the latter refers to a “transaction involving buying and 
selling of equity securities, debt securities in the forms of bonds, notes, money market 
instrument and financial derivatives with the exception of securities classified as direct 
investment and reserves fund” (BOT, 2005).  FDI in this study “reflects the lasting interest 
of a non-resident in a resident entity.  The item shows non-residents’ claims on resident 
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entities and thus is recorded as the country’s external liabilities” (BOT, 2005).  In 
addition, Dunning (1988) criticized FDI, saying that it concerned issues of direct control 
since resources were transferred internally within firms rather than externally between 
independent firms.  Haddad and Harrison (1993) proved that the benefits from FDI are not 
equally distributed in developing countries.  Policies should be developed to avoid 
inequality, encourage efficiency of domestic firms, benefit from linkages with and 
spillovers from foreign firms, and attract FDI into areas or categories that are most likely to 
benefit the poor such as in rural areas or agricultural processing.   
1.3 Interest of the Research 
There has been limited research on the determinants of FDI in Thailand.  Previous research 
addressed factors that are important to FDI in the Thai economy (see Brimble and 
Sibunruang, 2002; Lauridsen, 2004) and the effects of foreign investment in Thailand (see 
Jansen ,2003).  However, these studies focused only on the foreign investment at either the 
sectoral level or national level.  No research has focused on both levels.  For example, 
according to the Jansen (2003) study, the inflows of capital investment into Thailand are 
associated with higher asset prices, lower lending rates, and domestic spending driven by 
higher foreign investment.  In addition, the Lauridsen (2004) study shows that FDI plays a 
significant role in Thailand FDI development, which contributed to the long-term 
competitiveness and sustainability growth of the country during the 1990s.  Lauridsen 
(2004) study is concerned with the extent to which the Thai government was able to 
formulate and in particular implement a credible and adequate set of linkage and supplier 
development policies.  This study examines the role of FDI in Thailand and the factors that 
determine FDI across industrial categories in Thailand.  
1.4 Purpose of the Research 
The general objective of this research is to evaluate the determinants of FDI and portfolio 
investment in Thailand.  It also examines the FDI flows between different locations and 
their geographical distance in Thailand.  The primary research question addresses what 
factors motivate, attract, and sustain foreign investments in Thailand.  
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The specific objectives of this research include: 
 
1. To provide an overview of foreign direct investment (FDI) studies, such as the 
Eclectic Paradigm, Resourced-based Theory, and Business Network Theory, which 
help to explain the patterns of FDI in Thailand and the Gravity Model; 
 
2. To evaluate the determinants of FDI inflows and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) 
into Thailand using an extended Gravity Model;  
 
3.  To examine the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the FDI and foreign 
portfolio investment (FPI) in Thailand; 
 
4. To provide policy recommendations to policy makers for improving Thailand’s 
investment climate to attract inflow of FDI. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Research 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters.  Chapter 1 presents the introduction, the 
objectives of the research, and the scope of the work.  Chapter 2 describes the industrial 
patterns of FDI and portfolio investment in Thailand from 1980 to 2004.  Chapter 3 
reviews the conventional FDI literature based on the Eclectic Paradigm, Resource-Based 
Theory, and Business Network Theory.  Chapter 4 provides an overview of the Gravity 
Model in trade and FDI, which will be used to develop the empirical models in the next 
chapter.  Chapter 5 describes the data collection and research methodology.  Chapter 6 
presents the results of the research and discusses the research findings.  Chapter 7 
summarises the research findings and presents the conclusions.  The chapter also discusses 
the contributions of the research, the theoretical implications, limitations of the research, 
and suggestions for future research.    
  
CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION OF FDI IN THAILAND 
 
This chapter provides an economic overview of Thailand; the overall patterns of FDI 
inflow and the inflow of portfolio investment; the stages of FDI policy and the impact of 
investment policy on FDI.  The data for FDI and portfolio investment in Thailand are 
provided and further FDI data by categories (industry, financial institutions, trade, mining 
and quarrying, agricultural products, services, investment, real estate, and others) are also 
provided with a brief explanation.     
2.1 An Economic Overview of Thailand 
Thailand’s real GDP rose by 6.3% in 2004 and increased to 7% in 2005 (BOT, 2005).  
Growth in 2006 was 7.3% and inflation was 1.3% in 2005, a decrease from 2.7% in 2004 
(see Table 2-1).  Since 2003, economic performance in Thailand has recovered fully from 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  With its first fiscal surplus in 2003, the factors that 
contributed to the surplus included strong economic growth, improvements in tax 
administration and collection, falling debt service costs and the expiration of a five-year 
period when companies were allowed to carry over losses incurred during their insolvency.  
Exports accelerated in 2004 because global economic conditions keep improving and 
appreciation of the Thai Baht was kept in check.  The increase in government investment 
in 2005 further contributed to economic growth and development.  However, the rises of 
interest rates to cap inflationary pressures and other measures to curb the rise of household 
debt dampened the growth toward the end of 2004 and into 2005, including the inflow of 
FDI. 
 
Over the past few decades, the FDI inflow into Thailand has accelerated rapidly.  There 
was a large increase in FDI at the end of the 1980s until the late 1990s (before the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997), from US$ 489 million in 1987 through US$ 1,294 million in 
1988 to a peak in 1998 (US$ 7 billion) (see Table 2-1).  This figure decreased slightly over 
the following two years, but the value of FDI in 2001 was higher than it was in 1998.  
Recently, the amount of FDI has been small but the GNP, exports of goods and services 
(XGS), and reserve money became significantly larger (see Table 2-1).  Thus, this may 
imply that FDI will play an increasingly important role in Thailand’s economy in the future  
(Hongskul, 2000).
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2.2 Foreign Investment in Thailand  
Historically, Thailand has depended heavily on the inflows of FDI from the United States 
and Japan, which accounted for at least 50% of all FDI inflow.  This geographic pattern of 
FDI has changed remarkably since the early 1980s when Japan was looking for production 
bases abroad to escape appreciating home currencies.  Thailand’s FDI in recent years is 
geographically diversified with new partners including ASEAN, EU-151, Australia, and 
New Zealand.  
 
Thailand has been open to the international economy since the 1990s, as indicated by both 
the increase in FDI and rising GDP.  Thailand is among a small group of developing 
economies classified by Sachs et al. (1995, p. 22) as “always open”.  That is, it exhibits 
very high trade orientation, welcomes foreign investors, and has low average tariffs, 
modest interindustry tariff distribution and investment incidence of nontrade barriers.  
 
Table 2-2 shows the historic distribution of FDI flows to Thailand since 1970.  The annual 
FDI flows to Thailand started to exceed US$ 523 million in the early 1970s, and increased 
to US$ 1,300 million in 1988.  Inflow of FDI to Thailand increased from around US$ 500 
million during 1970-1974 to almost US$ 20 billion during 1995-1998, but decreased 
slightly to US$ 5,300 million in 1999 (see Table 2-2).  The outflow of FDI increased 
dramatically in 1991 with a reduction in 1993.  Furthermore, Table 2-2 shows portfolio 
investment in Thailand is insignificant compared to FDI during 1980-1986.  However, the 
portfolio investment inflow increased significantly in 1987, and in 1997, increased in both 
inflow and outflow. Since then, the net portfolio investment has decreased from US$ 4,000 
million in 1997 to US$ 265 million in 1998.  This is because of the effects of the 1997 
Asian Financial which caused the inflows of portfolio investment into Thailand to decrease 
dramatically from US$ 21.3 million in 1997 to US$ 6.8 million in 1998.  The consistent 
positive net portfolio investment indicates that foreign firms have great confidence in 
investing into the Thai economy, the only exceptions being in 1984 and 1994.  In 1997, the 
inflow and outflow of portfolio investment increased threefold from the previous year. 
However, because of the Asian Financial Crisis effect in mid 1997, the portfolio 
                                                 
1
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland (Republic of), Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom 
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investment decreased severely in 1998 and continued to decrease until 2002 (see Table 2-
2).  In comparison, net FDI is positive for every year in the country’s record.   
 
Table 2-2: FDI and Portfolio Investment in Thailand during 1970-2004 (Million US$) 
 
Period Inflow  
FDI 
Outflow 
FDI 
Net  
FDI 
Inflow 
Portfolio 
Outflow 
Portfolio 
Net 
Portfolio 
1970-1974 522.57 94.20 428.37 149.78 28.72 121.06 
1975-1979    1,144.70  757.38 387.32 257.15 28.89 228.26 
1980 452.00 263.00 189.00 54.00 3.00 51.00 
1981 422.00 133.00 289.00 12.00 11.00 1.00 
1982 415.05 227.00 188.05 27.00 0.00 27.00 
1983 606.00 250.00 356.00 18.00 3.00 15.00 
1984 721.00 309.00 412.00 103.00 109.00 -6.00 
1985 375.00 215.00 160.00 149.00 8.00 141.00 
1986 399.00 137.00 262.00 117.00 20.00 97.00 
1987 489.00 135.00 354.00 666.00 167.00 499.00 
1988 1,294.00 188.00 1,106.00 1,100.00 653.00 447.00 
1989 2,066.00 286.00 1,780.00 2,518.00 1,089.00 1,429.00 
1990 3,030.00 488.00 2,542.00 3,417.00 2,960.00 457.00 
1991 3,700.00 1,666.98 2,033.02 1,962.00 1,914.00 48.00 
1992 5,340.00 3,189.00 2,151.00 3,030.00 2,574.00 456.00 
1993 2,639.00 907.00 1,732.00 7,148.00 4,816.00 2,332.00 
1994 2,452.00 1,127.00 1,325.00 6,370.00 6,764.00 -394.00 
1995 3,051.70 1,047.80 2,003.90 7,163.00 4,909.00 2,254.00 
1996 3,940.26 1,669.65 2,270.61 7,261.00 6,138.00 1,123.00 
1997 5,141.66 1,514.87 3,626.79 21,376.00 17,389.00 3,987.00 
1998 6,980.70 1,838.52 5,142.19 6,761.00 6,496.00 265.00 
1999 5,307.33 1,745.58 3,561.75 5,114.00 4,168.00 946.00 
2000 6,255.63 3,442.38 2,813.25 4,766.00 3,869.00 897.00 
2001 8,958.18 5,085.51 3,872.67 1,492.00 1,475.00 17.00 
2002 7,489.21 6,466.68 1,022.53 1,472.00 1,263.00 209.00 
2003 7,689.97 5,807.84 1,882.13 6,241.00 5,658.00 583.00 
2004 7,583.00 6,748.00 835.00 5,077.00 5,541.00 -464.00 
Source: Bank of Thailand, Quarterly Bulletin (Various Issues) 
 
2.2.1 Inflow of FDI Classified by Category 1970-2004 
The categories that attracted the largest FDI inflow in Thailand are industry, financial 
institutions, and trade (see Table 2-3).  Financial institutions attracted an average of 50% 
per year of the total FDI since 1970, but this dominance has moved to industry and trade 
with more than 70% since 1993 (BOT, 2005).  The BOT reports that financial institutions 
were the most important category until 1992 and decreased rapidly from 53% to 2.91% in 
1993 and that category has never regained its popularity.  Trade became the most popular 
category after the decline of the financial institutions category and it became more and 
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more fundamentally important to FDI after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the share for 
trade category comprised 13% and 50% in 1993 and 2001, respectively (see Table 2-3).  
Smaller FDI inflows during 1993-1996 (before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis), the real 
estate category decreased to 30% and dropped to 2% in 1997.  The category came under 
pressure in 1995 for two main reasons: the over-supply of houses and office spaces, and 
the central bank’s squeeze on lending (Wong, 2001).  The lending squeeze was caused by 
accelerated interest rate from 10.9% in 1994 to 14.6% in 1998 (see Table 2-1) that 
depreciated the cash flow problems, making it difficult to sustain living standards.  This is 
demonstrated in the property clock diagram (Newland, 2004, p. 26) and the Thai economic 
indicators (Table 2-1), starting with the rise in property value and rising interest rates, then 
a drop in share prices which eventually affected the falling international reserves (US$ 38 
billion in 1996 to US$ 27 billion in 1997), making it harder to obtain finance.  Finally, the 
economy burst with low/falling interest rates and higher unemployment (1.55% in 1997 to 
4% in 1998) (see Table 2-1).   
 
In the 1970s, financial institutions received 50% of the total FDI inflows into Thailand, 
compared with industry’s 21% (see Table 2-3).  However, in 1993, 50% of the FDI was 
held by industry and trade with 37% and 13% respectively (BOI, 2005).  In 2002, the trade 
category received 50% (first place) of the total FDI and industry attracted about 30% of the 
total FDI.  Mining and quarrying, agricultural products, services, investment, real estate 
and others comprised about 20% (see Table 2-3). 
 
Figure 2-1: FDI (Million of US$) in Thailand from 1980-2004     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of Thailand, 2005   
1980 1990 2000 2004 
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2.2.2 Inflow of FDI in Thailand Classified by Country 1970-2004 
The economic growth that was driven largely by increasing FDI inflows and exports has 
now shifted towards manufacturing and enhanced production capabilities.  Value-added 
products can now compete with the lower wage countries of China, Indonesia, and 
Indochina.  The flow has been increasing since the late 1980s as an effect of “Endaka”, the 
appreciation of the Japanese Yen relative to the US dollar (Tiwari et al., 2003).  Thus, the 
Japanese manufacturing industry became the major foreign industrial investors in 
Thailand, and ASEAN.  FDI inflows from Japan to Thailand accounted for 12% of the 
total FDI in 1980 and increased to 50% in 1988 (see Table 2-4).  The Japanese FDI rapidly 
decreased to 8% in 1992 because Japan placed more importance on Europe (Kim, 2000).  
However, the Japanese FDI increased again in Thailand during the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis with an average of 20% of the total FDI inflow to Thailand.  The reasons were to 
take advantage of the benefits of Thai policies which protected foreign investors and the 
reduced cost of manufacturing through the use of local labour.  These have been the main 
motives for Japanese firms to invest in Thailand (Julian, 2001).  Therefore, Japanese firms 
exploited the depreciated value of the Thai Baht which reduced the cost and price to get 
higher overseas orders.   
Singapore is one of the main sources of investment funds into Thailand (see Table 2-4).  
During the beginning of 1980s, Singapore FDI was the highest, but it dropped to third 
place behind Japan and the US during the late 1980s and 1990s (BOT, 2005).  Table 2-4 
confirms Singapore was the major source again in 2001 to 2004 with over 50% of the total 
FDI inflow to Thailand.  
Although Japan, the US, and Singapore are the most important origins of FDI for Thailand, 
Hong Kong (a part of China) and Taiwan are also important sources. 
Table 2-4 shows FDI inflows from the three major investing nations (Japan, US and 
Singapore) accounted for 70-80% of the total FDI inflows to Thailand.  Initially, FDI from 
Hong Kong into Thailand registered between 20% and 26% in 1982, 1986-87 and 1991-92, 
before Hong Kong became part of China in 1997, the same period as the financial crisis in 
Thailand. 
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2.2.3 Inflow of Portfolio Investment in Thailand Classified by Country 1970-2004 
Singapore, Hong Kong, US, and UK are the most popular countries to make portfolio 
investment in Thailand. Table 2-5 shows the portfolio investment from 1980 to 2004.  
China and Hong Kong were heavy stock investors with about 40% of FDI from 1980 to 
1982, and also from 1985 to 1986, and they have not dropped lower than fourth position of 
portfolio investment (see Table 2-4).  However, China and Hong Kong have lost this 
position to Singapore, UK, and US since 1996.  
 
The case of UK is interesting.  UK had only 2% of total FDI flows in the 1980s, but, since 
1984, the share of UK portfolio investment in Thailand jumped to either first or second 
place (BOT, 2005).  It was 85.4% in 1985, the highest recorded portfolio investment in 
Thailand, but this dropped to 26% in 1986 because of the political instability with the coup 
d’état in the late of 1985.  Thus UK portfolio investors hesitated to invest in Thailand for a 
year.  During the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, UK portfolio investment was between 30-
40%.  During 1997-2000, it was the second highest behind Singapore.  
 
Singapore has demonstrated a consistent level of high investment in Thailand through both 
FDI and portfolio investment (see Table 2-5).  However, the proportion of the two 
investments is inverse.  If Singapore invested more in FDI, then the portfolio investment 
decreased and vice versa.  This is especially so from 1993 to 1998 when Singapore had the 
most attractive portfolio investment, 40-50% (total of US$ 25,130 million for 6 years – see 
Appendix A) in portfolio investment but only 10% (total of US$ 3,512 million for 6 years) 
in FDI.  
 
In contrast, the US maintained a low level of portfolio investment in Thailand between the 
1980s and the 1990s.  However, since the new millennium, the Thailand stock market has 
become more attractive.  Its share was 6.5% in 1999, down from 10% during 1980s, and 
jumped to 34% in 2001 (see Table 2-5).  Since then the US has become the most favoured 
country in terms of portfolio investment. 
 
Japan preferred to invest in Thailand in industrial categories rather than portfolio 
investment.  A possible explanation is the strong Nikkei index makes it unnecessary to 
move the source of funds overseas. 
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2.3 The Development of FDI Policy in Thailand 
 
1940s-1950s  State capitalism 
The country became a state monopoly for most imports and exports. 
 
1958-71 Import substitution 
The first Economic Development Plan (1961-66) brought a reduction in direct government 
involvement in the economy and greater promotion of private investment.  The import 
substitution policy was introduced with a high level of protection and tariffs especially on 
consumer products (Tangkitvanich et al., 2004).  The Board of Investment (BOI) 
established the tax concession and the Industrial Promotion Act of 1960.  Tariff structures 
were revised several times to give better protection to domestic industries.  Balance of 
payments problems led to a discussion of sustainability of import substitution policy. 
 
1972-1992 Export promotion 
The third Economic Development Plan (1972-76) introduced export promotion.  These 
included: the investment law amended in 1972 which provided exemptions from duty on 
raw materials and intermediate items for exporting industries; Alien Business Law of 1972 
which prohibited foreigners from entering several business areas; investment zones (21 of 
72 provinces) were designated; the Investment Promotion Act was enacted in 1977, 
introducing income tax holidays and a 50% concessionary import duty on machinery; and 
tax incentives on raw materials and machinery were reduced for Bangkok and its 
perimeter, to promote deeper industrial decentralization (BOI, 2005).  The investment 
Promotion Act was amended in 1987, introduced tax privileges and refunds, industrial 
zones, and export-processing zones; and the sixth Economic Development Plan (1987-91) 
was planned to improve income distribution and reduce income disparity. 
 
1993-1996 Promotion of industrial decentralization 
The seventh Economic Development Plan (1992-96) aimed to reduce the income disparity 
between urban and rural areas (NESDB, 2004).  This included setting up the promotion of 
sustainable development; the Investment Promotion Act was amended in 1993 to promote 
industrial decentralization, with generous incentives provided to encourage industries to 
locate in the rural areas.   
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1997-present Post-crisis liberalization 
After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, liberalization was extended as part of the IMF-led 
reform package and included: the Foreign Business Act of 1999, allowing full foreign 
participation in most manufacturing sectors; Condominium Act was amended in 1998 to 
allow foreigners to wholly own buildings on two acres or less of land; the Corporate Debt 
Restructuring Advisory Committee was established to supervise and accelerate debt 
restructuring; ASEAN Investment Agreement (AIA) was adopted in 1998; Bankruptcy Act 
was amended in 1999 to establish a central bankruptcy court; local content requirements 
were eliminated for vehicle assembly in 1999, and foreigners were allowed to own 100% 
of shares in promoted manufacturing projects in 2000 (NESDB, 2004).  
2.4 Impact of Investment Policy on FDI in Thailand  
Thailand’s investment policy regime has been continually revised to reflect the 
development of the overall economy in general and, in particular, from the era of import 
substitution to export promotion and post the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis liberalisation.  
Investment policy has become much more liberal during the past decade.  The changes in 
investment policies have an impact on the location of FDI while changes in the direction of 
greater openness allowed firms to set themselves up in a particular location, but do not 
guarantee that they will do so.  In contrast, changes in the direction of less openness will 
ensure a reduction in FDI (Mallampally and Sauvant, 1999).  The investment policies 
should enable the country to support a more competitive environment with alternative 
strategies for the country to maximize the productivity benefits from FDI.  
 
The Board of Investment (BOI) was set up to develop a plan to attract foreign investment 
from overseas and to collaborate to boost bargaining power and proceed faster in 
approaching potential sources of investment.  The principal aim is to further the 
development of FDI strategies of the Thai government.  This included the first National 
Economic Development Plan by the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB) in 1961 with the import substitution regime to promote industrialization 
(Kohpaiboon, 2003).  In addition, the Ninth National Economic and Social Development 
Plan (2002-2006) was established to enhance investment strategies such as preparing 
immediate measures to alleviate drought, prevent any increase in non-performing loans, 
launching offensive strategies to support Thai exports, accelerating economic stimulation 
packages and strengthening the local economy to attract new or reinvested FDI. 
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2.5 Summary 
In the early stage of FDI development in Thailand, US and Japan were the main sources of 
inflows of FDI into the country, which accounted for at least 50% of all FDI inflows.  The 
inflows of FDI into Thailand started to increase rapidly in the mid of 1980s because of the 
effect of “Endaka”, which is an appreciation of Japanese Yen against the US Dollar.  
Therefore, Japanese investors shifted their funds to invest overseas in order to reduce the 
production costs and to gain more competitive advantage from the low labour cost 
countries with rich natural resources.  Japanese manufacturers had started to become major 
foreign investors in many countries, including Thailand.   
 
The inflows of portfolio investment into Thailand started to increase dramatically in the 
mid 1980s at the same time as Japanese and US investment in FDI.  Singapore and Hong 
Kong are the main sources of portfolio investment fund into Thailand, followed by the US 
and the UK.   
 
In addition, Thailand has developed its FDI policy since 1940s and promoted FDI policy 
from import-substitution to export-oriented in the 1980s.  This is not only to improve the 
growth of the economy but to increase the country’s welfare.   
 
The following chapter provides the background of FDI theory and introduces the 
applications of the FDI theory.  
CHAPTER 3 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT THEORIES 
 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature that focuses on both the firm and the aggregate 
level of FDI under three main FDI theories: the Eclectic Paradigm concept, the Resource-
Based Theory, and the Business Network Theory.  This chapter also discusses issues 
concerning FDI.  An overview of the FDI literature is discussed first followed by a 
discussion of FDI relationships, specifically the impact between the government and the 
investment policy.     
 
The chapter consists of five sections.  The first section provides an overview of the FDI 
theories.  The second section provides an overview of the Eclectic Paradigm concept 
followed by the Resource-Based Theory and the main Business Network Theory of FDI.  
Section five summarizes the chapter. 
3.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
3.1.1 An Overview and Application of FDI Theory 
Foreign investments flow to host countries because of lower production costs.  As foreign 
investors search for the location that will provide the highest returns on their investment, 
they look for countries with abundant natural resources but low-quality institutions.  Some 
countries such as Thailand and Indonesia encourage FDI or Foreign Indirect Investment 
(FII) to their countries with friendly regulations offering them a higher rate of return.  The 
popular determinants of FDI flowing to smaller economies include market potential and 
low relative unit labour cost which have significant and plausible effects enhancing FDI 
decision-making (Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Noorbakhsh and 
Paloni, 2001).  For example, Hong Kong and Singapore have mainly targeted the financial 
category, which is relatively skill intensive.  In Korea, most of the FDI was invested in the 
manufacturing category.  Thailand attracted a quarter of FDI flows in the capital-intensive 
and relative skill-intensive chemical, machinery and electrical manufacturing sectors 
(Velde and Morrissey, 2002).  
 
Following the Second World War, global FDI was dominated by the US, as much of the 
world recovered from the devastation of the war.  The US accounted for around three 
 25 
quarters of new FDI between 1945 and 1960.  Since then, FDI has spread to become a 
global phenomenon.  At the same time, numerous researchers have conducted studies on 
FDI, including investigating the fundamental theories of FDI, various macro economic 
variables that influence FDI, the impact of economic integration on the movement of FDI, 
and the advantages and disadvantages of FDI in the host countries (Carstensen and Toubal, 
2004; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Zhang, 2001a).  Dunning (1980) introduced the FDI theory 
via the Eclectic Paradigm.  Accordingly, the Eclectic Paradigm shows that specific 
advantages related to a firm or its country of origin can be estimated as independent 
variables in an equation to describe the origins of FDI in a host country.  Most originators 
agree that there exists a positive causal relationship between FDI and economic 
performance, either in the short run or the long run, or both.  Firms from developing 
countries face immense difficulties in setting up a distribution network, keeping in close 
touch with the rapid changes in a consumer-taste, mastering the technicalities of industrial 
norms and safety standards, and building up a new product image.  Their lack of skills 
constitutes a key entry barrier to markets (Blomström and Kokko, 1997); therefore, they 
seek Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to compensate for the deficiencies.  
 
Perlmutter (1969) introduced FDI as a strategic alternative that firms adopt to serve foreign 
markets after they have gained international experience through trade and/or licensing.  
The potential benefits of FDI to host countries from encouraging capital inflows include: 
(1) foreign firms bring superior technology; (2) foreign investment increases competition 
in the host country; (3) foreign investment typically results in increased domestic 
investment; (4) foreign investment gives advantages in terms of export market; and (5) 
foreign investment can aid in bridging a host country’s foreign exchange gap (Brooks et 
al., 2003).  These may lure the government of host countries to rapidly transform from 
agricultural production and the exploitation of raw materials into major producers and 
exporters of manufactured goods.   
 
To examine the potential benefit of FDI in host countries, Ismail and Yussof (2003) used 
time series data on FDI, wages, labour force, skills, R&D expenditure, and the interest rate 
to analyse the FDI impact on economic development.  Their study showed the labour 
market determinants differ between countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines in terms of the FDI role in the country.  Their results suggested that, with 
regard to labour market competitiveness, different countries may require different policy 
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recommendations in order to attract FDI inflows into the countries.  In addition, the results 
in Jansen (2003) and Mirza and Giroud (2004) confirmed Malaysia as a classical example 
of benefits of FDI.  Mirza and Giroud (2004) studied the experience of FDI effects on the 
economy, growth, and poverty reduction in Malaysia and Thailand.  The authors suggested 
that FDI is a key factor in driving export-led growth in this region.  Through such 
investment, host economies have been rapidly transformed from agricultural production 
and the exploitation of raw materials into major producers and exporters of manufactured 
goods.  These skill resources tend to spill over to domestic enterprises in the host country.  
Therefore, FDI can be expected to contribute more to the economic growth than domestic 
investment in the host country.  Consequently, FDI has become an important source of 
private external finance (besides the source of funds from internal saving) for developing 
countries which contain a minimal fund.  Though FDI represents investment in production 
facilities, its significance for developing countries is much greater.  FDI is also a means of 
transferring production technology, skills, innovative capacity, and organisational and 
managerial practices between locations as well as accessing international marketing 
networks (Jansen, 2003). 
3.1.2 Government and the Impact of Investment Policy 
Firms’ successes consist of market and non-market components.  The market refers to ‘the 
suppliers, customers, and competitors who give each other conventional economic signals 
through prices, product differentiation, advertising, and other forms of market behaviour 
in the process of generating economic transactions’ (Boddewyn, 1988, p. 342).  Boddewyn 
(1988) used politics as an instrumental element to emphasize particular ways of relating to 
targets located in the non-market environment for firms.  The non-market environment 
refers to any factors that support or do not support the economic transactions through 
power (authority permission) and other positive or negative noneconomic sanctions (e.g., 
the granting or withdrawal of legitimacy, government institutions) (Boddewyn, 1988; 
Williamson, 1975). 
 
Studies of FDI have also addressed political behaviour.  For example, the Eclectic 
Paradigm refers explicitly to government interventions of various kinds into source of 
ownership, location, and internalisation advantages.  Most studies found positive 
relationships between governments and their investment or trade policies (Annett, 2001; 
Binh and Haughton, 2002; Brewer, 1993; Vernon, 2001).  However, Reis (2001) found 
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different opinions of policy relevance and FDI by measuring the welfare effect on FDI.  
Reis argued that producers in the host country will no longer be able to invest in the R&D 
sector after the opening of the economy to FDI, which has a negative effect on national 
income and profits. 
 
Boddewyn (1988) enriched the Eclectic Paradigm by explicitly incorporating political 
elements in the consideration of ownership, internalisation, and location advantages.  The 
author largely focused on government as the target of political behaviour.  The author 
stated that Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm can be readily expanded to include the political 
element in its consideration of firm-specific, location, and internalisation advantages.  
Boddewyn’s results conclude that all advantages are necessary for FDI, “such as market 
imperfections may also be enacted through political behaviour in order to raise the 
transaction costs of competitors and to exploit various rents arising from these 
imperfections” (Boddewyn, 1988, p. 357).  
 
The international theory of FDI includes government policies that create market 
imperfections, which makes FDI an economically reasonable strategic alternative for firms.  
For example, Brewer (1993) examined the effects of government policies on market 
imperfections and FDI.  Brewer suggested that government policies are significant 
determinants of the sizes and growth rates for markets of all goods and services in the 
economy.  Vernon (2001) focused on government regulation and how government can 
reshape the policy in a global economy for the firms.  The area of FDI and government 
policies has become more popular in the later studies.   
 
Haddad and Harrison (1993) explained that the benefits from FDI, such as transferring 
technology to domestic firms, are not equally distributed in developing countries.  
Solicitous policies (income tax holidays and import duty exemptions) should be developed 
to avoid inequality among big and smaller cities, to encourage efficiency of domestic 
firms, to benefit from linkages with and spillovers from foreign firms, and to attract FDI 
around the country.  Other research findings show the dispersal of productivity is less in 
those sectors with more foreign firms and that foreign investors may be attracted to protect 
domestic markets rather than transferring technology to domestic firms (Binh and 
Haughton, 2002).   
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Annett (2001) developed the concept of government budget and policy by adding the 
social fractionalisation of a country’s population (ethno-linguistic and religious dimension) 
to explore the relationship between the political instability and government consumption.  
The author found that higher fractionalisation led to political instability.  Annett showed a 
strong positive relationship between fractionalisation and government consumption.  
Furthermore, the author also showed the effect of fractionalisation on government 
consumption operates through the political instability channel.  
 
In the case of the impact of FDI on home and host countries, Sanna-Randaccio (2002) 
studied the welfare effect when taking into account the FDI effect, not only in product 
market competition, but also its influence on the incentive to innovate and on the firms’ 
overall technological level.  The author showed that, in high technology sectors, a policy of 
attracting FDI may increase welfare in both home and host countries.  Further, the results 
indicated that there is a possibility that FDI will increase the host-country welfare with the 
technology transfer.  Welfare in the host country will benefit more if technological 
spillovers are at national level instead of international level. 
 
FDI does not always increase welfare in the host country, especially if firms have 
monopoly power in the world market.  These firms can increase output from the new 
competition by lowering the price of the exportable, thus reducing the terms of trade and 
lowering welfare in the host country.  Reis (2001) studied the welfare effect of foreign 
investment and found that foreign investors are able to introduce new goods into the 
economy at a lower cost than nationals.  This implies that after the opening of the economy 
to foreign investors, indigenous producers find that it is not profitable to invest in the R&D 
sector.  This has a negative effect on national income and the impact of FDI, which is 
translated into loss of profits.  Furthermore, foreign investment may decrease national 
welfare due to the transfer of profits to the home country, even when the increase in the 
rate of growth has a positive effect on welfare; this occurs only if the increase in 
productivity is great enough to compensate for the loss of profits.  Moreover, Reis 
suggested that the policy relevance of the theoretical results should not focus only on their 
quantitative importance.  
 
Milner et al. (2004) investigated the effects of Japanese firms (home country) and Thailand 
(host country) characteristics on the inter-industry pattern of FDI at the firm level.  The 
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authors found strong evidence to support the fact that Thai government incentives have 
important effects on the cross-industry pattern on FDI, which was similar to results found 
in Jiang’s study (Jiang, 2003).  Jiang studied the forces of FDI in China.  Jiang’s results 
suggested that the relatively stable political conditions in China had a strong positive 
influence on FDI decisions.  Low labour and establishment costs in China as well as 
cultural factors were insignificant in deterring FDI.  Jiang’s study demonstrated that the 
incentives provided by the Chinese government would most likely be treated as additional 
benefits by most international firms, rather than as decisive factors in their FDI decision 
making.  Jiang’s findings supported previous studies by Hartman (1984), Head et al. 
(1999), and Simmons (2003). 
 
The above literature suggests several preliminary conclusions about the role of government 
policies in FDI.  There is recognition that government policies are important determinants 
of FDI.  However, according to Reis’s (2001) suggestion, the quality of residents’ life in 
the host country should be included in future studies because quality is just as important as 
quantity of FDI. 
3.1.3 The Advantages of FDI Theory 
In the early and mid seventies, the respective merits of various streams of economic 
theories (capital, trade, location, and investment) and the beginning of the phenomenon of 
international production occurred in two streams of the theory on international production 
(Calvet, 1981; Hymer, 1972; Kim, 2000; Ragazzi, 1973).  One is a micro-oriented theory, 
which explains why firms choose the location of a particular value-added activity in 
different host countries based on the absolute costs and benefits comparison (Dunning, 
1976).  The other stream is a macro-oriented theory, which explains the firms’ activities 
are best undertaken in different host countries based on the comparative costs and benefits 
(Dunning, 1976).  Casson (1982) argued that the theory of FDI consists of three integrating 
theories: the Theory of International Capital Markets, the Theory of the Firm, and the 
Theory of Trade.  The integration of all three theories provides answers to complicated 
FDI issues.  The Theory of International Capital Markets answers the issues of the origins 
of finance (funding, risk-bearing including ownership and utilisation risks).  The Theory of 
the Firm clarifies the problems in the location of control such as country of 
registration/origin, location of headquarters, cultural affiliation, and source of 
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management.  The Theory of Trade explains the location of production and destination of 
final sales.  
 
The sequence of how domestic firms become multinational firms is illustrated in Figure 3-
1.  A firm facing high demand abroad typically will begin by exporting to a foreign market.  
The firm takes advantage of exporting due to low risk and capital expenditure, minimum 
start-up costs with immediate profits (Shapiro, 2003).  Furthermore, this initial step helps 
the firm to learn about the present and future supply and demand conditions, competition, 
channels of distribution, payment conventions, financial institutions, and financial analysis.  
When the firm succeeds, it will expand the marketing organisation abroad, switching from 
using export agents and other intermediaries to deal directly with foreign agents and 
distributors.  Therefore, the firm can easily sustain market development and adapt its 
products and production to overseas.  After the firm sets up local production facilities, it 
shows a greater commitment to the local market, which brings added sales and provides 
increased assurance of supply stability (Shapiro, 2003).  Rugman (1980) suggested that 
firms producing and marketing abroad will consider the foreign markets by: 1) simply 
wishing to export to foreign markets when there is no barrier to free trade; 2) engaging in 
FDI when the barriers exist; or 3) licensing a foreign producer when foreign markets are 
fully separated.  
 
Figure 3-1: Typical Foreign Expansion Sequence 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Shapiro, 2003, p. 542 
 
The theory of FDI explains and analyses economic production and impact issues in relation 
to FDI activities.  Particularly, the Eclectic Paradigm, the Resource-Based Theory, and the 
Business Network Theory can verify the importance of factors that are relevant in the 
choice of FDI over alternative forms of internationalisation.   
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3.2 Eclectic Paradigm  
 
Dunning’s (1980) Eclectic Paradigm provides an analytical basis for nearly all studies of 
international production and foreign direct investment.  It builds upon the internalisation 
theory by including location-specific factors in various countries that help determine 
foreign investment (Dunning, 1980).  The concept of the Eclectic Paradigm of international 
production was pioneered by Ohlin in 1976: “The intention was to offer a holistic 
framework by which it was possible to identify and evaluate the significance of the factors 
influencing both the initial act of foreign production by enterprises and the growth of such 
production” (Dunning, 1988, p. 1).  Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm (Dunning, 1980) noted 
that a firm’s FDI decision is influenced by three factors: ownership, location, and 
internalisation.  The Eclectic Paradigm of the multinational enterprise builds upon the 
internalisation theory by including the location-specific factors in various countries that 
help determine foreign investment.  This paradigm helps researchers and businesses to 
understand why FDI takes place, how it is strategically used by MNEs (Multinational 
Enterprises) to improve their global competitiveness, how it affects the host country’s 
competitive advantages, how (and why) governments (both host and home countries) 
address it, and how it is used by industries in response to changes in competitive 
conditions.  However, the Eclectic Paradigm has limited power to explain or predict 
particular kinds of international production and, even less, the behaviour of individual 
enterprises (Dunning, 1988, 1998; Dunning and Gray, 2003). 
 
According to the Eclectic Paradigm, a firm’s pattern of international production is 
determined by three configuration sets of advantages perceived by the enterprise as follows 
(Dunning, 1988, 1998; Dunning and Gray, 2003):  
1. Ownership-specific (O) advantages (one nationality or affiliates of the same over 
those of another) and they can refer to the origin of investment.   
2. Location-specific (L) advantages (may favour home or host countries), which can 
refer to the direction of investment.  
3. Internalisation-incentive (I) advantages (e.g., to protect against or exploit market 
failure) and they can refer to the externalisation or reasons for foreign investment.  
The MNE has various choices of entry mode, ranging from the market to the 
hierarchy (Exporting  Capital participation  Joint venture  Mergers & 
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Acquisition  Greenfield  Wholly owned subsidiary) (Brewer, 1993; Dunning, 
1998).  
 
Several studies have employed the Dunning’s paradigm (also called OLI Paradigm) to 
identify the global strategic approaches of firms to other regions.  Dunning’s paradigm 
explains the preferences of firms, identifies the factors that affect FDI netflow, the impact 
of FDI on economic growth and the technological advantages (see Agarwal and 
Ramaswami, 1992; Ismail and Yussof, 2003; Loungani and Razin, 2001; Pak and Park, 
2005).  
 
Hill et al. (1990) studied the factors (such as strategic, environmental, and transaction) that 
influence firms’ choice of entry mode into the foreign market (licensing or franchising, 
entering into a joint venture, and setting up a wholly owned subsidiary) and integrated 
factors within the framework of an Eclectic theory of choice of entry mode.  In the Hill et 
al. (1990) framework, each of the entry modes is consistent with a different level of 
control, resource commitment, and dissemination risk.  It can be explained as follows: 
 
1.  Entry mode and control.  Different entry modes imply a different level of control 
over the foreign operation.  Calvet (1981) and Anderson and Gatignon (1986) 
pointed out that different entry modes imply a different level of control, which is 
lowest in the case of licensing and highest in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary, 
over the foreign operation.  Moreover, Eden and Lenway (2001) summarised the 
forms of foreign investment and control level in the same way.  However, in the case 
of a joint venture, the level of control depends on the ownership split and the number 
of parties involved. 
 
2.  Entry mode and resource commitment.  According to Vernon’s (1966) study, 
resource commitment assets cannot redeploy to alternative uses without cost.  These 
assets can be intangible (e.g., management know-how, technology) or tangible (e.g., 
physical plant, machinery).  The level of resource commitment required for licensing 
is low because the licensee bears most of the costs of opening up and serving the 
foreign market.  For the wholly owned subsidiary, it has to bear all costs, thus the 
level of resource commitment is correspondingly high.  The level of resource 
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commitment for a joint venture will fall between these two extremes, depending on 
the ownership split and resource sharing between venture partners. 
 
3.  Entry mode and dissemination risk.  The dissemination risk refers to the risk that 
firm-specific advantages in know-how will be expropriated by the licensing or joint 
venture partner.  Technological and marketing know-how constitutes the basis of the 
competitive advantage of many firms (Rugman, 1982).  The risk of the dissemination 
of know-how is likely to be lowest in the case of a wholly-owned subsidiary and 
highest in the case of licensing.  
 
Hill et al. (1990) discussed three factors: strategic (extent of national differences, extent of 
scale economies, global concentration), environmental (country risk, location familiarity, 
demand conditions, volatility of competition), and transaction cost consideration (value of 
firm-specific know-how, tacit nature of know-how) with respect to the decision of entry 
mode.  They showed firms pursued a global strategy with a high-control entry mode 
(wholly-owned subsidiaries) preference.  However, when the country risk is high, licensing 
and joint ventures were favoured over wholly-owned subsidiaries.  According to the 
transaction cost logic, if the reduction in transaction costs exceeds the costs of establishing 
and transferring know-how, wholly-owned subsidiaries make more sense.  The authors 
concluded that management decision-makers should consider the relative weight of the 
strategic, environmental, and transaction-specific factors into an eclectic theory to identify, 
select, and influence the mode of entry. 
 
Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) examined the effect of interrelationships among a firm’s 
ownership, location, and internalisation advantages on its choice of entry modes; 
exporting, licensing, joint venture, and sole venture in foreign markets.  The authors’ 
results showed the effects of the interrelationship, which implied that the firms would like 
to establish a market presence in foreign countries through direct investment.  However, 
the firms’ abilities are constrained by their size and multinational experience.  In addition, 
firms used investment modes only in high potential markets. 
 
Eicher and Kang (2005) examined multinationals’ optimal entry mode into foreign markets 
as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs, and transport costs.  The authors 
extended the Mueller (2001) structure to include international trade and transport costs to 
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investigate the dynamics of a three-stage entry mode between a local firm and its 
multinational company (MNC) rival.  The results varied with competition intensity in the 
host country and were not different from previous research.  It showed that low trade 
barriers favoured international trade over other entry options on the part of MNCs.  As 
trade barriers increase, however, the authors found that trade depressed the price levels and 
rendered it less likely that the MNCs could overcome trade barriers.  FDI also existed in 
markets due to the MNCs’ advantage in production cost over the local firm.  High fixed 
investment costs increased the threshold of market size for FDI, which cannot be offset 
unless the trade barriers are sufficiently low to allow for MNCs’ export penetration.  With 
sufficiently high trade barriers, MNC favours acquisitions over trade as long as FDI fixed 
costs are not too large to allow for FDI.  Moreover, large markets give rise to acquisition 
and independent trade barriers, because the monopoly power derived from acquisitions are 
very attractive.  In the case of high competition, FDI becomes the predominant entry mode, 
which allows the MNCs’ to take full benefit of their ownership advantage. 
 
Itaki (1991) critically dealt with the Eclectic theory of the multinational enterprise.  He 
examined the theoretical redundancy of the ownership advantage, the inseparability of the 
ownership advantage from the location advantage, the conceptual ambiguity of the location 
advantage, and possible methodological dangers of the multi-factor analysis under the 
three headings (ownership, location, and internalisation) of the Eclectic theory.  
 
Itaki argued that the ownership advantage consisted of the firm’s internal economies of 
integration, internalized external economies, minimized transaction costs, and market 
power. The author argued that Eclectic theory confused the ownership advantage in 
engineering terms and ownership advantage is influenced by and inseparable from location 
factors. The author suggested that the theory should distinguish between real terms and 
nominal terms.  Dunning (1988) agreed with Itaki’s criticism and accepted it to some 
degree.  Further, Boddewyn (1988) expanded Dunning’s model by explicitly incorporating 
political elements such as ownership, internalisation, and location advantages and 
commented about the possible contents of a broader MNE theory to explain FDI.   
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3.2.1 Applications of Eclectic Paradigm Concept  
Chandprapalert (2000) explored the motives and determinants of the US FDI and 
multinational enterprises’ activity in Thailand.  The author looked at the role of ownership 
advantage, location advantage, and internalisation advantage as defined in the Eclectic 
Paradigm.  Using primary data, the author empirically tested some of the determinants and 
strategic motivations of FDI based on managerial perceptions.  Linear regression was used 
to analyse and test the correlation coefficient.  
 
Chandprapalert’s (2000) study showed strong empirical evidence to support the importance 
of ownership advantage, firm size, and multinational experience.  It showed that larger 
firms have greater ability to absorb losses than smaller firms, and have more financial 
assets to invest overseas and, therefore, are less sensitive to uncertainty effects.  In terms of 
location advantage, the market potential was significant for Thailand and showed a strong 
positive relationship between the market potential factor and US investment in Thailand.  
There is strong empirical evidence in the literature for internalisation (Buckley and Casson, 
1981; Rugman, 1986; Teece, 1981).  However, Chandprapalert’s findings also showed a 
strong negative relationship between investment risks (exchange rate fluctuation, taxes, 
large public deficit, and institutional reform) and US FDI in Thailand.   
 
Galan and Gonzalez-Benito (2001) studied 103 Spanish firms that have conducted FDI.  
The FDI was built on the Eclectic Paradigm (ownership, location, and internalisation 
factors), which affects the internationalisation processes of firms.  The results showed the 
important FDI determinants such as the existence of specific assets of an intangible 
scenario.  It also showed that the transaction costs and other questions related to 
knowledge transfer were relevant in the choice of FDI over alternative forms of 
internationalisation.  
 
Zhang (2001b) estimated a model of FDI determinants with both cross-section and panel 
data using a sample of 29 provinces in China from 1987-1998.  The results showed that 
China’s huge market size, liberalized FDI regime, and improving infrastructure were 
attractive to multinational firms.  The regional distribution of FDI within China was 
influenced largely by FDI incentives and historical-cultural links with foreign investors, 
along with other location factors.  The author used the OLI framework to analyse the 
demand-supply side of foreign firms with certain ownership advantages which open a 
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subsidiary in China with location advantages to respond to expected return.  The ownership 
and internalisation advantages were viewed as the supply-side factors of FDI, and location 
advantages were treated as the demand-side determinants, and the model addressed the 
question why FDI invest in a particular country.  
 
Zhang identified the potential FDI determinants as market size, labour costs, labour quality 
(level of education), agglomeration economies, transportation network, FDI incentives, and 
cultural links to encourage FDI flows, and degree of openness.  The results supported the 
widely held view that FDI might have been encouraged largely by China’s market along 
with the increasingly liberalised FDI regime and FDI incentives.  Moreover, the provinces 
with better conditions in labour quality, manufacturing ability, infrastructures, and cultural 
links with foreign investors seemed to be more attractive to multinational firms.  These 
results are consistent with previous studies (see Brewer, 1993; Buckley and Casson, 1981; 
Rugman, 1986).  
 
Inspired by the ownership advantage in Dunning’s (1980) OLI paradigm, Deichman (2004) 
examined the financial, social, and spatial attributes of origin countries that allowed and 
motivated firms to invest in Poland.  Deichman’s study addressed the following question: 
What origin-specific factors motivate and enable transnational firms to make foreign 
direct investments in Poland?  It drew from Dunning’s seminal theoretical and empirical 
explanation of FDI in the context of the US as well as subsequent works by Grosse and 
Trevino (1996) and Dunning (1998).  The methodology differed from other studies by 
focusing upon a unique set of independent variables in the non-Western context of Poland 
and by defining the dependent variable (numbers of FDI) as the number of investment 
transactions (foreign equity, long-term loans, or re-invested profit amounting to at least 10 
percent of a subsidiary’s value) rather than their value.  The author combined the 
geographic distance with financial, spatial, and social variables in order to understand the 
European Union’s commanding role in Poland’s FDI account. 
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to estimate the model in explaining 
the origins of FDI in Poland by extending the Grosse and Trevino (1996) formula.  The 
results showed that the number of transactions from each country is absolutely related to 
the size of the origin economies, number of Polish in the origin country, followed by EU 
membership.  
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In addition, one of the most significant changes in international business during the past 
three decades is regional economic integration.  It originally developed from traditional 
trade theory, which assumes perfect competition, and concerns the location of production 
(Kim, 2000).  The major goals of economic integration are: to get away from unfairness 
derived from trade and payment restrictions and government interferences; to relieve 
cyclical fluctuations; and to increase national income; and to produce goods more 
efficiently with long-term profitability by undertaking FDI (Balasubramanyam et al., 2002; 
Dunning, 1998; Kim, 2000).  The OLI theory of FDI is concerned with the impact of 
international economic integration on the competitive advantages of firms of different 
nationalities, the locational attractiveness, and the different ways to internalise these 
competitive advantages of firms and locational attractiveness (Dunning, 1998).  As a 
result, the explanation of the impacts of economic integration on FDI is also based on the 
Eclectic Paradigm. 
 
Many initial studies on economic integration and FDI have focused on Europe (Agarwal, 
1997; Brenton et al., 1999; Girma, 2002; Pain and Lansbury, 1997) or North America 
(Buckley et al., 2003; Courchene and Harris, 2000; Garson, 1998).  However, in recent 
years, China and other parts of Asia have become popular in this field (Gao, 2005; Tuan 
and Ng, 2004).  This shift has produced a greater variety of studies.  These studies 
suggested that there is a positive correlation between FDI and economic growth on one 
hand and economic integration on the other. 
 
This research provides an overview of the characteristics and sources of the Eclectic 
Paradigm which has provided an alternative analytic framework for evaluating FDI.  Table 
3-1 provides a summary of the key literature on FDI using the Eclectic Paradigm, which 
appropriates the resources effectively and efficiently in order to increase firms’ 
performance.   
 
For example, the Eclectic Paradigm theory can be explained by reconfiguration through the 
pattern of FDI in Thailand via the comparative advantages of MNCs, the location 
advantages of the country, and how firms organise their cross-border activities.  This 
theory can also explain the changing pattern of FDI and FPI in Thailand.  Moreover, this 
theory can identify which factors are the major determinants that led to an overall 
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convergence in the inflows of FDI and FPI into Thailand during the study period (1980-
2004).   
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3.3 Resource-Based Theory 
 
The resource and capability-based advantages resulting from market segment selection and 
competitive position are complementary to competitive advantages (Barney, 1991).  The 
Resource-Based Theory, as a strategy, is a means for achieving competitive advantage by 
taking into account the positioning of the business, where to compete and how to compete 
(Grant, 1991).  The competitive advantage is the result of a methodical understanding of 
the external and internal forces that strongly affect an organisation (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 
2004).  In a competitive environment, profit is likely to be associated with resource and 
capability-based advantage resulting from market segment selection and competitive 
position.  According to the Resource-Based Theory literature, most studies confirmed that 
firms possess resources that are rare, unique, and limited so as to beat their competitors in 
various performance indicators.  Resources are the basis of firms’ capability including 
financial resource, physical resource, human resource, and organisational resource 
(Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Idris et al., 2003; Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2004).  
 
(1) Financial Resource 
The financial resource is a requirement for firms when entering a strategic factor market 
and implementing a product market strategy (Barney, 2001).  The firm’s financial position 
constitutes either strength or weakness and affects the firm’s ability to build distinctive 
competencies in other areas (Hill and Jones, 1992).  It is very important to internal firms 
for driving abroad investment forward to the host country (Certo and Peter, 1991).  
 
All firms must think carefully about financial strategies, including different sources of 
capital, the capital structure, the cost of capital of the enterprises, and the effect of dividend 
policy (Ansoff, 1984; Bowman and Asch, 1987).  Brown and Gutterman (2003) identified 
the key financial factors as: (1) historical financial statements, which indicate the firm’s 
current position and how the firm has been managed in the past; (2) pro forma financial 
statements, which state the risk of the business and performance; and (3) operating 
budgets, which impact the firm’s operation.    
 
The financial performance is very important for companies’ stakeholders because they 
need assurance that companies can survive.  One feature of the financial performance is the 
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financial ratio to assets which indicates the financial strengths and weaknesses of firms.  A 
widely used term in financial analysis is the return on investment (ROI).  ROI is a return 
on total assets, return on common equity or on book value, and gross profit margin 
(Cooley, 1994).  
  
The successes of firms include not only improving the financial statement but also the 
marketing strategy to measure the firms’ performance.  Finance and marketing must work 
together to devise complete products and services and drive them to commanding positions 
in a defensible market segment (Davidow, 1986; Idris et al., 2003; Marr et al., 2004). 
 
(2) Physical Resource 
Penrose (1959) originally split the firm’s resources into physical and human, and defined 
the physical resource as tangible things such as plant, equipment, land, and natural 
resources.  Williamson (1975) emphasized the importance of physical resource to gain a 
competitive advantage.  Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) stated that the physical resource 
of a firm is characterized by fixed capacity.  The physical resource is able to assess the 
capacity available for diversified expansion of the stock beyond the requirements of the 
current investment firms.  
 
Marr et al. (2004) included all tangible infrastructure assets, such as structural layout and 
information and communication technology, which contains databases, servers, and 
physical networks like intranets into the physical resource. 
 
(3) Human Resource 
Penrose (1959), in his split of the firm’s resources into physical and human, identified 
human resource as a key asset of the firm.  Becker (1976) used the phrase human resource 
to define a core asset of an organisation.  Hall (1992) underlined skills and know-how as 
important and Roos (1998) defined the human resource as knowledge, skills, and 
experience of employees. Human resource, therefore, includes employees’ skills, 
competences, commitment, motivation, and loyalty.  Others (Barney, 2001; Harvey and 
Bowin, 1996; McGoldrick et al., 2002) added the technical expertise and problem-solving 
capability, creativity, education, and attitude into the definition of human resource.  
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Human resources include training, education, judgement, intelligence, relationships, and 
insight of individuals and workers in firms, and these are central to sustaining competitive 
advantages.  Previous studies on human resource and firm performance agreed that this 
resource is able to improve the firms’ efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991; 
Elmawazini et al., 2005; Grant, 1991) and has a direct impact on the firms’ potential 
performance and moderate relationships between strategy and performance.  Furthermore, 
in order to achieve the firms’ objectives of maximising profits, high control level, and low 
cost transactions, firms need to increase employee participation in the work process and 
adopt work-force planning (Hill and Jones, 1992).  
 
(4) Organisational Resource 
Previous researchers (Chaterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Hall, 1992; Idris et al., 2003) stated 
that the organisational resource refers to the intangible resource that is very critical for 
firms in making decisions and policies.  Today’s competitive advantages come from better 
utilisation of the intangible resource such as technology, patents, trade marks, copyrights, 
registered designs, trade secrets and processes, technical employees, and research facilities. 
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) also included brand name and reputation in the 
organisational resource.  
 
Bettis (1981) suggested that firms achieved better performance because they were open to 
the possibility of differentiation and segmentation which are associated with accounting 
determined risk, R&D expenditures, and capital intensity.  Furthermore, the finding 
showed that R&D is the most important determinant in the performance advantage.  
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991), Grindley and Teece (1997), and Hall (1992) supported 
Bettis’s suggestion on how the organisational resource is being handled and how work 
flows through the organisation with modest cost in the effectiveness of original operations.   
 
The Resource-Based Theory has been developed to explain how organisations achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage (Calderia and Ward, 2003).  Accordingly, firms must 
look for unique attributes that may provide superior performance (Barney, 1991; Caldeira 
and Ward, 2003). 
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3.3.1 Applications of Resource-Based Theory  
 
Rugman (1988) studied the structure and performance of 16 resource-based Canadian 
MNEs that engaged in FDI.  It was apparent that substantial environmental limitations 
determined FDI as a foreign entry mode.  These Canadian MNEs demonstrated the success 
of managerial strategies aimed at marketing rather than production.  They built on the 
resource strength and process and distributed products aggressively on a worldwide basis.  
 
Closs and Thompson (1992) added infrastructure management (facilities design, location 
analysis, channel analysis, inventory planning, and information system) into their study as 
part of the physical resource.  The authors suggested the infrastructure manager focus on 
integrating business functions rather than on market or product segment, and on variances 
from targets rather than on absolute cost levels.  
 
Loungani and Razin (2001) suggested in their study that FDI contributes to investment and 
growth in host countries through various channels such as technology transformation, 
human capital development by employee training programmes, and corporate tax revenues.  
The authors suggested that developing countries should focus on improving the investment 
climate in all kinds of capital, both domestic and foreign, to attract FDI. 
 
Schroeder et al. (2002) examined the manufacturing strategy from the perspective of the 
resource-based view (RBV) based on Barney (1991) and Grant’s (1991) findings and 
Rugman (1988) study of the firm, by examining how 164 manufacturing plants (in 
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and the US) developed capabilities and resources in pursuit of 
better performance and competitive advantage.  The RBV implies that such innovations 
can contribute to competitive advantage and cannot be easily duplicated.  
 
Chen and Ku (2002) highlighted the FDI as a strategic move by foreign investors to exploit 
host country resources.  These are not equally available to all firms and hence created a 
competitive advantage for those firms.  The authors, using Taiwanese firms as an example, 
found the resource-based FDI strategy to be most effective among large firms in mature 
industries.  A similar study in the international competitiveness of Korean enterprises by 
Ray et al. (2004) showed that Korea has successfully made the transition from resource-
based industries to high technology industries. 
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In summary, the Resource-Based Theory can be used to explain success in FDI in 
Thailand.  This theory explains how internal contextual factors of a firm (such as human 
and financial resources, intangible resources) can adapt to the external economic 
environment (such as inflation rate and wage rate from investing partners).  Therefore, the 
Resource-Based Theory is used to analyse and understand why and how the attributes of 
these factors caused different levels of FDI success across countries.  The Resource-Based 
Theory can also explain the knowledge and performance indicators in most models (Idris 
et al., 2003).  Table 3-2 shows a summary of key literature on FDI with the Resource-
Based Theory. 
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3.4 Business Network Theory 
 
The Business Network Theory is a set of relationships between firms, including strategic 
alliances, joint ventures, long-term buyer-supplier partnerships, and collaborative 
relationships (Chen and Chang, 2004; Ebers and Jarillo, 1998; Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; 
Jarillo, 1988).  The network theory was started by sociologists who used networks to 
understand norms, exchanges, and power during the 1960s and the 1970s.  Since the 1980s, 
the ‘network’ concept has been more fashionable in social science applied to business.  
 
Gulati (1999) referred to the networks by following the ‘invisible hand’ of Alfred Chandler 
(1977) as a concept akin to the notion of social capital that has been developed for 
understanding individual networks.  Castells (2000) considered the network as a new form 
of paradigm and regarded the network as the fundamental node from which new 
organisations are and will be made.  Mills et al. (2003) stated that networks are the interest 
groups within the company and involve company personnel with suppliers, customers, 
legislative authorities, or advisers.  They also include reputation and brand as part of 
network.   
 
A network can be defined as: “a long-term relationship between organizations as actors 
that share resources to achieve negotiated actions for joint objectives” (Porras et al., 2004, 
p. 354).  Similarly, Backman and Butler (2003) defined the network as a long-term 
purposeful arrangement among distinct but related for-profit organisations that allows 
those firms to gain or sustain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis their competitors outside 
the network.  DeBresson and Amesse (1991) developed the network theory into two 
different levels: (1) international strategic alliances; and (2) regional networks, where the 
regional networks are the main loci of technological and economic externalities that benefit 
FDI.  
 
Business networks with high embeddedness can develop trust (Ebers and Jarillo, 1998; 
Jarillo, 1988; Newell and Swan, 2000) and support a rich exchange of information among 
their members.  Business networks are information repositories.  Members of business 
networks develop appropriate organisational structures and inter-organisational interaction 
routines, improving technology and operation activities.  Facing radical innovation 
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opportunities that arise, business networks need to regroup their members to access new 
knowledge.  Accordingly, a high degree of embeddedness of business networks is related 
to the capacity for incremental innovation, whereas a low degree of embeddedness is 
related to the capacity for radical innovation (Chen and Chang, 2004).  
 
The purpose of networks through FDI is to tap into the resources in a foreign market and to 
serve as a source of sustainable competitive advantage, such as market intelligence, 
technological know-how, management expertise, or simply reputation for being established 
in a prestigious market (Chen and Chen, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000).  This theory enables 
investors to gain economies of scale and scope, to improve the efficiency of operations, to 
reduce the vulnerability to market fluctuations, and to pave the way for further growth in 
the future.  
 
Networks can be created and sustained by the basic condition for efficiency that is the gain 
accrued by being part of the network over the long term.  This can be achieved through the 
realisation of two points: (1) belonging to the network gives superior performance (thus 
there is more pie to share, because the network is effective); and (2) the sharing 
mechanisms are ‘fair’.  Efficiency and effectiveness are the basic conditions of existence of 
networks applying through the firms. 
3.4.1 Applications of Business Network Theory  
Jarillo (1988) employed a simple transaction cost model to determine whether firms should 
produce internally or outsource.  The research findings showed the total cost of 
outsourcing partners is lower than the internal production cost, and firms should not 
internalize the production activities but outsource them through collaboration with 
partners.  Chen and Chang (2004) supported Jarillo’s findings that business networks 
develop social capital and routines to create value and reduce transaction costs.  They are 
very beneficial to firms but cannot reduce competition. 
 
Chen et al. (2004) used Taiwanese manufacturing firms investing abroad to analyse the 
pattern of local linkages as an investment local relationship.  The authors defined a 
network as a set of interconnected business relationships upon which exchanges between 
activities are conducted as: (1) sourcing of components and parts; (2) marketing of final 
products; (3) product design and innovation; (4) hiring of local labour; (5) sourcing of local 
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production capacities; and (6) obtaining financial resources.  The findings showed the local 
linkage intensity of a foreign subsidiary differed by FDI location, entry mode, firm size, 
and the nature of the production network in which an investor is embedded.  More local 
linkages will be pursued by an investor if it is in search of distinctive and unique 
reproducible resources (workers, components and parts, subcontracting, and source of 
R&D).  
 
Girod and Rugman (2005) examined the retail multinational enterprise relationship 
between FDI and business networks.  The authors tried to explain the internalisation of 
three retailers (UK-based multinational retailers – Tesco, the Body Shop, and French-based 
global retailer – Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton) whose geographic scope, sectoral 
conditions and competitive strategies differed substantially.  Their findings supported those 
of Chen et al. (2004) as evidence of strong network relationships can succeed in 
overcoming internal and/or environmental constraints to cross-border resources transfer.  
However, the authors found that the business relationship can be more successful in 
countries where there are barriers to FDI. 
 
The Business Network Theory explains how business firms and organisations in Thailand 
can form alliances, economic integrations and trade agreements to improve production and 
reduction production costs.  For example, Thailand’s natural resources, abundant labour, 
and growing markets in the region present great investment opportunity for foreign 
investors to form alliances.  In addition, Thailand is a member of several economic 
integrations such as APEC and ASEM and this is an added advantage in drawing inflows 
of FDI into Thailand.   
 
Table 3-3 presents a summary of key literature on FDI with the Business Network Theory.  
There are many studies which explore the relationships between FDI firms and Business 
Network Theory.  The results from most of these studies suggest that firms can increase 
their performances with the cost reduction related to the Business Network Theory (see 
Table 3-3). 
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3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter briefly reviews three important FDI theories such as the Eclectic Paradigm, 
the Resource-Based Theory and Business Network Theory.  The chapter begins with an 
overview of the FDI followed by a critique of the role of government, its impact on 
investment policy, and a review of the literature on general theories of FDI.  The 
determinants of FDI and its impact to the host country are also discussed.  FDI can be 
regarded as a firm’s strategy in achieving its goal to gain more profit and/or serve the 
foreign markets.  However, FDI inflows affect the host economy in several ways, with 
both positive and negative impacts to the host and home economy.  
 
In the early stage of FDI, Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm was useful in explaining FDI 
characteristics and the firms’ specific advantages.  Basically, this theory suggests that the 
tendency of a firm to engage in foreign production depends on its OLI configuration in the 
target market.  Even though there are many different modes to enter foreign production for 
a firm, FDI is the main mode to capture a foreign market if the firm has the capacity to 
utilize all OLI advantages.  Dunning (1980) denoted that the firm's FDI decision is 
influenced by three factors: ownership, location, and internalisation.  The paradigm 
explains how FDI affects the distribution of ownership advantages between the firms of 
different origins and the configuration of ownership, location, and internalisation specific 
advantages.  Many researchers use the Eclectic Paradigm concept to determine and explain 
the dynamic effects of firms in terms of marketing and investment in various countries. 
 
The Resource-Based Theory focuses on resources rather than products (Kim, 2000).  
According to the theory, a firm’s capability to handle its competitiveness depends on its 
competence in firm-specific resources and its unique potential in terms of technical know-
how and professional ability.  Most social science, investment, and marketing research use 
this theory to understand the external and internal forces to organisations’ diversification 
strategy.  
 
The Business Network Theory is a field of social science applied to business.  It is a set of 
relationships between firms to support the exchange of information among members.  The 
network develops suitable organisational structures and inter-organisational interaction 
routines, improving technology and operation activities.  
CHAPTER 4 
GRAVITY MODEL AND FDI 
 
The theoretical foundation and empirical relevance of FDI have been discussed in Chapter 
3.  The FDI discussion was based on the conceptual framework of the Eclectic Paradigm 
introduced by Dunning (1980).  The concept of the Eclectic Paradigm can be applied to the 
locational variables in the empirical models in this study to identify potential factors in 
influencing foreign investment decision.  Characteristics such as market size, market 
growth, economic development, agglomeration, labour costs, governmental and integration 
policies discussed in the Eclectic Paradigm are used to analyse FDI determinants.   
 
The Resource-Based Theory provides possible internal factors in home and host countries.  
This theory complements the empirical models in explaining FDI decisions and trends a 
country should pursue.  The theory suggests how Thailand can improve the investment 
climate to attract more FDI and sustain its economy.   
 
Finally, the Business Network Theory is used to explain the collaborative relationships 
between the 21 investing partners and Thailand.  The theory explains why regional 
integrations, such as APEC and ASEM, are included in the empirical models.  The theory 
explains and evaluates the benefits of being a member of the regional integrations.   
 
However, the literature on the incentives for FDI is enormous.  Since FDI is considered as 
a form of international capital movement, a number of theories have been developed to 
explain FDI trends.  At this point, it is possible to answer the questions: ‘why do firms 
locate their operation overseas?’ and ‘what advantages do home and host countries have?’.  
Chapter 3 reviews the literature in the areas of FDI and provides some key concepts from 
the relevant literature in order to frame the determinants of FDI and the main hypotheses 
analysed in Chapter 5.   
 
The empirical models use some of the concepts from the three theories to explain and 
discuss foreign investment flows into Thailand.  This includes investigating the reasons 
why foreign investors favour close-by countries with similar characteristics and familiar 
environments over the gravity factor and institutionally different countries (Guerin, 2006).  
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Besides physical distance, the extended Gravity Model identifies the flows of FDI from the 
21 investing partners to Thailand, which can be explained by supply side of investing 
partners, demand conditions of Thailand, and other economic factors (such as regional 
integration) which can either assist or resist the movements of investment flows.   
 
Recently, the Gravity Model (Buch et al., 2003) has become a popular method to analyse 
the importance of countries’ attractive location factors for FDI.  The Gravity Model has 
performed remarkably well as an empirical framework for explaining investment flows 
(Martinez-Zarzoro and Nowak-Lehmann, 2004) and identifying the common determinants 
of FDI across countries (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Brenton et al., 1999; Wei and Wu, 2001). 
 
The Gravity Model is based on the interactions of various potential sources across border.  
The model has an inverse relationship between origins and destinations.  The model is also 
designed to account for the behaviour of large groups of people, commodities, trade, and 
investment that is appropriate to investigate the determinants of the inflows of FDI and FPI 
into Thailand.  On the other hand, the distance from various origins to destinations is not 
considered in other FDI studies.  Therefore, the Gravity Model is a static formulation 
which is capable of explaining factors that attract inflows of foreign investment into 
Thailand. 
 
The first part of this chapter provides a background to the Gravity Model.  The theoretical 
framework of the Gravity Model in both trade and FDI is discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, 
respectively.  The last section summarises the chapter.  
4.1 Background to the Gravity Model  
 
The Gravity Model is based on an analogy of Newton’s Law of Gravitation and is used to 
predict the movement of information and commodities between different places related to 
the distance between them (Erlander, 1980; Rosenberg, 2004).  According to Cheng and 
Wall (as cited in Cortes-Rodriguez, 2002), the variants of the gravity equation have been 
used in the social sciences since the 1860s, when Carey applied Newtonian physics to 
study human behaviour.  The Gravity Model has become popular and has often been used 
in the field of social science since William J. Reilly set up the Reilly’s Law of Retail 
Gravitation in 1931.   
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Inspired by the formula of gravity, Reilly proposed that a similar formula could be used to 
calculate the point at which customers will be drawn to one or the other of two competing 
centres: 
 
ji
ij
xj pp
d
d
/1+
=   
The formula yields the break point ( )
xjd  between customers who will go to one centre and 
those who will go to the other, located on a line connecting the two centres. The break 
point lies at distance xj from the smaller of the two centres. In the formula, ( )ijd  is the total 
distance between the two centres, pi is the size of the larger centre, and pj is the size of the 
smaller centre (Reilly, 1953).  
 
Reilly’s law calculates the breaking point between two places where customers will be 
drawn to one or the other of two competing commercial centres (Rosenberg, 2004).  
4.2 Trade and the Gravity Model  
4.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
The Gravity Theory has been applied to a wide variety of goods, trades, and services 
moving across regional and national borders (Anderson, 1979; Deardorff, 1995; Pelletiere 
and Reinert, 2004).  Anderson’s (1979) study provided additional theoretical justification 
for the gravity equation applied to commodities’ transfers.  The gravity equation can be 
derived from the properties of expenditure systems.  Anderson presented a theoretical 
foundation for the Gravity Model based on constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)2 
preferences and goods that are differentiated by region of origin.  The author also provided 
a theoretical explanation for the gravity equation applied to commodities that later became 
popular in the studies on trade and FDI.  Furthermore, the author identified some biases in 
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where Xkj (Xjj) is the amount of k’s aggregate good (j’s domestically produced good) demanded by j’s 
consumers, ψj = (µj – 1) / µj where µj is the CES between domestic and importable goods in j (0 ≤ µj ≤ ∞), 
and   θj = (σj – 1) / σj where σj  is the CES among importables in j (0 ≤ σj ≤ ∞) (Anderson, 1979). 
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the estimators used in the model such as tariffs and transport costs.  The gravity equation 
as specified by Anderson is given as follows:  
 
ijkijjijikijk UdNNYYM kkkkk
µεξγβα=          (4.1) 
 
where ijkM is the dollar flow of good or factor k from country or region i to country or 
region j, Yi and Yj  are incomes in i and j, Ni and Nj are population in i and j, and dij is the 
distance between countries (regions) i and j, respectively.  Uijk is a logarithmically 
distributed error term with E(ln Uijk) = 0. 
 
McCallum (1995) used the Gravity Model to explain the effect of a trade bloc on trade 
patterns between Canada and the US.  The estimated equation is given as follows:  
 
xij = a + byi + cyj + ddistij + eDUMMYij + uij      (4.2) 
 
where xij is the logarithm of shipments of goods from region i to region j, yi and yj are the 
logarithms of gross domestic products in regions i and j, respectively, distij is the logarithm 
of the distance from i to j, DUMMYij is a dummy variable equal to 1 for interprovincial 
trade and 0 for province-to-state trade, and uij is an error term.  
 
McCallum used the simplest version of the Gravity Model to answer his propositions and 
suggested that national borders continue to matter.  McCallum conducted a sensitivity test 
that focused on specification issues and econometric questions relating to 
heteroskedasticity and a possible simultaneity problem.  The evidence suggested that 
national borders continue to have a decisive effect on trade patterns.  Yet, to the extent that 
the rising trade share has been driven by reduced tariff protection, the impact of free trade 
will be quite modest.  
 
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) applied their empirical models to solve McCallum’s (1995) 
border puzzle equation by using a method that: (i) consistently and efficiently estimated a 
theoretical gravity equation; and (ii) correctly calculates the comparative static of trade 
frictions.  The implementation of the theory were both in the context of a two 
industrialized country model (US and Canada), and a multi-country model.  Their results 
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showed borders reduced bilateral national trade levels by substantial magnitudes.  
Intuitively, the more a region is resistant to trade with all others, the more a nation is 
forced to trade with a given bilateral partner. 
 
Other studies have used imperfect competition models to identify the FDI-trade 
relationship (see Bergstrand, 1985; Helpman, 1984, 1987; Ratnayake and Townsend, 
1999).  Bergstrand (1985) applied the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility in 
the demand function similar to Anderson (1979) and the constant-elasticity-of-
transformation (CET)3 joint production surface in the supply function to estimate the 
equilibrium4 of the actual trade flow from region i to j.  The author’s equation for trade 
analyses includes the Heckscher-Ohlin Samuelson model of inter-industry trade and formal 
models of intra-industry trade in the bilateral gross aggregate trade flow and is expressed 
as follows: 
( ) ))(1/())(1(1)/()1()/()1()/()1()/()1()/()1( σγγηγσγσγγσσγγσσγγσσγγσγσ ++−−−+++++−++−+++− ∑′××= ikijijijjiij PETCYYPX
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where Ri is the amount available of the single, internationally immobile resource in a given year in i to 
produce the various output, δi = (1 + ηi) / ηi  where ηi  is i’s CET between production for home and foreign 
markets (0 ≤ ηi ≤ ∞) and  Φi = (1 + γi) / γi  where γi  is i’s CET for production among export markets (0 ≤ γi ≤ 
∞) (Anderson, 1979).  
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where PXij is the value of the trade flow from i to j (PXij = PijXij), 
  Y is the income, 
  P is the price, 
  T is the tariff rate, 
  C is the transportation cost, and 
  E is the spot values.  
 
In addition, Bergstrand (1985) presented the reduced form from a partial equilibrium 
subsystem of a general equilibrium model with nationally differentiated product, which is 
given as follows:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ijijijjiij uADYYPX 43210 βββββ=        (4.4) 
 
iY  and  jY  are incomes in country i and country j,  
ijD   is a resistance factor (distance) from economic centre of country i to country j, 
ijA  is an assistance factor such as the grouping effect from economic centre of country i  
to country j, and 
iju   is a log-normally distributed error term with E(lneij) = 0. 
 
Besides Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) who applied the CES into the gravity 
equation, Deardorff (1995) also used the H-O model and CES to form a Gravity Model.  
Deardorff derived the gravity equation from the H-O model with frictionless and impeded 
trade.  This implied Gravity Models can support the H-O model.  The author also used the 
Cobb-Douglas formula (CES) in the standard gravity equation.  The results showed the 
elasticity of trade with respect to the relative distance estimation is: -(σ - 1) (see Equation 
4.3).  Thus, the substitution among goods can decline in trade between distant countries.  
Higher volumes of trade will be greater among close countries (and transactions within 
countries).   
 
Generally, international trade will expand as the transportation costs reduce, whereas trade 
between neighbours via a bilateral contract will improve the transportation technology.  
Deardorff (1995) argued that the gravity equation can be derived from the trade theories 
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but its characters cannot be applied to test any of them.  However, Deardorff’s study was 
not to test the model, but to provide an empirical evidence of the bilateral trade flows with 
the Gravity Model.  
 
The gravity equation can be used to predict trade flow.  Helpman (1984) applied the idea 
that firm-specific assets associated with marketing, management, and product-specific 
R&D can be used to service production plants in countries other than the country in which 
these inputs are employed.  A general equilibrium model of international trade in which the 
location of plants in a differentiated product industry (decided as variable) was developed.  
The model was then used to derive predictions of trade patterns, volumes of trade, the 
share of intra-industry trade, the share of intra-firm trade as a function relative to country 
size, and the differences in relative factor endowments.  
 
Helpman (1987) added another view of influence to trade which led to a re-examination of 
implications in the (commercial) policy.  This generated the current policy debate on 
broader issues of industrial policy. 
 
For example, Ratnayake and Townsend (1999) applied the Gravity Model in analysing the 
geographical pattern of international trade.  The authors used the concept of the Gravity 
Model from Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) to express a function of variables 
representing the supply and demand conditions of exporters and importers and trade 
resisting and promoting factors.  They presented the model as follows: 
 
T = f (D, Y, N, P)           (4.5) 
 
where, T is trade flow, D is distance, Y is the incomes of exporting and importing 
countries, N is the populations of exporting and importing countries, and P is a dummy 
variable representing specific relationships between countries or nations.  
 
Ratnayake and Townsend (1999) applied Equation (4.5) to their empirical model 
representing the specific relationship between New Zealand and other countries.  The 
empirical model was estimated as follows: 
 
Tij = C.Dijβ1.Yiβ2.Yjβ3.Niβ4.Njβ5.APECβ6.SOCβ7.COMβ8.CERβ9   (4.6) 
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where 
 Tij  =  value of exports from country i to country j, 
 C   = a constant, 
 Dij = the distance between country i and country j, 
 Yi.Yj = the incomes (GNP) of the exporter and importer respectively, 
 Ni.Nj = the populations of the exporter and importer respectively, 
APEC, SOC, COM, CER = dummy variables equal to 1 when New Zealand’s  
       trading partner is a member of one of the associations. 
 
Ratnayake and Townsend’s (1999) empirical results presented the conventional gravity 
trade flow variables.  The findings showed that distance and exporter and importer incomes 
were highly significant in all years estimated (1987-1992).  The coefficient for the exporter 
population was also highly significant.  However, the coefficient for the importer 
population was significant in only three out of six years.  The dummy variable is positive 
in all years as expected, but it was significantly different from the relationship among 
group members.  
 
Furthermore, the Gravity Model could estimate the effect of international trade on 
international debt (Rose and Spiegel, 2004).  Rose and Spiegel estimated a wealth of 
potential variables.  Their study showed a significantly positive effect of bilateral trade on 
bilateral lending patterns, i.e., debtors tended to borrow more from creditors with whom 
they shared more international trade ties. 
 
The gravity equation characterises were applied in many trade models including both intra-
industry trade models and standard trade theories (Deardorff, 1995; Kumar and Zajc, 
2003).  The Gravity Model has been used widely since the late 1980s to evaluate the trade 
effects in regions.  It contributed to econometric techniques to test the efficiency of the 
empirical models not only in trade but also in FDI.   
 
Table 4-1 presents a summary of the key trade literature using the Gravity Model as 
discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
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4.3 FDI and the Gravity Model 
4.3.1 Theoretical Framework  
 
In the last five years, the Gravity Model has become very popular in explaining FDI, 
including the flow of FDI (Stone and Jeon, 1999), the effects of distance over FDI (Egger 
and Pfaffermayr, 2004a, 2004b), and the relationship between FDI and trade in a bilateral 
context (Gopinath and Echeverria, 2004).  The Gravity Model can capture the relative 
market sizes of two economies and their distance from each other.  Distance can be viewed 
as a measure of the transaction cost in undertaking foreign activities, for instance, costs of 
transportation and communications, costs of dealing with cultural and language 
differences, costs of sending personnel overseas, and the informational costs of 
institutional and legal factors, for example, property rights, regulations and tax systems 
(Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Deardorff, 1995; Portes and Rey, 2005). 
 
Stone and Jeon (1999) explored how the Gravity Model specification can be used to 
estimate the bilateral flows of FDI.  The log-linear FDI equation which specifies FDI flows 
from home country i to country j can be explained by supply conditions of the home 
country, by demand conditions of host country, and by other economic forces either 
assisting or resisting the flows.  Stone and Jeon used 200 observations of bilateral FDI 
flows each year during 1987-1993 within the Asia-Pacific region where FDI flows have 
grown rapidly in the 1990s.  The authors applied the general form of the gravity equation 
from Anderson (1979), and then specified the gravity-type equation for the FDI study as 
follows: 
 
 FDIij = β0 + β1GDPi + β2Popi + β3GDPj + β4Popj + β5Distanceij + β6Tradeij  
      + β7APEC +β8ASEAN + β9DAE + εij      (4.7) 
 
where FDIij and Tradeij represent total bilateral FDI and trade flows between two 
countries, and subscripts i and j identify the home country and the host country, 
respectively.  GDP is the gross domestic product, Pop is the population, and Distance is 
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the geographical distance between the two countries i and j. APEC, ASEAN, and DAE 
(Dynamic Asian Economies)5 dummy variables are included in the estimation equations.  
 
The study (Stone and Jeon, 1999) showed that FDI flows in the region were driven more 
by market size and income in the home country than factors in the host country.  It was 
also evident that the geographic location factor was not a significant resistance or 
assistance factor for FDI flows. 
 
Brenton et al. (1999) studied the impact of the integration between the EU and the Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in FDI flows by employing the Gravity Model to 
determine three key issues (the level of the long-term FDI in the CEECs, the link of FDI 
and trade (complements or substitutes), and an increase in the attractiveness of CEECs to 
foreign investors which has affected the magnitude of FDI to other European countries).  
The authors used Austria, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Switzerland, UK, US, Japan, and South Korea as the sourcing countries.  The approach of 
Brenton et al. was based on Sapir’s (1997) study which examined whether a domino effect 
has characterised the impact of European integration upon bilateral trade flows.  The 
pooled data including dummy variables in the Brenton et al. study were from 1982-1995 
(with sub-periods: 1982-1986, 1987-1991, and 1992-1995).  The results showed an 
increase of both horizontal and vertical FDI in the CEECs (for product sourcing mainly for 
European, rather than US or Japanese firms).  There was no link between FDI and trade for 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.  For the remaining countries, FDI and 
trade were complementary.  There was no evidence to suggest that FDI in particular 
countries or regions had affected the FDI flows to other countries in Europe.  
 
Buch et al. (2003) used panel data (1980-1999) to examine the patterns of FDI in two 
regions on the periphery of Europe (CEECs) and the countries of Southern Europe.  The 
authors used the Pedroni (1999) suggestion by using the two-stage panel cointegration test 
to determine the long-term FDI as follows: 
 
tittiiit exy ,, +′+= βα    t = 1, 2, …, T, i = 1, …, N   (4.8) 
 
                                                 
5
 DAE group is composed of the nine most dynamic members of the region: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
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where yi,t represents FDI stocks in country i, iα is a constant term, iβ is a long-run 
coefficient, xi,t is a vector of explanatory variables, and ei,t is the error term.  
 
The findings showed that the most important determinant of FDI is the purchasing power 
(market size) of the host country market, rather than low labour costs.  Bilateral trade and 
GDP per capita had positive effects on FDI.  Overall, bilateral trade and GDP per capita 
showed the positive effects of the FDI stocks.  However, the findings gave no clear 
evidence that trade and FDI were complements or substitutes, which is inconsistent with 
the Brenton et al. (1999) study.     
 
The FDI forecasting was investigated with the following equation (Buch et al., 2003): 
 
ln Xij = α  + 1β ln(GDP)j + 2β ln(GDP per capita)j + 3β ln(Distance)ij  
  + 4β (FDI restriction)j  + 5β EU + 6β (Common language)ij   
  + 7β (Common legal system)ij + ijε        (4.9) 
 
where Xij is the logarithm of total FDI stock held in given reporting in country6 i and in 
recipient country7 j, (FDI restriction)j is the index for restrictions and controls of the 
recipient country for FDI, and ijε  is the error term.  
 
The findings in Equation (4.9) showed GDP, GDP per capita, common language, and 
common legal system positively impact FDI stocks.  However, FDI restrictions in the host 
country and further distances between both the countries brought less FDI.  
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the focus of studies on FDI and trade has shifted from 
US and Japan to Europe (after the breakdown of Berlin wall and the USSR).  Kumar and 
Zajc (2003) applied the Gravity Model to panel data (1995-2000) in Slovenia at the macro 
level.  The authors studied three main product manufacturers: intermediate product, 
investment product, and consumer product.  The result supported the findings of Brenton et 
al. (1999) that the relationship between inward FDI and trade (for all three main product 
categories) are complementary.  The authors showed the positive effects for Slovenian 
                                                 
6
 A group of seven reporting countries are: Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK, and US. 
7
 Recipient countries are countries in CEECs and the Southern Europe. 
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firms with foreign capital, bringing capital goods from their source countries to improve 
technological capability and additional positive benefits to Slovenia.  
 
Bevan and Estrin (2004) used panel data and the Gravity Model to address trade flow and 
FDI in Europe.  The data set covered from 1994-2000 with CEECs as the host countries 
and US, Switzerland, EU, Korea, and Japan as the source countries.  Unit labour cost and 
the overseas investment risk were employed to evaluate the costs of the host countries.  In 
addition, the interest rate differential between source and host countries was included.  The 
authors stressed the importance of institutional development and economic and political 
risk reflected in policies towards FDI.   
 
Bevan and Estrin derived the empirical model for gravity and FDI in the following form: 
  
( )tjtijtjtjijtjtitij riskrULCtradedistGDPGDPfFDI ,,,,,,=      (4.10) 
 
where t is year, i is the source country, j is the host country, t jiGDP )(  represents the size of 
the source (host) country, jULC is the unit labour costs in host country, ijr measures the 
interest rate differential between the source and host countries, ijdist represents the distance 
between the source and the host country, jtrade measures the openness of the host 
economy, and jrisk captures a vector of institutional, legal, and political factors in the host 
country.  The results showed the most important influences on FDI were unit labour costs 
(negatively), distance (negatively), and market size (GDP) (positively).   
 
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004a, 2004b) studied the effect of distance on FDI in the OECD 
and non-OECD countries (19 home countries8 and 57 host countries9).  Egger and 
Pfaffermayr (2004a) analysed the effects of distance as a common determinant of exports 
and FDI in a three-factor trade model: physical capital, human capital, and labour 
                                                 
8
 Home regions: Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Republic of 
Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. 
9
 Host regions: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, the Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, UK, US, and Venezuela. 
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endowment; assuming that distance affected both pure trade costs and plant set-up costs.  
They considered the CES utility function and the balance of payments guaranteed that 
goods trade flows were balanced by both trade in invisibles and capital flows across 
borders (FDI).  The results showed the impact of distance depended on the relative 
importance of fixed foreign plant set-up costs compared to trade costs.  Distance had a 
significantly weaker effect on plant set-up costs than on exports.  Exports and FDI were 
not necessarily substitutes with respect to distance since the predicted impact depended on 
its importance for fixed plant set-up costs relative to transportation costs and the relative 
importance of firms.  The results were similar to Bevan and Estrin (2004) findings.  There 
were significant negative interactions between distance and the difference in physical 
capital to labour ratio on outward FDI. 
 
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004b) used OECD panel data on stocks of outward FDI to 
evaluate the impact of bilateral investment treaties.  The authors concentrated on FDI and 
analysed whether bilateral real outward FDI stocks rose as new treaties were signed or 
implemented.  The finding showed a positive significant impact of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) on bilateral FDI stocks.  To check the robustness of findings and to examine 
an endogenous treatment of BITs, the authors added infrastructure variables, corporate tax 
rates, and trading bloc effects to ensure that the estimated BITs coefficients did not include 
effects from other omitted variables.  However, the alternative results did not change the 
estimated BITs but estimated the BITs more robustly.  It implied that bilateral investment 
treaties reduce barriers to FDI.  
 
Gopinath and Echeverria (2004) examined the relationship between FDI and trade in a 
bilateral context using a Gravity Model approach.  The relative demand (import/FDI-
produced goods) was negatively affected by tariffs and transportation cost and positively 
affected by institutional distance.  The results suggest that, as distance between the two 
economies increases, the home country’s bilateral exports (host country’s bilateral imports) 
fall relative to FDI-based production.  Hence, the authors reported geographical distance 
caused countries to switch from nominal trade to FDI, which has not been evidenced in 
previous studies before.   
 
  69 
The Gravity Model has also been used to examine cross border equity flows (Portes and 
Rey, 2005).  Portes and Rey explored eight years of panel data (1989-1996) on bilateral 
cross border equity flows between 14 regions (US, Japan, UK, Germany, France, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Scandinavia, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore).  The authors included variables such as the information flows, transactions 
technology, and time into the empirical model.  
 
The results showed that distance was a significantly negative factor.  Telephone calls and 
financial market sophistication had a positive influence on transaction flows.  The cross 
border equity flows and trading costs relied on market size in the source and destination 
countries.  However, there was weak evidence to support that cross border equity flows 
were purely complementary to trade.  The authors suggested that the model may capture 
some determinants of asset flows but not all. 
 
Table 4-2 presents a summary of the key FDI literature using the Gravity Model.  These 
studies have been discussed in Section 4.3.1. 
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4.4 Summary 
 
The Gravity Model was developed from the Newton’s Law of Gravitation to predict the 
movement of information and commodities between two different places.  The Gravity 
Model can be used in trade and FDI studies.  Earlier researchers used the Gravity Model to 
test the factors of trade between two countries.  It is a model that proved to be applicable 
and empirically successful in explaining bilateral trade flows.  The model appears to be 
proportional to GDPs and negatively linked to geographical distance.  The model was 
applied to various goods and factors (such as income and population) moving over 
regional/national/economic borders.  It described the flow from an origin i to a destination 
j in terms of supply factors in the origin, demand factors in the destination and various 
interesting or retraining factors relating to the specific flow, such as distance (as a proxy 
for trade costs) and trade preferences (Anderson, 1979). 
 
Since the growth of FDI in recent decades shares some features with the evolution of trade, 
having become more intense between countries with similar and relatively high income 
levels, and having grown faster than income, the Gravity Model may also be useful in 
modelling the regional pattern of FDI (Brenton et al., 1999).  More recently, the Gravity 
Model has been one of the most influential methods to analyse countries’ attractiveness as 
a location for FDI using aggregate-level data or identifying the determinants of FDI across 
countries.   
 
Distance, incomes, and population were evaluated using the Gravity Model in many 
empirical studies (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; McCallum, 1995).  However, some 
researchers added significant variables into the empirical model such as the transport costs, 
labour costs, exchange rate, price, regional grouping to test the hypotheses (Buch et al., 
2003; Ratnayake and Townsend, 1999; Stone and Jeon, 1999).  In addition, many potential 
factors (from many of trade and investment theories) were added into the empirical gravity 
patterns.  The Gravity Model can be flexible and further developed to answer the 
researchers’ questions and propositions on trade and FDI studies.  
 
The following chapter discusses the methodology and empirical equations using the 
Gravity Model.  
CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter discusses the variables used in the extended Gravity Model.  This is followed 
by a description of the empirical model and technique used to determine the FDI and 
equity flows to Thailand.  One-way and two-way error component models are also 
discussed in this section.  Section 5.3 discusses the extended Gravity Model in detail and 
the model specification with hypothesised signs.  Section 5.4 discusses the data sources 
used in this research.  The structural break test that was used to test the effects of the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis on FDI and equity flows to Thailand is discussed in Section 5.5.  
Section 5.6 presents the SURE model to examine and analyse the relationship between FDI 
and industrial categories across Thailand.    
5.1 Summary of Variables Used in the Gravity Model 
 
The extended Gravity Model provides a wealth of potential instrumental variables.  It is 
widely used to solve the problems of investment and international trade (Bougheas et al., 
1999; Pelletiere and Reinert, 2004; Ratnayake and Townsend, 1999).  Researchers have 
attempted to investigate whether border effects inhibit foreign investment and international 
trade using the Gravity Model.  Moreover, Markusen and Maskus (2002) argued that the 
Gravity Model can be used to discriminate between alternative trade theories and adjusted 
to a pattern of investment flows.  This study develops a theoretical Gravity Model to 
answer the research objectives, and to test the determinants of FDI and FPI in Thailand.   
 
Empirical studies of bilateral FDI flows using the Gravity Model have been based on the 
proposition that transactions between regions are determined by their national incomes 
(such as GDP, GDP per capita, GNP) and their geographical distance.  Table 5-1 presents a 
summary of the variables generally used in the Gravity Model.  These were discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
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5.2 Empirical Models 
5.2.1 The Determinant of FDI 
Following the three FDI theories: the Eclectic Paradigm, the Resource-Based Theory, and 
the Business Network Theory discussed in Chapter 3 and the Gravity Model discussed in 
Chapter 4, our research model is derived from the Isaac Newton’s modified Law of 
Gravitation (Rosenberg, 2004).  Social scientists have used the gravity equation to predict 
the movement of people, information, commodities, trade, and investment between cities, 
countries, and continents.  The empirical model is developed to investigate the 
determinants of FDI and FPI in Thailand. 
 
The starting point of the Gravity Model formulation is expressed as a function of the 
general specification of the FDI.  The main components of the Gravity Model include 
national incomes and geographical distance, which represent the cost of FDI.  The basic 
form of the Gravity Model is presented as follows: 
Fij  =  A
ij
ji
D
MM
           (5.1) 
where  
 Fij  is the gravity forces 
 Mi and Mj are the national incomes in country i and j, respectively,  
 Dij is the distance between country i, 
 A  is a constant of proportionality. 
 
Population is added to test for the size of market.  The reduced form of the Gravity Model 
is presented as follows (Ratnayake and Townsend, 1999): 
 
F  =  f (D, Y, N, P)          (5.2) 
where:   
F is FDI,  
D is distance,  
Y is incomes of exporting and importing countries, 
N is populations of exporting and importing countries, and 
P is a dummy variable representing specific relationships between exporting and   
   importing countries. 
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Anderson (1979), Bergstand (1989), Evenett and Keller (2002), and Stone and Jeon (1999) 
constructed the Gravity Model using distance, trade barriers, cultural differences, and 
assistance forces such as regional membership, common language, openness, and 
economic similarity.  The Gravity Model has been applied successfully to different types 
of flows such as migration, investment, and international trade.  Anderson (1979) and 
Bergstand (1989) applied the reduced form partial equilibrium model of demand and 
supply into their Gravity Model.  The demand equation is derived from the utility function 
under income restriction and the supply equation is derived from the profit maximisation 
of the exporting countries according to the constant elasticity of transformation.   
 
The general form of the gravity equation proposed by Anderson (1979), and Stone and 
Jeon (1999) is specified as follows: 
 
( ) ijijijijjijiij eADRNNYYQ 7654321 )()()()()()(0 ββββββββ=          (5.3) 
       
where: 
Qij is the bilateral flow of good or investment from country i to country j, 
Yi and Yj are incomes in country i and country j, respectively, 
Ni and Nj are population in country i and country j, respectively, 
ijD  is a resistance factor (distance) from economic centre of country i to country j, 
Rij and Aij are the resistance factors including distance and the assistance factor such  
as regional grouping which provides stimulus to investment, respectively, 
from the economic centre of country i to that of country j, and 
eij is a log-normally distributed error term with E(lneij) = 0. 
 
The role of geography in determining trade pattern has been reviewed by Krugman (1991; 
1995).  Krugman (1991) stated that “economic geography” is the location of production in 
space and economists should be worried about where things happen in relation to one 
another.  The economics of geography and its impact on trade and industrial development 
patterns have been examined in other studies (see Ratnayake and Townsend, 1999; Stone 
and Jeon, 1999).  The rise in regional trade agreements plus the development of specific 
industries in specific locations with historical geographic conditions have been applied to 
either the trade model (Ratnayake and Townsend, 1999) or FDI model (Stone and Jeon, 
1999).  The importance of geographical factors provides further justification for the 
  77 
consideration of a distance or proximity determinant in explaining FDI patterns, including 
regional grouping dummy variables.  Stone and Jeon (1999) applied the regional 
membership of APEC, ASEAN, and DAE (Dynamic Asian Economies) as dummy 
variables in their study to represent specific regional groupings.  
 
Formal theoretical foundations for the gravity equation have been discussed above (see 
Equation 5.3), but per capita income, GDP growth rate, wage rate, and inflation rate have 
largely been ignored.  Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1989) applied microeconomic 
foundations in their Gravity Model including per capita incomes as exogenous variables 
with the assumption of perfect substitutability of products across countries.  
 
Gophinath and Echeverria (2004), Portes and Reys (2005), and Rose and Spiegel (2004) 
used explanatory variables such as GDP, GDP per capita, and market size for both source 
and destination countries in their models to measure the economic masses and to determine 
the effects of the sizes of economies on the dependent variables (equity flow and FDI). 
 
The Eclectic Paradigm is used to explain the FDI characteristics, to determine the dynamic 
effects of MNCs in terms of marketing and investment in a country, and to examine the 
motivations (either efficiency-seeking or market-seeking) of FDI (Dunning et al., 2007).  
Following the Eclectic Paradigm Theory, GDP, GDP Per Capita, and GDP Growth Rate 
are employed in the model (see Equation (5.4)).  The regional integration variables are 
included to examine a competitive advantage by gaining economies of scale and reducing 
investment barriers between member countries.  This perception is derived from the 
Business Network theory (see Chapter 3) and APEC and ASEM are included (Equation 
(5.4)).  The Resource-Based Theory explains the external and internal forces that strongly 
affect the FDI models such as Inflation Rate and Wage Rate variables.  
 
To explain the pattern and effects of inflows of FDI to Thailand, each choice variable is 
considered independently.  Equation (5.4) is derived from Equations (5.2) and (5.3).  The 
reduced form of the related choice variables are given as follows: 
 
FDI = f (GDP, CAP, GDPGR, D, T, X, WGE, INFL, APEC, ASEM)  (5.4) 
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where: 
 FDI10 is foreign direct investment, 
GDP is gross domestic product, 
 CAP is gross domestic product per capita, 
GDPGR is gross domestic product growth rate, 
D is distance,  
T is trade, 
 X is exchange rate,  
 WGE is wage rate,  
 INFL is inflation rate, 
 APEC is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and 
 ASEM is the Asia-Europe Meeting. 
 
The Thai Baht has fluctuated significantly since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  From the 
end of WWII until 1980, the Baht was pegged to the US Dollar at an exchange rate of 20 
Baht per US Dollar.  In 1984, a strengthening of the US economy caused Thailand to 
revise the value of the Thai Baht to 25 Baht per US Dollar.  In July 1997, the Thai 
government floated the Baht.  This made Thailand increasingly vulnerable to market 
liquidity and losing the foreign investors’ confidence in the Thai economy because of the 
volatility of the Thai Baht.  This study examines the FDI model with the exchange rate of 
the investing countries’ currency against Thai Baht.  
 
For estimation purposes, the extended gravity equation for FDI inflows into Thailand 
applied Equation (5.4) in log-linear form expressed as follows: 
 
 
itittittitiit DISGDPGRCAPCAPGDPGDPFDI ln)()ln()ln(ln 4321 ββββα ++×+×+=       
       ititititit APECINFLWGEXTRADE 98765 )()ln(lnln βββββ +++++  
       ititASEM εβ ++ 10            (5.5) 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 FDI (or inward FDI) reflects the interest of a non-resident in a resident entity.  The item shows 
nonresidents’ claims on resident entities and thus is recorded as the country’s external liabilities (BOT, 
2005). 
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where:  
FDIit represents the bilateral flow of FDI inflow from investing partner i to Thailand  
in year t, 
GDPit is the gross domestic product of investing partner i in year t, 
GDPt is the gross domestic product of Thailand in year t, 
CAPit is the gross domestic product per capita of investing partner i in year t, 
CAPt  is the gross domestic product per capita of Thailand in year t, 
GDPGRit is the gross domestic product growth rate of investing partner i in year t, 
DISit  is the geographic distance between investing partner i and Thailand, 
TRADEit is the total amount of imports and exports between investing partner i and  
Thailand in year t, 
Xit  represents the exchange rate (computed by taking the nominal exchange rate 
and multiply by the ratio of Thai Baht/investing partner i’s currency in year t), 
WGEit is the wage rate of investing partner i in year t, 
INFLit is inflation rate of investing partner i in year t, 
APECit and ASEMit are dummy variables (to capture the regional effects) of investing  
partner i and Thailand in year t, and 
itε   is an error term. 
5.2.2 The Determinant of Portfolio Investment 
The extended gravity FDI Equation (5.5) is used to examine the determinant of FDI 
inflows into Thailand.  There are two types of foreign investment, which are FDI and 
portfolio investment (see Chapter 1).  FDI to a project is considered to be a long term 
commitment, but portfolio investment is viewed as a short term action (Ahmad et al., 
2004).  Guerin (2006) examines the determinants of FDI, trade, and portfolio investment 
flows emphasising on the role of geographical distance in 52 countries.  Guerin’s study is a 
direct comparison of the determinants of FDI, trade, and portfolio investment flows.  The 
author concludes that geographical factor (distance) is significant in explaining FDI and 
portfolio investment flows.  In addition, the author’s results indicate that portfolio 
investment flows, compared to FDI, are highly sensitive to changes in GDP per capita and 
distance.  Further, the author suggests that if there is a crisis in the host and home 
economies, portfolio investment flows will be more volatile than FDI flows.   
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The national accounts summarise all economic activities in the country including the 
foreign investment flows.  In addition, GDP and GDP per capita consist of the amounts of 
foreign investments.  Thus, the foreign investments including FDI and portfolio investment 
have significant effects on Thailand’s economy.    
 
To examine the movements of foreign investments, the determinant of portfolio investment 
inflows will cover all types of foreign investment.  Therefore, the Equation (5.6), derived 
from Equation (5.5), is used to examine the inflows of foreign investments to Thailand.  
Equations (5.5) and (5.6) will show the outcomes of foreign investors’ decisions and 
relative volatility of FDI versus portfolio investment in Thailand.  In addition, foreign 
portfolio investors found the exchange rate significantly influenced Thailand’s local stock 
market (see Chapter 2) especially during the financial crisis in 1997 to mid 1998.  
Therefore, the portfolio investment flows in Thailand can be estimated as follows: 
 
itittittitiit DISGDPGRCAPCAPGDPGDPPRT ln)()ln()ln(ln 4321 ββββα ++×+×+=       
       ititititit APECINFLWGEXTRADE 98765 )()ln(lnln βββββ +++++  
       ititASEM εβ ++ 10                (5.6) 
 
where: 
PRT11it is bilateral flow of equity from investing partner i to Thailand in year t, 
GDPit is the gross domestic product of investing partner i in year t, 
GDPt is the gross domestic product of Thailand in year t, 
CAPit is the gross domestic product per capita of investing partner i in year t, 
CAPt  is the gross domestic product per capita of Thailand in year t, 
GDPGRit is the gross domestic product growth rate of investing partner i in year t, 
DISit  is the geographic distance between investing partner i and Thailand, 
TRADEit is the total amount of imports and exports between investing partner i and  
      Thailand in year t, 
Xit  represents the exchange rate (computed by taking the nominal exchange rate 
and multiplying by the ratio of Thai Baht/investing partner i’s currency in year 
t),  
WGEit is the wage rate of investing partner i in year t, 
                                                 
11
 Portfolio investment refers to a “transaction involving buying and selling of equity securities, debt 
securities in the forms of bonds, notes, money market instrument and financial derivatives with the exception 
of securities classified as direct investment and reserves fund” (BOT, 2005) 
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INFLit is inflation rate of investing partner i in year t, 
APECit and ASEMit are dummy variables (to capture the regional effects) of investing  
partner i and Thailand in year t, and 
itε   is an error term. 
 
Equation (5.5) is the extended Gravity Model of FDI inflow to Thailand and Equation (5.6) 
is the extended Gravity Model of portfolio investment in Thailand for both one-way and 
two-way error component models.  Individual effects (α) are included in the regressions to 
test whether they are fixed or random using the Breusch-Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test 
and Hausman specification test (Baltagi, 2005; Bangnai and Manzocchi, 1999; Stock and 
Watson, 2003).  In order to find the best approximation of the extended Gravity Model, the 
Hausman test is used to test whether the random effects model is more efficient than the 
fixed effects model. 
 
This study uses panel data from 1980 to 2004.  Thus, the general structure of the panel data 
model can be written as follows (Baltagi, 2005; Kang, 2003): 
 
ititit XY εβα +′+=           (5.7) 
 
The data set consists of multiple observations.  The subscript t = 1, .., T indicates time 
series observations and the subscript i = 1, ..., N indicates cross-sectional observations 
units such as households, individuals, firms, countries, etc. (Baltagi, 2005).  The term α is 
the intercept coefficient, β is the slope of the coefficients to be estimated, Xit represents the 
explanatory variables, and itε  is an error term, assuming E ( itε ) = 0 and Var ( itε ) = 2εσ .  
The variations across individual countries or the time effect of this structure can be 
analyzed with a simple shift of regression function, including both one-way error 
component and two-way error component models for fixed and random effects models, 
respectively.  Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 discuss the important feature of these two models in 
details with certain assumptions on country and time specific effects in panel data analysis. 
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5.2.3 One-way Error Component Model 
The one-way error component model is one of the most widely used models in panel data 
applications.  By pooling time series and cross-section data containing observations on N 
units of the countries for T years, the regression can be regressed using Equation (5.7).  In 
Equation (5.7), α  is considered as a constant over time, t, and is specific to the country’s 
cross-sectional unit, i, assuming E ( itε ) = 0 and Var ( itε ) = 2εσ . 
 
It is assumed that the difference across countries can be captured in the different constant 
term of each country.  To find the best approximation of the extended Gravity Model, there 
are two techniques to estimate the panel data model based on the assumption made on 
individual effects.  These include fixed and random effects models.  Dascal et al. (2002) 
stated that individual effects are treated as fixed parameters, whereas in the latter, 
individual effects are treated as a sample of random drawings from a population and they 
become part of the model’s term.   
 
In general, most of the empirical applications of panel data have focused on a one-way 
error component model for the disturbances as follows:  
 
itiit vu +=ε            (5.8) 
where:   
ui indicates the country specific effect and 
vit indicates the reminder of the disturbances.  
 
In the fixed effects model, the ui are treated as fixed parameters to be estimated and the 
remainder are disturbances that are stochastic, with vit independent and identically 
distributed IID (0, 2vσ ).  It is also assumed that the Xit are independent from vit for all i and t 
(Dascal et al., 2003). 
5.2.4 Two-way Error Component Model 
The one-way error component model can be extended to a two-way error component 
model by including a time specific effect.  Kang (2003) suggested that by pooling cross-
section and time series data, there is a need to account for variations such as across time, 
across export destinations, and joint disturbance.  Thus, the two-way error component 
disturbances model can be estimated from Equation (5.8) as follows (Baltagi, 2005): 
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  ittiit vu ++= λε            (5.9) 
 
The decomposed error term approach permits the application of the two-way effects model 
with respect to country and time specific effects.  The term ui denotes a country specific 
effect, tλ  denotes a time specific effect, and vit is a remainder stochastic disturbance term.  
An error structure leads to the use of a two-way error component model (Kang, 2003).  In 
the two-way error component model, it is assumed that both the country’s specific errors 
and time errors are normally distributed random effects.  
 
The panel data estimator also permits two-way fixed effects and random effects models 
following similar reasoning to the one-way model.  Therefore, Equation (5.9) can be 
extended to a more sophisticated model by allowing a time specific component in addition 
to a country specific component. 
 
A panel data set offers advantages over cross-section or time series data sets.  The benefits 
of using panel data analysis include: (1) if the number of observations is very large, it gives 
more reliable parameter estimates than the cross-section or time series data sets; and (2) a 
panel data set diminishes the multicollinearity problem and the bias of estimation in 
regression.  Moreover, the use of panel data methodology captures the relevant 
relationships among variables over time and is able to examine possible individual effects 
(Kang, 2003).  In a panel data framework, the model needs to be identified in terms of 
country specific effects for each country and time specific effects for a particular year from 
the estimation.  Therefore, in order to identify factors affecting the FDI inflow and 
portfolio investment in Thailand, it is necessary to specify the extended Gravity Model 
with time specific effects over a time period for both the one-way and two-way effects 
model. 
 
Multiple regression techniques via the LIMDEP and EVIEW can be used to estimate 
Equations (5.5) and (5.6).  Since individual effects ( ijα ) are included in Equations (5.5) 
and (5.6), it is appropriate to choose whether they are to be treated as fixed or as random 
by using the Breusch-Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test and/or Hausman test specification.   
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5.3 Model Specification 
 
According to the literature discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, bilateral FDI and portfolio 
investment models in Thailand are functions of GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, 
Distance, Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, Inflation Rate, and Regional Integration 
(Equation (5.4)).  By rearranging and taking a natural logarithm, Equation (5.4) becomes 
Equation (5.5) for the FDI model and Equation (5.6) for portfolio investment model.  
These variables are factors that influence the level of FDI and portfolio investment in 
Thailand.  This research categorises these factors into seven groups.  They include: market 
size (GDP, GDP Per Capita, and GDP Growth Rate); Geographical Distance; Trade; 
Exchange Rate; Wage Rate; Inflation Rate; and Regional Integrations (ASEM and APEC).  
 
The hypothesised signs of the variable specify the potential role of the Thai economy in 
attracting foreign investors inward in the FDI Equation (5.5) and the portfolio investment 
Equation (5.6).  In this study, the host country is Thailand and 21 major investing partners 
examined including Hong Kong (China and Hong Kong are considered one investing 
partner).  These 21 major partners invested substantially in Thailand (see Chapter 2).  The 
seven groups of variables are discussed below.   
5.3.1 Market Size  
 
The possible correlation between the market size of a host country or region and the 
volume of inward investment is taken into account in most FDI empirical studies 
(Anderson, 1979; Buch et al., 2003; Dunning, 1980; Kim, 2000).  For example, Kim 
(2000) employed GDP as the proxy of market size to represent the location or 
internalisation advantage of the host countries (Japan and the US).  The author found that 
GDP was significant to the determinants of FDI in the host countries.  The market size also 
represents the location specific advantage of the host country.  Moreover, market size and 
the national income level are important to consider for the host country, especially for 
market-seeking FDI (Guerin, 2006; UN, 1998).  The significantly increased coefficient for 
GDP represents the patterns of overall distribution of FDI, which is market-seeking rather 
than resource-seeking. 
 
Market size and its potential are expected to be strongly significant for the inflow of 
foreign investment to Thailand.  Chandprapalert (2000) provided evidence that GNP as 
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proxies for the market size and potential is a big attraction for FDI into Thailand.  In this 
study, the potential role of the market size of Thailand is investigated using three different 
measurements: GDP, GDP Per Capita, and GDP Growth Rate. 
5.3.1.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
According to the extended Gravity Model, GDP is incorporated into the model as an 
explanation of the economic size of countries in many studies (see Martinez-Zarzoso, 
2003; Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann, 2004; Pelletiere and Reinert, 2004).  
Pelletiere and Reinert (2004) found a high level of income in the host country indicates a 
high level of production, which increases the availability of investment.  In contrast, 
Martinez-Zarzoso (2003) and Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2004) discovered a 
high level of income in home countries suggested a higher amount of source of funds to 
invest overseas.  
GDP, GDP per capita, or the GDP growth rate is the national income indicator of the size 
of economies, which is related to total of production, consumption, and distribution of 
goods and services of a country, as identified by Gopinath and Echeverria (2004).  GDP is 
included in Equations (5.5), (5.6), (5.7), and (5.8) as a proxy to scale bilateral 
FDI/portfolio stocks and the level of integration between Thailand and investing partners.  
GDP represents total income in investing partners and Thailand.  GDP also measures the 
level of the country’s economic development and domestic market opportunities for 
investors.  Moreover, Thailand’s GDP levels reflect the purchasing power and its market 
capability.  In the long term, a strong and stable GDP will secure FDI and attract new 
investors to Thailand. 
 
This research hypothesised a positive relationship between FDI flows and national incomes 
of Thailand as well as the investing partners.  The relationship between investing partners’ 
GDPs and Thailand’s GDP captures the levels of market potential from large markets to 
Thailand.  Therefore, the expected sign of GDP of investing partners and Thailand is 
positive.  Consequently, it is expected to have a positive impact on the FDI inflows and 
portfolio investment into Thailand.  Moreover, the GDP affects FDI positively if trade and 
FDI are complementary.  The theoretical literature suggests that both FDI and trade can be 
complementary or supplementary to each other depending on the nature of investment and 
Thailand’s characteristics.  This study includes the level of economic activity such as GDP, 
GDP Per Capita, and GDP Growth Rate into the models.  Therefore, a positive relationship 
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is expected, the larger the economic size of Thailand, the more likely that Thailand 
receives foreign investment.  
5.3.1.2 Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDP Per Capita) 
The GDP per capita income is defined as a proxy for the country K/L (capital/labour) ratio.  
Many studies ignored per capita incomes, but Bergstrand (1989) argued the per capita 
income is appropriate with the Gravity Model.  Bergstrand applied GDP per capita as a 
proxy of the country’s capital-labour endowment ratio and suggested that if GDP per 
capita is significant and negative, it could imply the country has labour intensive 
production.  In terms of consumption, Bergstrand also concluded that if GDP per capita is 
significant and positive, a country has luxurious consumption. 
 
The expected sign of GDP per capita may be positive or negative depending on the 
strategic factors driving FDI (a capital or labour intensive industry).  According to Buch et 
al. (2003) and Limao and Venables (2001), if FDI attracts the Thai domestic service 
market, GDP per capita should be positive since it would signal a higher purchasing power 
in Thailand.  On the other hand, if FDI is encouraged to produce and to export to other 
countries, GDP per capita should have a negative sign since it implies relatively low labour 
costs in Thailand.  Hence, GDP per capita may increase trade relative to FDI-based 
production.   
 
It is possible to aggregate the GDP Per Capita in this study.  Note GDP Per Capita is 
included in equations (5.5), (5.6), (5.10), and (5.11) because the GDP Per Capita is a 
positive measurement, implying that larger values indicate greater quality and relationship 
between the 21 investing partners and Thailand.  GDP Per Capita has also been very 
commonly employed in the Gravity Model (see Dascal et al., 2002) and it takes into 
account the idea that as income increases, the effect of foreign investment in Thailand may 
increase.  In Thailand, GDP per capita has an impact on the volume of bilateral FDI and 
the portfolio investment.  Thus, the expected sign of GDP per capita coefficient can be 
positive or negative depending on the Thai government’s strategy on investment policy.    
5.3.1.3 Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate 
The GDP Growth Rate specified in Equations (5.5) and (5.6) is defined as a return of 
investing partners’ equity markets or the rate of return to FDI.  The GDP growth rate can 
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be characterised as FDI-led and it is often used as proxies for the size and growth of 
market demand and supply.   
 
A selection algorithm to reduce multicollinearity, the possible problems of endogenous and 
multicollinearity of GDP growth rate and FDI/Portfolio models are carefully dealt with in 
using panel data.  These equations identify the GDP Growth Rate in investing partners 
which affects the investment in Thailand.  FDI/portfolio investment will be moved to 
Thailand with a stable and high level of GDP growth rate from the investing partners to 
Thailand.  Thus, the expected sign for GDP Growth Rate should be positive.  
5.3.2 Geographical Distance 
According to Bergstrand (1985, 1989) and Portes and Rey (2005), experiments verified 
that distances between capital cities and financial centres showed similar results.  
Therefore, the geographical Distance in this study represents the navigable distance 
between the capital of Thailand, Bangkok, and the capital cities of investing partners.  
Distance serves as a proxy for all possible transportation, public infrastructure, and 
operating costs such as placing personnel abroad, costs of local tax laws and regulations, 
language and cultural differences, communication costs, and costs of being outside 
domestic networks (see Bougheas et al., 1999; Brenton et al., 1999; Limao and Venable, 
2001).  Bougheas et al. (1999) stated that distance inhibited transaction flow by increased 
transportation and other transactions costs.  Therefore, distance can have direct and indirect 
effects on the investment climate between Thailand and investing partners.  Distance can 
potentially act as a barrier to interaction among economic institutions via tax laws and 
regulations.  Moreover, distance also affects the investment equations since the costs of 
operating overseas are likely to rise the further from the main headquarters or their home 
countries (Brenton et al., 1999).  Portes and Rey (2005) suggested that distance is the most 
important determinant of transaction flows in foreign investment.  Guerin (2006) presented 
distance as a proxy for information costs, rather than transport costs, in the FDI and equity 
flows.  The cost of information gathering would likely increase with distance, as 
familiarity with the host country’s investment opportunities, customs, and culture 
decreases. 
 
In the Gravity Model, geographical Distance is generally included as an explanatory 
variable (Portes and Rey, 2005; Stone and Jeon, 1999).  Geographical distance may cause 
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countries to change from exports (trade) to invest overseas in order to reduce transportation 
and production costs (Gopinath and Echeverria, 2004).  This implies investing partners 
may be encouraged to invest directly in Thailand for the purpose of reducing transportation 
costs, information costs or to serve the customers better.  Thus countries with large 
domestic markets, or close to larger markets, may be more attractive to investors than 
smaller or more remote markets.  Furthermore, the more open a country with advances in 
transportation densities and short distances from markets can attract investors even if it is 
surrounded by smaller markets.  Further, investments in infrastructure can reduce gaps 
between the capital cities, financial centres, and small towns in the countryside (IMF, 
2004). 
 
Therefore, the Distance coefficient in Equations (5.5) and (5.6) is expected to be negative 
since it is a proxy of all possible investment barriers which inhibit foreign investment by 
distance.  It implies that increases in these investment costs will have a negative effect on 
FDI/portfolio investment flows into Thailand.   
5.3.3 Trade 
Equations (5.5) and (5.6) include bilateral Trade as an independent variable to examine 
whether trade complements FDI activity (when the coefficient of Trade is significantly 
positive) or supplements FDI activity (when the coefficient of Trade is significantly 
negative) following the Stone and Jeon (1999) approach.  Trade is designed to indicate the 
openness of the Thai economy which is similar to Bevan and Estrin (2004) and Ismail and 
Yussof’s (2003) study.  Consequently, the higher the level of openness of the Thai 
economy, the easier it is for investors to invest in and trade with Thailand. 
 
It is more appropriate to refer to the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI, since 
it can explain more about the complementary or supplementary relationship between FDI 
and trade for investing partners and Thailand.  If the main motivation of foreign investors 
is to produce for the Thai market or to export to other countries in the same region, that 
would be horizontal FDI, otherwise it would be vertical FDI. 
 
Trade has lower risk but higher liquidity problems compared with FDI, but Guerin (2006) 
argued that the developed countries (such as US, Japan, and UK which are the major FDI 
in Thailand) may prefer FDI to trade when access to larger markets is the key motivation.  
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Trade is highly sensitive to changes in market size in Thailand.  For example, if there is a 
negative output shock, trade flows will be more impulsive than FDI.  Furthermore, distance 
can reduce the trade flow but increase the investment because the investing country would 
like to reduce transport costs by investing in manufacturing in Thailand (see Bergstrand, 
1985). 
 
The openness of the Thai economy is expected to attract FDI inflows.  Hence, the Trade 
coefficients in Equations (5.5) and (5.6) are expected to be positive.  In this study, Trade 
refers to total imports and exports from Thailand to an investing partner i in year t.  
However, Thailand may prefer FDI to trade because FDI would improve Thailand’s 
development interests such as technology development, the level of infrastructure, as well 
as the level of openness of the economy. 
5.3.4 Exchange Rate 
Exchange rate is included in Equations (5.5) and (5.6) as one of the most essential 
components affecting FDI.  Exchange rate volatility may affect direct investment and 
portfolio investment negatively.  A volatile exchange rate might reduce investment.  It was 
first introduced in the Gravity Model by Berstrand (1985; 1989).  Exchange rate 
movements are relevant and significant to FDI in spite of exchange rate volatility because 
exchange rate volatility directly contributes to uncertainty on the returning transaction plan 
from the investing countries (see Guerin, 2006; Hubert and Pain, 2002; Rose, 2000).   
 
The exchange rate affects the relative currency prices of closely matched manufactured 
goods produced in different countries.  In terms of trade, an increase in the value of an 
importing country’s currency implies a depreciation of the Thai Baht and is expected to 
have a positive impact on exporting products that are produced in Thailand.  A higher 
value investing partner currency enables investors to invest in the Thai economy more 
inexpensively, thus the amount of FDI will rise.  A higher value currency from an 
investing partner also makes exporting products more expensive to Thai purchasers, so 
again FDI in Thailand would be stimulated to overcome this cost disadvantage (Grosse and 
Trevino, 1996; Isard, 1977).   
 
The Bank of Thailand (BOT) controls the current foreign exchange in maintaining 
exchange rate stability (Julian, 2001).  During the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the Thai 
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government floated the Thai Baht, triggering a collapse of the financial sector resulting in 
economic recession.  The value of the Thai Baht fell from 25 to the US Dollar to 40 in 
2004 (BOT, 2004).  The Thai Baht was attacked by foreign speculators and the Thai 
government failed to defend its currency.  Moreover, the finance and real estate categories 
were weak before the crisis.  The value of Thai Baht dropped rapidly to the lowest point of 
56 Baht per US Dollar in January 1998.  By the fourth quarter of 2004, the Thai Baht 
almost reached its previous high of 40 Baht per US Dollar.  The coefficient of Exchange 
Rate is expected to be positive because most investors take advantage of the depreciation 
of the Thai Baht (Equations (5.5) and (5.6)) to reduce their costs of investment (see Bajo-
Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; Blonigen, 1997; Froot and Stein, 1991).  
5.3.5 Wage Rate 
According to neo-classical theories, wage rate is considered in the cost minimisation 
strategies of firms.  Wage rate differentials were considered as an important determinant of 
FDI (see Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Ismail and Yussof, 2003; Milner et al., 2004).  Dunning 
(1980) argued that real wage cost is more likely to influence the model of servicing in 
developing country markets than in developed country markets.  Bevan and Estrin’s (2004) 
study used labour cost in the host country to evaluate alternative locations based on a real 
cost to ensure that a lower wage was not compensated by reduced labour productivity or by 
an overvalued currency.  Their findings showed labour costs are negative and significant to 
FDI, which supports their hypothesis that foreign investors are cost sensitive.  In contrast, 
Milner et al. (2004) used the labour cost from the home country (Japan) to consider 
shifting investment to Thailand.  The results indicated that labour cost affects the 
magnitude of FDI and the greater the labour intensity in Japan, the greater the amount of 
the corresponding (magnitude of) FDI in Thailand.  
 
Roberto (2004) argued that when foreign investors decide to build new production 
facilities overseas, they are strongly influenced by location decision of previous ‘foreign’ 
investors and the labour costs and availability of labour. 
 
Wage rate is included in Equations (5.5) and (5.6) to capture the intensity and costs of 
labour in production of the investing partners.  Evaluating the relative impact on the 
investing partners, the low wage of local labour decreases the expansion of overseas 
investment.  The higher level of wage rate in their countries stimulates FDI outflows to 
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substitute for lower labour cost of production.  Thus, the coefficients of Wage Rate are 
expected to be positive because investors evaluate alternative production locations in 
Thailand to ensure that there will be a lower wage rate than in their countries.  
5.3.6 Inflation Rate 
Inflation rate is considered a proxy for the quality of macroeconomic management.  The 
inflation rate is measured by the changes in the consumer price index which is a weighted 
average of price of goods and services consumed.  A high inflation rate indicates high 
economic tension in a country, and reflects the inability or unwillingness of the 
government to conduct a stable economic policy.  It can be argued that if foreign investors 
are risk-averse (or even risk-neutral), a higher inflation rate may lead to a reduction in FDI 
in the host country, because investors will not risk profits expected from investment.  As 
long as there is uncertainty, foreign investors will demand a high price to cover their 
exposure to inflation risks, and this, in turn, will decrease the volume of investment.  Thus, 
to encourage investment, the stability of the inflation rate is important.   
 
Inflation Rate, as measured by consumer price indexes from the investing partners, is 
included in Equations (5.5) and (5.6).  Foreign investors who transfer profits to their 
countries would benefit if the inflation rate in their countries is high since the currency 
would have more value when converted to domestic currencies.  In this case, foreign 
investors’ profits are higher as a result of the appreciated exchange rates.   
 
Thus, the expected sign for Inflation Rate of the investing partners will be positive which 
implies an increase of the average price level and the purchasing power in investing 
country’s economies.   
5.3.7 Regional Integrations  
Regional integrations are political or semi-economic in nature and governments which 
pursue integration hope to decrease barriers among members and political uncertainty.  
Regional integrations evaluate the effect of preferential investment agreements among 
member nations and indicate the consolidation and effectiveness among the group 
members.  The FDI policies, as well as their perceived feedback, influence attitudes toward 
negotiating a multilateral framework for investment.  Head et al. (1999) demonstrated that 
countries which offered industrial estates, job-creation subsidies, and low taxes received 
significantly higher foreign investment.  
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The coefficients for all regional integrations are expected to be positive, since they affect 
the FDI inflow and the operation of the capital market in Thailand.  This could imply that 
APEC and ASEM stimulated the FDI between Thailand and these member countries.   
 
APEC and ASEM are included in the models to represent the close relationship between 
investing partners and Thailand.  These regional integrations measure Thai security 
interests from investing partners and the degree of political alliance or friendliness between 
the parties involved.  Consequently, investing partners might want to join a regional 
integration association such as ASEM and APEC to take higher benefits.  By joining 
APEC and ASEM, investing partners have better opportunities to establish contacts with 
Thai businesses and further increase their investment relationship with Thailand.  Thailand 
is considered as the gateway to other neighbouring countries’ markets as the hub of the 
“golden pentagon” comprising Myanmar and Indo-China, which has a potential market 
size of more than 145 million consumers.  Many foreign countries may decide to locate 
their manufacturers in Thailand to take advantage of this market (UNCTAD, 2004).  The 
market potential is significant for economic integration which has a direct effect on 
internationalisation by reducing transaction and information costs (see Chandprapalert, 
2000; Guerin, 2006; Martinez-Zarzoso, 2003).   
 
Equations (5.5) and (5.6) suggest that bilateral FDI and portfolio investment depend on 
each country’s market size, Distance, Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, Inflation Rate, 
and Regional Integrations.  Table 5-2 summarises the expected signs of the parameter 
estimates on the explanatory variables used in modelling the Gravity model equations.  A 
positive sign (+) indicates an anticipated positive effect on FDI/portfolio investment.  A 
negative sign (-) indicates an anticipated negative effect on FDI/portfolio investment. 
 
Table 5-2 shows the hypothesised signs of the variable on FDI models and portfolio 
investment models.  For example, Trade is hypothesised to be positively related to the FDI 
and portfolio investment.  
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Table 5-2: Variables Descriptions and Expected Signs 
 
Variable 
 
Description Expected  
Sign 
GDP Gross domestic product in investing partner i and 
Thailand 
+, + 
GDP Per Capita Gross domestic product per capita in investing partner i 
and Thailand 
+/-, +/- 
GDP Growth Rate Gross domestic product growth rate in investing partner i  +, + 
Distance The geographical distance between the capital cities of 
investing partner i and Bangkok, Thailand 
-, - 
 
Trade Total imports and exports between Thailand and 
investing partner i  
+, + 
Exchange Rate Value of bilateral exchange rate Thai Baht per 1 
investing partner i’s currency  
+, + 
Wage Rate A basic wage per hour in US Dollar of investing partner 
i  
+, + 
Inflation Rate Percentage at the consumer price in investing partner i +, + 
Regional 
Integration 
Value equal to “1” if investing partner i and j are 
members of each specific regional grouping such as 
ASEM, APEC in year t, and “0” otherwise 
+, + 
 
5.4 Data Source 
 
This study examines a number of countries involved in FDI activity in Thailand.  The data 
set is limited by the amount of information available for each country involved.  Equations 
(5.5) and (5.6) cover the period from 1980 to 2004.  The data are obtained from the “UN’s 
World Investment Directory”, “OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook”, 
and “Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook”, the World Resources Institute.  Other 
data sources from Thai organizations include the Board of Investment (BOI), National 
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), and Bank of Thailand (BOT).  
Additional data are collected from the “IMF’s International Financial Statistics or IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook”.  Distances between cities are obtained from the 
website (www.indo.com/distance).  Investing partners with more than 90% of total FDI 
inflows and portfolio investment to Thailand (Table 2-4, and Appendix A) are chosen.  The 
data set consisted of 35 countries including India, New Zealand, Spain, Portugal, Brunei 
Darussaram, Taiwan, Ireland, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam.  However, many 
countries have missing data on many variables due to the low quality of the database 
system, political policy, and low degree of openness.  These countries are excluded in the 
empirical analysis because their total FDI inflows into Thailand are less than 5% (see 
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Table 2-4).  The summary of data sources and descriptive statistics for the variables are 
presented in Appendix B. 
 
Finally, the empirical analysis is divided into 21 groups of investing partners (22 
economies) following the BOI criteria: Japan, US, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, 
Finland, France, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, China and Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland.  The 
FDI manufacturing is separated into nine categories following the BOI and BOT 
framework: (1) agricultural products; (2) mining and quarrying; (3) industry; (4) financial 
institutions; (5) trade; (6) services; (7) investment; (8) real estate; and (9) others (BOI, 
2005; BOT, 2004). 
5.5 The Effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on FDI and Equity 
Flows to Thailand  
 
Before 1997, relatively low yields in industrial countries, and impressive economic growth 
and attractive returns in developing countries have motivated investors from industrial 
countries to invest their funds in the East.  Thailand was one of the countries which 
benefited from this growth.  For example, Thailand received capital inflows from Japan in 
the form of FDI and exports, as a result of Yen appreciation (Siamwalla et al., 1999; 
Tiwari et al., 2003).  The Thai government decided to remove its exchange controls in 
1991 to liberalise financial institutions, but left the fixed exchange rate unchanged.  
Consequently, Thailand’s net capital inflow doubled from US$ 6 billion in 1990 to US$ 11 
billion in 1996 (see Table 2-2).  There was a big increase in portfolio inflows from US$ 2.7 
billion per annum in 1990-1992 to US$ 7 billion per annum in 1993-1996.  The influx led 
to the booming of the stock market index, P/E ratio, and market capitalisation that strongly 
attracts foreign investors, especially in 1995.  From 1990 to 1996, Thailand experienced 
sustainable economic growth with an annual average growth rate of 8% per annum (see 
Table 2-1). 
 
However, the market began to question Thailand’s microeconomic and macroeconomic 
stability and the capability of the government to sustain the stability of financial system.  
This led to both creditors and investors rapidly withdrawing their funds, which coincided 
with debt repayments.  The resulting capital outflows forced the Thai government to float 
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the Baht exchange rate in July 1997, sparking a series of financial crises in East Asia and 
other regions.  
 
Thailand floated the Baht on 2 July 1997.  Thailand was essentially bankrupt and the Bank 
of Thailand made huge numbers of forward commitments to sell foreign currency in order 
to defend the Baht against speculators (Sussangkarn, 1999).  Consequently, net 
international reserves fell to US$ 27 billion by the end of 1997 (see Table 2-1).  
 
After the float, net capital outflows peaked in the third quarter of 1997 and the Baht kept 
depreciating.  The exchange rate stayed above 40 Baht per US Dollar throughout the fourth 
quarter of 2004.  The effects of the financial crisis on Thailand’s economy were severe.  
The GDP growth rate of Thailand declined from 7.7% in 1996 to -2.68% in 1998 (NESDB, 
2004).  Interest rates during the crisis in Thailand increased from 13% to 15% and the 
currency depreciated against the US Dollar to 56 Baht per US Dollar in January 1998.  In 
addition, the ordinaries index of SET (Stock Exchange of Thailand) fell by over 75% 
(SET, 2004).  Furthermore, the social impacts of the crisis were quite severe in Thailand.  
For example, the level of poverty increased during this period due to inflation (up to 8%), 
and the number of unemployed in February 1998 was 1.1 million more than in 1997 (0.94 
million).  The number of underemployed (who work less than 20 hours a week) was 0.8 
million, out of a total labour force of 30 million (Siamwalla et al., 1999).   
 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis caused structural changes in the determinants of FDI and 
portfolio investment in Thai economy.  To test the changes from the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, this study defines two different time periods: first is the pre-crisis period and second 
is the post-crisis period.  
 
To study the effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on the FDI and portfolio investment 
in Thailand (integrating the pre- and post-crises), it is important to test the linear 
relationships to find whether the coefficients changed over the sample period 1980 to 2004 
(Greene, 2003).  Equations (5.5) and (5.6) will be used to test for the structural changes 
using dummy variables suggested by Perron (1989).  
 
Let τ denote the hypothesized break year and let Dt(τ) be a binary variable that equals zero 
before the break year t and after, so Dt(τ) = 0 if  t (year) ≤ τ and Dt(τ) = 1 if t > τ.  From 
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Equation (5.5), the regression model including the binary break indicator and all 
interaction term, is given as follows: 
 
itittittitiit DISGDPGRCAPCAPGDPGDPFDI ln)()ln()ln(ln 4321 ββββα ++×+×+=       
       ititititit APECINFLWGEXTRADE 98765 )()ln(lnln βββββ +++++  
       ittit DASEM ετββ +++ )(1110          (5.10) 
 
The portfolio flows can be expressed as follows: 
 
itittittitiit DISGDPGRCAPCAPGDPGDPPRT ln)()ln()ln(ln 4321 ββββα ++×+×+=       
       ititititit APECINFLWGEXTRADE 98765 )()ln(lnln βββββ +++++  
       ittit DASEM ετββ +++ )(1110              (5.11) 
 
where:  
FDIit  represents the bilateral flow of FDI inflow from investing partner i to Thailand 
in year t, 
PRTit is bilateral flow of equity from investing partner i to Thailand in year t, 
GDPit is the gross domestic product of investing partner i in year t, 
GDPt is the gross domestic product of Thailand in year t, 
CAPit is the gross domestic product per capita of investing partner i in year t, 
CAPt is the gross domestic product per capita of Thailand in year t, 
GDPGRit is the gross domestic product growth rate of investing partner i in year t, 
DISit  is the geographic distance between investing partner i and Thailand in year t, 
TRADEit is the total amount of imports and exports between investing partner i and  
Thailand in year t, 
Xit  represents the exchange rate (computed by taking the nominal exchange rate 
and multiplying by the ratio of Thai Baht/investing partner i’s currency in year 
t), 
WGEit is the wage rate of investing partner i in year t, 
INFLit is inflation rate of investing partner i in year t, 
APECit and ASEMit are dummy variables (to capture the regional effects) of investing  
partner i and Thailand in year t, and 
itε   is an error term. 
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If there is no break in equations (5.10) and (5.11), then 11β  is insignificant.  
5.6 The Relationship between FDI and Industrial Categories across 
Thailand 
 
This study also investigates the relationship between FDI and industrial categories across 
Thailand during the period 1980-2004.  There are nine industrial categories following the 
BOI and BOT framework: agricultural products, mining and quarrying, industry, financial 
institutions, trade, services, investment, real estate, and others (BOI, 2005; BOT, 2004).  
Using the country-level data available in the inflows of FDI, the regressions are estimated 
for all nine industrial categories to determine the influences of FDI in the industrial 
categories in Thailand. 
 
To estimate the relationship between FDI inflows and the nine industrial categories 
(industry, financial institutions, trade, mining and quarrying, agricultural products, 
services, investment, real estate, and others), the seemingly unrelated regression estimation 
(SURE) was employed.  Zellner (1962) stated that the SURE model can be applied to 
analyse data when regressions for several commodities are to be estimated.  SURE is a 
technique for analysing a system of multiple equations with cross-equation parameter 
restrictions and correlated error terms (Greene, 2003).  SURE may contain multiple 
equations which are independent with different independent variables.  SURE allows 
correlated errors between equations.  SURE developed prior information on the 
disturbance variances that reduce the number of parameters in the disturbance covariance 
matrix.   
 
To estimate SURE (Greene, 2003; Kontoghiorghes, 2000; Zellner, 1962):  
 
yi = Xiβi + ui, i = 1, …., G        (5.12) 
where: 
 yi is the response vectors,  
 Xi is the exogenous matrix with full column ranks, 
 βi is the coefficients, 
 ui is the disturbance term, with E(µi,) = 0 and E(µi µjT) = σijIT(i, j = 1, ….., G), and 
G is the number of equations. 
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Assume each equation has k observations.  Then the reduced form of the SURE model 
computing the GLS estimation for βi can be written as follows: 
 
( ) iiiii YVXXVX 111ˆ −−− ′′=β          (5.13) 
where: 
EC(Y) = ( )
1 i
G
i
X
=
⊕ VEC({ } )() UVECGi +β        (5.14) 
where: 
 
Y  = (y1….yG) and U = (u1…uG).  Let ∑ be a G×G matrix iGi X1=⊕  defines the G×K 
block-diagonal matrix: 
       X1 
i
G
i
X
1=
⊕ = nXXX ⊕⊕⊕ ...21 =  X2        (5.15) 
       
…… 
        XG  
where: 
K = ∑ = iGi k1   
 
The set of matrices used in the direct sum are not necessarily of the same dimension 
(Kontoghiorghes, 2000). 
 
The SURE strategy can be applied to co-integrating regressions to obtain asymptotically 
efficient estimators when the equilibrium errors are correlated across equations.  Moreover, 
Mark et al. (2005) suggested that SURE is applicable for panel co-integration estimation in 
environments where the cross-section is small relative to the available time series.  
Therefore, a test of regression coefficient vectors is applied in the analysis.   
 
This study analyses the role of FDI in Thailand across industry sectors and uses 25 years of 
time series data, from 1980 to 2004.  Thus, to examine the relationship between FDI in 
each industrial category, Equation (5.16) examines the routinely calculated variance 
inequalities and correlations constraints as follows: 
 
FDIk = β1 + β2GDPkt + β3Kkt + β4IFLt + β5X_USt + β6RESt + β7CURt + β8NNSVt  
    + β9WGEt + β10UNEMt + β11ASEMt + β12APECt + u    (5.16) 
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where: 
FDIk is the FDI in each k industrial category: industry, financial institutions, trade, 
mining and quarrying, agricultural products, services, investment, real estate, 
and others, in year t, 
GDPk  is the GDP in k industrial categories in year t,  
 Kk is the net capital stock in k industrial categories in year t, 
 IFL is the inflation rate in year t, 
 X_US is the exchange rate (Thai Baht per US Dollar) in year t, 
 RES is the international reserves in year t, 
 CUR is the total current account balance in year t, 
 NNSV is the total national saving in year t, 
 WGE is the minimum wage rate per day in Thailand in year t, 
 UNE is the unemployment rate in Thailand in year t, 
 ASEM, APEC are dummy variables (to capture the regional effects) that equal 1 if  
Thailand becomes a member of either ASEM or APEC in year t, and   “0” 
otherwise in year t. 
 
The summary of data sources and the descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in 
Section 5.3 and Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter reports the results of the empirical models and discusses the findings.  The 
discussion refers to prior research on FDI and portfolio investment discussed in Chapter 2; 
to the theoretical issues discussed in Chapters 3 and 4; and to the methodology in Chapter 
5.  
 
The chapter is divided into five main sections.  The results of the determinants of FDI and 
portfolio investment in Thailand are discussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, respectively.  
Section 6.3 discusses the impacts of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on FDI and portfolio 
investment in Thailand.  The relationships between FDI and industrial categories across 
Thailand are presented in Section 6.4.  Finally, Section 6.5 provides the conclusions of the 
empirical findings.  
6.1 FDI Models Using Equation (5.5) 
 
This section presents the results of the estimated coefficients of the determinants of the 
inflows of FDI into Thailand.  The estimated results using Equation (5.5) are presented in 
Table 6-1.  Panel data from 1980-2004 were used in the analysis.  The extended Gravity 
Model is estimated by pooling the data across 21 investing partners using four different 
baseline models.  The model includes 10 explanatory variables: GDP, GDP Per Capita, 
GDP Growth Rate, Distance, Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, Inflation Rate, APEC, 
and ASEM.  The likelihood-ratio test on all models rejects the joint restriction of zero 
coefficients on all explanatory variables (see Appendix D).  Model 1 shows the estimated 
coefficients of the basic Gravity Model which consists of the market size (GDP, GDP Per 
Capita, and GDP Growth Rate) and the geographical Distance.  The model estimates the 
effects of macroeconomic status between investing partners and Thailand.  Model 2 shows 
the results including Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, and Inflation Rate.  It investigates 
the effects of investing partners’ economies over the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  Two 
dummy variables, APEC and ASEM, are included in Models 3 and 4 in order to take 
account of barriers to investment between members.  However, the Distance variable is 
excluded in Model 3 to compare the results with Model 4.  The Distance variable is 
included in Model 4 to test the gravity factor as presented by Distance affecting the inflows 
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of FDI into Thailand.  Therefore, Model 4 shows the empirical results for all explanatory 
variables. 
 
In addition, we also test for stationarity with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for 
all models.  The unit root test rejected the null hypotheses for each of the variable.  The 
result shows the variables are stationary.  The FDI models (see Table 6-1) in Thailand are 
one-way error component models which are supported by the techniques to estimate panel 
data models.  The F-test and Breusch-Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test reject the null 
hypothesis of a common intercept (see Chapter 5).  When choosing between fixed and 
random effects, the Hausman tests fail to accept the null hypothesis (the random effects 
model is preferred).  The results in Table 6-1 show that the fixed effects models generated 
the most reliable results used in this study.  All models show that most of the estimated 
coefficients have the hypothesised signs and are statistically significant.  In addition, the 
explanatory powers of all four models (R2) are high, they are between 69%-71%, and the 
specification F-statistics are statistically significant at the critical 1% level.   
 
All the variables have the hypothesised signs except Exchange Rate (in Models 2, 3, and 
4), Distance (in Models 1, 2, and 4), and APEC (in Models 3 and 4), but Distance and 
APEC are insignificant.  The Exchange Rate contradicts to hypothesised signs and it is 
statistically significant only in Models 3 and 4.  The results show the coefficients of GDP, 
GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, Trade, Wage Rate, Inflation Rate, and ASEM 
variables are statistically significant with the hypothesised signs in all models.  However, 
Distance and APEC coefficients are not significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
of significance in all models.   
 
GDP is included in estimating Equation (5.5) to capture the effect of the size of economies 
between Thailand and the 21 investing partners.  GDP is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance in all models.  When the regional integration 
variables are included in Models 3 and 4, the coefficient values of GDP are smaller in 
Models 3 and 4 than in Models 1 and 2.  This suggests that the inflows of FDI into 
Thailand are affected by other factors beside GDP.  The significant positive sign on GDP 
indicates that the FDI flows into Thailand are strongly oriented toward capturing the local 
market in Thailand and domestic markets in the investing partners.  This finding is 
consistent with previous studies (see Nakamura and Oyama, 1998; Portes and Rey, 2005;  
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Table 6-1: Determinants of FDI in Thailand Using Equation (5.5) 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
Model 1a 2b 3c 4d 
GDP 4.6550*** 4.8243*** 4.2077*** 4.2077*** 
GDP Per Capita 
-3.8255*** -3.8881*** -3.2523*** -3.2523*** 
GDP Growth Rate 
.0164 .0612 .0751** .0751** 
Distance 
.4351 .2538 - .0387 
Trade 
- .0976** .1124** .1124** 
Exchange Rate  
- -.3441 -.4788** -.4788** 
Wage Rate 
- .1176** .1245*** .1245*** 
Inflation Rate 
- .0776*** .0869*** .0869*** 
APEC 
- - -.3623 -.3623 
ASEM 
- - .6779*** .6779*** 
 
    
No. of observations 525 525 525 525 
Mean 2.0851 2.0851 2.0851 2.0851 
Std. Dev. 1.7984 1.7621 1.7446 1.7464 
Sum of squares 1617.06 1540.07 1506.62 1506.62 
R2 69.32% 70.78% 71.41% 71.41% 
Adjusted R2 67.84% 69.13% 69.74% 69.68% 
F-Statistics 47.06*** 42.90*** 42.64*** 41.13*** 
Hausman-test 28.13*** 44.05*** 31.37*** 41.55*** 
 FEM FEM FEM FEM 
Notes:  i. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
        respectively. 
    ii.  FEM is the fixed effects model. 
    iii.  1a Model 1 represents the basic specification of extended Gravity Model which  
includes GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, and Distance. 
 iv.  2b Model 2 represents the basic specification variables, the macroeconomic    
variables of the investing partners (Wage Rate and Inflation Rate) and the  
economic relationship variables between Thailand and the investing partners  
(Trade and Exchange Rate). 
    v.  3c Model 3 includes APEC and ASEM but excludes Distance. 
    vi.  4d Model 4 includes all explanatory variables. 
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Tahir and Larimo, 2005) which confirmed that the GDP of investing partners and Thailand 
has a positive effect on FDI.  It indicates that a large market size in both investing partners 
and Thailand has a significant positive effect on attracting FDI.   
 
Based on results of GDP (Table 6-1), an increase of GDP for both investing partners and 
Thailand raises the affiliate activity of FDI in Thailand, this is because the coefficient of 
GDP is income-elastic.  Thus, a large size of economies in both investing partners and 
Thailand increase the FDI in Thailand.  One of FDI’s objectives is to have a large market 
share and to achieve this objective FDI produces huge quantities to benefit from economies 
of scale.  Due to this factor, there is huge market potential to attract FDI in Thailand.  It 
can be argued that investing partners expect to make more profits through mass production 
with lower marginal costs of production in Thailand with larger market size to serve their 
products.   
 
The coefficients of GDP Per Capita are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
of significance in all models.  Similar to GDP, when the regional integration variables are 
included in Models 3 and 4, the coefficient values of GDP Per Capita are slightly smaller 
than in Models 1 and 2.  Co-linearity may exist among APEC, ASEM, GDP, and GDP Per 
Capita in the regressions, while holding the other variables constant (see Appendix D).  
However, GDP Per Capita’s elasticities are quite high (3.3-3.8%), thus confirming the 
importance of the agglomeration internalities conferred by GDP Per Capita of both 
investing partners and Thailand which may be due to the information internalities 
concerning the economic environment.  GDP Per Capita, as an indicator of potential 
market size, may develop the Thai economy relative to FDI production base.  Previous 
studies found a negative and significant coefficient of GDP Per Capita, for example, 
Bergstrand (1989) suggested that GDP per capita is a proxy for the country’s capital-labour 
endowment ratio and the negative coefficient for GDP per capita implies a country has 
labour-intensive production (in term of production).  Based on the estimated coefficients of 
GDP Per Capita (see Table 6-1), this means that Thailand is a labour-intensive and, 
simultaneously investing partners are capital-intensive in production.  This could be due to 
other characteristics that make Thailand attractive to investors (such as a relatively stable 
economic environment and steady GDP growth rate).  Moreover, Dascal et al. (2002) 
argued that an increase in foreign investment stimulates production in the host country, 
which is exported back to markets in their countries.  Hence, this may increase the bilateral 
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trade relationship between investing partners and Thailand.  As expected, GDP and GDP 
Per Capita are statistically significant in the FDI Models. 
 
The estimated coefficients of the GDP Growth Rate are positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level of significance in Models 3 and 4 but are insignificant in Models 1 and 2 
when the dummy variables are excluded.  GDP Growth Rate is one of the key determinants 
of the inflows of FDI into Thailand, and the elasticity of the GDP Growth Rate is 0.08 in 
Model 4 when all explanatory variables are included but elasticity is the same as shown in 
Model 3 when Distance is excluded.  Holding other factors constant, this implies that an 
increase of 1% in GDP Growth Rate in the investing partners’ share of the GDP Growth 
Rate will increase the inflows of FDI into Thailand by 0.08%.  This shows that a high-
income investing country with steady economic growth has a greater probability of 
investing directly in overseas markets.  Stone and Jeon (1999) agreed that the strong 
economy of an investing partner creates a requirement to expand into foreign markets to 
exploit economies of scale.  It is consistent with Wei et al. (1999) who argued that outward 
FDI from investing partners (inward FDI) is positively related to the growth of market 
demand in their countries (host economies).  This argument suggests that investing 
partners with steady GDP growth rate is a major reason for FDI to shift their source of 
funds to Thailand.  In addition, the findings in this study are consistent with the findings of 
Cuevas et al. (2005) where the GDP growth rate captured elements of the investment 
environment such as macroeconomic stability and good economic policy management.  
The authors also suggest that high economic growth rate facilitated FDI. 
 
Market size variables include GDP, GDP Per Capita, and GDP Growth Rate.  The GDP 
and GDP Per Capita are statistically significant at the 1% level of significance in all 
models.  The GDP Growth Rate is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance in 
Models 3 and 4.  Based on the estimated coefficients, GDP growth rate of the investing 
partners is less sensitive to changes in the inflows of FDI into Thailand compared to GDP 
and GDP per capita.  This may because the GDP Growth Rate shown in Table 6-1 used 
only information from the investing partners but the GDP Per Capita captures the 
economic status between investing partners and Thailand.  Moreover, the magnitudes of 
the coefficients for GDP Growth Rate are the smallest compared to the other coefficients in 
this group of variables.  However, the GDP Growth Rate is a significant determinant of 
FDI in Thailand and it would also increase overseas investment.  
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The coefficients of the Trade variables are positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance in Models 2, 3, and 4.  The magnitudes of the coefficients increase 
from 0.10 in Model 2 up to 0.11 in Models 3 and 4 when the regional integration variables 
are included. That means a 1% increase in Trade will cause FDI to increase by 0.10% in 
Model 2 and 0.11% in Models 3 and 4.  This implies an increase in Trade is associated 
with an increase of the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  When Thailand and investing 
partners become members of APEC and ASEM, it positively impacts the value of trade 
and increases the investment flows into Thailand from overseas.  
 
In order to investigate the plausible impact of FDI on Trade, under the hypothesis of 
substitutability following Brenton et al. (1999), the Trade coefficient in Equation (5.5) 
should be negative.  The results in Table 6-1 suggest that FDI and Trade are 
complementary, rather than supplementary.  This finding reinforces those of Bevan and 
Estrin (2004) and Stone and Jeon (1999) who found a complementary relationship between 
FDI and Trade.  The positive relationship between Trade and FDI supports the hypothesis 
that high levels of trade have a positive effect on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.   
 
For all models (see Table 6-1), GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, and Trade are 
significant determinants of FDI.  Inflows of FDI increases as the GDP, GDP Growth Rate, 
and Trade increase.  However, the GDP and GDP Per Capita are more sensitive to changes 
in FDI compared to Trade.  This suggests that economic indicators such as GDP, GDP per 
capita, and GDP growth rate, are preferred over the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  This 
implies that FDI in Thailand is driven more by the income of investing partners than by 
Thailand.  Ismail and Yussof (2003) and Stone and Jeon (1999) argued that the FDI 
activity in Thailand is supply-side driven and represents an important marketing channel 
for FDI to export most of their products.  This is consistent with the BOI objectives where 
the majority of promoted foreign investment in Thailand is export-oriented (BOI, 2005).  
However, this result contradicts Guerin’s (2006) findings that showed that trade is more 
sensitive and preferred to FDI in the developing counties.  In contrast, developed countries 
preferred FDI to trade when it is motivated by larger markets.   
 
The estimated coefficients of Exchange Rate are negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level of significance in Models 3 and 4 when the dummy variables are included.  FDI 
is highly sensitive to the exchange rate.  This suggests that a depreciation of investing 
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partners’ currencies against the Thai Baht encourages the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  
For example, a 1% depreciation of the exchange rate decreases FDI from investing partners 
by 0.5% (see Models 3 and 4), other factors being constant.  The result contradicts Tahir 
and Larimo (2005) who argued that a country can attract FDI by devaluing its currency 
because FDI will benefit from currency weakness in the host country.  The appreciation of 
the Thai Baht actually increases the inflows of FDI into Thailand for three reasons.  First, 
the investing partners are seeking advantage by exporting new/used production facilities 
into Thailand as part of their FDI to Thailand.  Thailand is labour-intensive and it lacks 
advanced technologies and equipment which are necessary to set up plants in Thailand.  
Similarly, Seo and Suh (2006) showed that the flow of Korean investment into Thailand is 
accompanied by Thailand imports of components, intermediate products, or machinery 
from Korea.  Therefore, the foreign investors take benefit from the appreciation of the Thai 
Baht.  Bergstrand (1985; 1989) and Dascal et al. (2002) suggested that appreciation of a 
country’s currency against other currencies increased imports, whereas depreciation 
stimulated the country’s exports.  The exchange rate is one of the most significant factors 
affecting trade between countries.  If the exchange rate rises, trade is relatively more 
profitable to exporters, so exporters will be sensitive to changes in the exchange rate. 
 
Second, it may reflect a special feature of FDI from investing partners into Thailand, which 
is occupied by non-industry sectors such as trade, services, and financial institutions (see 
Table 2-3).  This implies that there is a relationship within the investing partners in the 
establishment of the supporting industries in Thailand.  The FDI from some of the 
investing partners would increase the need for supporting industries in Thailand that 
consequently would support and attract other FDI into Thailand.  For example, in the 
1960s, the Japanese automobile assembly plant, Toyota, was established in Thailand.  The 
plant installed the auto loading system with advanced technologies in the 1980s.  It 
generated a remarkable spillover of technology and human resource development in 
Thailand.  In addition, the spillover accelerated the government’s policy to allow 
exemptions on import duties for inputs and regulations allowing similar conditions for 
related other firms (BOI, 2005).  These conditions attracted other FDIs such as General 
Motors (from the US) to establish its plant in Thailand in 1997 in order to take advantage 
of a highly efficient and advanced technological production process which the Japanese 
firms had arranged earlier (Julian, 2001).  The findings are consistent with Nakamura and 
Oyama (1998) who found the exchange rate is negatively significant in the FDI from Japan 
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and US to the East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.  They also 
suggested that this may indicate the improved profitability of export industries to Japan 
which attracts US investment to this region.  Moreover, Chang and Alexandra (2001) 
found the evidence of appreciation of the host countries’ currencies is accompanied by an 
increase in the foreign investment of non-manufactured production.   
 
Finally, it may improve the confidence of foreign investors because of the stable and 
strong Thai economy in the long-term.  Foreign investors will not encounter the exchange 
rate risk since the Thai Baht appreciated and this increased FDI into Thailand.  Foreign 
investors benefit when converting the earnings to their home currencies.  This results in 
higher profits for foreign investors.  
 
The coefficient of Wage Rate is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance in Models 3 and 4 and is positively significant at the 5% level of significance 
in Model 2 when the APEC and ASEM are excluded.  Foreign investors evaluate 
alternative production locations in Thailand to ensure that the wage rate will be lower than 
in their countries.  Therefore, it can imply that higher wage rates in the investing partners 
increase the FDI into Thailand.  The results support Ismail and Yussof’s (2003) hypothesis 
that an increase in the wage rate will increase the cost of production, therefore, the wage 
rate has a positive impact on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  It can be argued that with 
the increase in market share, it also becomes relatively more profitable to increase the 
degree of product specialisation and operate within specific product niches.  As a result, 
reduced labour costs and further market growth rate are reasons to open up new investment 
opportunities for investing partners in Thailand with a relatively lower wage rate.  This 
finding reinforces the conclusions of Julian (2001) and Tiwari et al. (2003) who found that 
the main reason Japanese investors invest in Thailand is to reduce the cost of 
manufacturing through using Thai local labour.  Tahir and Larimo (2005) further argued 
that low wage rates may increase opportunities to approach economies of scale, higher 
production efficiency, and lower marginal costs of production, which in turn can lead to 
larger market share.    
 
The coefficients for Inflation Rate are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
of significance in all three models (Models 2, 3 and 4), indicating that high inflation rate in 
investing partners increases the FDI into Thailand.  This also shows that an increase of the 
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price index in investing partners and the increase of demand for substitute products, which 
are cheaper, for the consumers in their countries.  This implies that investors may increase 
investment overseas with lower inflation rates to keep price competitiveness in both the 
global market and their domestic markets.  It can be argued that the inflation rate indicates 
the macroeconomic stability of the investing partners and also captures uncertainties in 
their economies, and therefore high inflation rates in their countries can encourage outward 
FDI.  For example, in the mid 1980s, Japan had a high inflation rate with the appreciation 
of the Yen, therefore, most Japanese firms established production bases overseas with low 
wage and inflation rate in order to maintain price competitiveness in the global market.  
Thailand, which acts as a host country, offered location advantages to the Japanese firms 
that depended on factor endowments of the host country such as low labour cost or large 
markets (Dunning, 1988).   
 
The dummy variables for APEC and ASEM are included in Equation (5.5) to capture the 
significance of becoming APEC and ASEM member countries.  The coefficients of the 
ASEM dummy are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance in 
Models 3 and 4.  The ASEM hypothesised sign is positive since FDI may take advantage 
of ASEM to increase its opportunity for investment and/or trade between ASEM members 
by reducing the information cost and increasing the potential market.  The results suggest 
that investing partners’ memberships in ASEM significantly influence FDI into Thailand.  
Thailand has been an ASEM member since 1996, so investing partners might prefer 
Thailand because Thailand offers free access to ASEAN and APEC markets.  Investing 
partners may prefer a country to be an ASEM member because it offers free access to the 
EU, EFTA, and some Asian markets.  Most of the investing partners from Europe (such as 
UK, France, and Germany) use Thailand as a gateway to access ASEAN and APEC 
markets.  Siamwalla et al. (1999) agreed that some foreign investors recognised Thailand 
as a key linkage between Asia and Europe, comprising abundant raw materials and a large 
market, reasonable wages, and stable government policies. 
 
This result also supports the fact that the inflows of FDI into Thailand and bilateral trade 
are complementary because Thailand receives more FDI and trade from ASEM member 
countries.  When investing partners are ASEM members, both FDI and trade may benefit 
from the reduced investment and trade barriers.  The positive and significant coefficients of 
the size of economy variables (GDP, GDP Growth Rate), Trade, and ASEM suggest that 
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most FDI in Thailand is principally vertical FDI.  Markusen and Maskus’s (2002) study 
showed that trade and FDI are either substitutes or complements, which are consistent with 
horizontal and vertical investment, respectively.  Vertical investment separates production 
by stages in different countries.  Moreover, Aizenman and Marion (2004) argued that 
horizontal investment arises between similar country size of source and host countries.  
This is consistent with the findings of Milner et al. (2004) that showed most FDI in 
Thailand is vertical investment.  Furthermore, Thailand has higher trading shares with 
ASEM nations, which also receives significantly more FDI.  It suggests that the inflows of 
FDI into Thailand are enhanced by bilateral trade flows in ASEM nations.   
 
The coefficients APEC are negative and statistically insignificant in Models 3 and 4.  This 
suggests that if there is any significant effect from APEC agreements, Thailand and 
investing partners’ memberships of APEC do not significantly influence the inflows of FDI 
into Thailand.  The Brenton et al. (1999) study showed a negative sign on integration 
variables which suggests that membership in regional integration does not significantly 
affect FDI.   
 
However, if Thailand is an attractive location for FDI mainly for ASEM rather than APEC 
members, this means ASEAN members such as Malaysia and Indonesia or other ASEAN 
member nations may attract FDI with sufficient confidence.  Table 6-1 shows that 
members of ASEM have a significant influence on the inflows of FDI into Thailand but the 
members of APEC are insignificant.  The results also show that 16 of the 21 investing 
partners are members of ASEM, which accounts for almost the whole sample size in this 
study, but only nine APEC members are included in this study.  Since countries such as 
India and Switzerland are not members of APEC or ASEM, the regional integration 
dummy variables are likely to be correlated with the other explanatory variables.  It is 
obvious that the coefficient of the ASEM dummy variable provides a significant measure 
of the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  
 
The results also show that Distance is not a significant factor in determining FDI.  It is 
evident that geographical distance between investing partners and Thailand is an 
insignificant resistance factor for the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  This is due to the 
patterns of FDI being dominated by the U.S and Japan (see Chapter 2) (see Stone and Jeon, 
1999).  Distance in our models reflects information cost.  To check for robustness, 
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Distance is excluded in Model 3, but the results from Model 4 are not different from Model 
3.  Distance is positive when APEC and ASEM are excluded (see Model 1 and Model 2) 
but is negative when APEC and ASEM are included (see Model 4).  Distance and APEC 
are insignificant in all models.  Their exclusion does not affect the overall significance of 
the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  Based on the results, Distance and APEC have not 
contributed much to the inflows of FDI into Thailand during 1980 to 2004.  
 
In summary, Equation (5.5) examines the determinants of FDI in Thailand with the 
specifications of the extended Gravity Model.  The GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth 
Rate, Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, Inflation Rate, and ASEM have significant 
impacts on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  The removal of the Distance and APEC 
variables from Equation (5.5) did not result in a loss of the explanatory power of the 
models.  These variables do not have a significant impact on the inflows of FDI into 
Thailand.   
 
The empirical results suggest that FDI in Thailand is more focused on export-oriented 
investment which is both market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI (see Chapter 1).  It 
shows that FDI in Thailand is significantly influenced by investing partners, thus FDI in 
Thailand is supply-side driven by investing partners.  The transferring of the investing 
country’s technology and the participation of Thailand in training courses encourages 
closer investment links in both the investing partners and Thailand.  Because Thailand is a 
labour-intensive country, FDI can take advantage of cost reductions such as lower labour 
cost.  The results of this study showed the vertical form of FDI in Thailand and different 
stages of production are developed in the country by the investors.  Foreign investors try to 
avoid higher labour costs in their home countries by producing parts of their production in 
Thailand and shipping the products back home or exporting them to the same regions.  In 
addition, the relationship between FDI and the trade of investing partners and Thailand is 
complementary rather than supplementary.  Therefore, the market size and the economic 
environment in the investing partners determine their decisions to invest in Thailand.  The 
most important reason for FDI locating in Thailand is to produce and export both 
intermediate and final goods to other countries in the same region or to be resold in their 
respective home countries.  Furthermore, Thailand offers promotion investment policies to 
attract FDI and Thailand is strategically located in Indo-China and is a member of many 
agglomeration economies.   
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6.2 Portfolio Investment Models Using Equation (5.6) 
 
This section examines foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in Thailand by employing the 
gravity specifications based on Equation (5.6).  The estimated results of the determinants 
of portfolio investment in Thailand by 21 major investing partners are presented in Table 
6-2.  The panel data for 1980-2004 were used in the estimates.  Models 1 and 2, which 
examine only the economic variables, are based on the extended Gravity Model.  The fixed 
effects models (FEM) are theoretically appropriate for these two models based on the 
Hausman test statistics.  The inclusion of the regional integration variables into the 
extended Gravity Model is presented in Models 3 and 4.  The random effects model (REM) 
has some application in Models 3 and 4, and is appropriate due to the large value of the 
Breusch and Pagan statistics in the presence of small Hausman statistics (Greene, 2003).   
 
The F-statistics on all models are highly significant thereby rejecting the null hypothesis 
that all explanatory variable coefficients are jointly zero.  The overall performance of the 
panel estimates in all models is satisfactory (see Table 6-2).  The R2 values for all 
estimates are high, particularly for Model 4 at 68%.  Similar to Table 6-1, Model 1 shows 
the estimated coefficients of the basic Gravity Model that contains variables such as the 
size of the economy in both investing partners and in Thailand (GDP and GDP Per Capita) 
and GDP Growth Rate (for in the investing partners only) and geographical Distance.  
Model 1 tests the effects of the market size and distance between investing partners and 
Thailand as important determinants of portfolio investment in Thailand.  Model 2 is an 
extension of Model 1 with additional economic variables such as Trade, Exchange Rate, 
Wage Rate, and Inflation Rate.  Model 2 examines the effects of investing partners’ 
economies on portfolio investment in Thailand.  APEC and ASEM are included in Models 
3 and 4 to capture the effects of APEC and ASEM membership on portfolio investment 
among members.  However, the Distance variable is excluded in Model 3 but included in 
Model 4 in order to examine the effect of the gravity factor on the determinants of foreign 
portfolio investment in Thailand.  Finally, the estimated coefficients for all explanatory 
variables are presented in Model 4.   
 
The results in Table 6-2 show that the coefficients of the GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth 
Rate, Distance, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Inflation Rate variables support the 
hypothesised signs.  The GDP variables from all four models show mixed signs.  The 
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coefficients in both Models 1 and 2 are negative but positive in Models 3 and 4.  However, 
the GDP values are statistically significant in all models.  The estimated coefficients of 
Distance, Wage Rate, APEC, and ASEM are negatively correlated with the inflows of 
portfolio investment into Thailand in all models.  In fact, Wage Rate, APEC, and ASEM 
have the opposite signs from those hypothesised signs.  When the ASEM variable is 
included in Models 3 and 4, it yields a significant relationship with the inflows of portfolio 
investment into Thailand.  The GDP Growth Rate, Wage Rate, and Inflation Rate variables 
in all models do not yield significant statistics because their values are close to zero and lie 
below the 10% level of significance. 
 
The estimated coefficients of GDP are negative in Models 1 and 2, which implies that an 
increase (decrease) in GDP for both investing partners and Thailand will cause a decrease 
(increase) in portfolio investment in Thailand.  Conversely, the estimated coefficients of 
GDP are positive in Models 3 and 4, which means that an increase (decrease) in GDP in 
both investing partners and Thailand will result in an increase (decrease) of portfolio 
investment in Thailand.  The estimated values in all models are significant at the 1% level 
of significance.  The estimates of GDP in all models alternate in signs depending on 
whether it is FEM (Models 1 and 2) or REM (Models 3 and 4) models.  When APEC and 
ASEM are included in the models, the estimated coefficients’ sign of GDP changed from 
negative (see Models 1 and 2) to positive (see Models 3 and 4).  The highly significant 
estimates of GDP in all models confirm that the GDP in both investing partners and 
Thailand could significantly affect portfolio investment in Thailand.  In comparison, for 
the GDP estimates in the FDI models (see Table 6-1), the estimated coefficient signs of 
GDP are positive under FEM in all models.  However, the GDP signs under FEM (Table 6-
2) are negative (see Models 1 and 2).  This might be due to problems arising from the 
estimation technique where variables are under identified in Models 1 and 2.  
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Table 6-2: Determinants of Portfolio Investment in Thailand Using Equation (5.6) 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
Model 1a 2b 3c 4d 
GDP 
-8.0049*** -7.9135*** 1.4037** 1.5701*** 
GDP Per Capita 11.9400*** 11.8131*** 1.4960** 1.7986*** 
GDP Growth Rate 
.0694 .1216 .1556* .1104 
Distance 
-8.0795 -8.1476 - -3.9929*** 
Trade 
- .1906 .2662** .2694** 
Exchange Rate  
- .2418 1.0576*** 1.1730*** 
Wage Rate 
- -.0258 -.0546 -.0177 
Inflation Rate 
- .0781 .0942 .1011* 
APEC 
- - -.9980 -1.7729** 
ASEM 
- - -1.7768*** -2.2708*** 
Constant 
- - -45.7594*** -19.5554** 
 
    
No. of observations 525 525 525 525 
Mean 
-3.7513 -3.7513 -3.7513 -3.7513 
Std. Dev. 4.9906 4.9918 6.3509 5.9097 
Sum of squares 12453.16 12359.28 21135.09 18300.49 
R2 59.47% 59.78% 64.33% 67.56% 
Adjusted R2 57.53% 57.51% 63.78% 67.00% 
F-Statistics 30.57*** 26.33*** 15.12*** 10.98*** 
Hausman-test 15.56*** 21.48*** 15.91 11.82 
 FEM FEM REM REM 
Notes:  i. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,  
      respectively. 
    ii. FEM is the fixed effects model. 
   iii. REM is the random effects model.  
    iv.  1a Model 1 represents the basic specification of extended Gravity Model which  
includes GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, and Distance. 
    v.  2b Model 2 represents the basic specification variables, the macroeconomic  
variables of the investing partners (Wage Rate and Inflation Rate) and the 
economic relationship variables between Thailand and the investing partners 
(Trade and Exchange Rate). 
    vi.  3c Model 3 includes APEC and ASEM but excludes Distance. 
    vii.  4d Model 4 includes all explanatory variables. 
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The estimated coefficients of GDP Per Capita are positive and significant in most models 
(see Table 6-2).  Only when market size and economic variables are included (see Models 
1 and 2), the GDP Per Capita are highly significant at the 1% level of significance.  Similar 
to the GDP variable, the estimated coefficients of GDP Per Capita decrease dramatically 
from 11.9 (Model 1) to 1.5 (Model 3) when APEC and ASEM are included.  These results 
suggest that a co-linearity exists among GDP, GDP Per Capita, and the regional integration 
dummy variables (see Appendix D).  Model 4 results are more robust given that the 
inclusion of GDP Per Capita causes an increase in portfolio investment in Thailand.  An 
increase of 1% in GDP and GDP Per Capita for both investing partners and Thailand will 
increase the values of portfolio investment in Thailand by 1.6% and 1.8%, respectively 
(see Model 4).  To test for the robustness of the model results, the REM is preferred to 
FEM in Models 1 and 2 and the coefficients for GDP Per Capita are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance (see Appendix C).  The sign of the 
estimated coefficients for the GDP variable are consistent with the hypothesised sign and 
the results of the FDI models (see Table 6-1).  It is evident that GDP has the same effect on 
FDI and portfolio investment in Thailand.     
 
The GDP Per Capita in Table 6-2 shows a positive relationship between GDP Per Capita in 
both investing partners and Thailand and the inflows of portfolio investment into Thailand.  
However, the results in Table 6-2 contradict the results in Table 6-1.  For example, the 
GDP Per Capita reflects the potential of the market size and its coefficients, which can be 
both positive and negative depending on whether they are capital-intensive or labour-
intensive, respectively.  The FDI in Table 6-1 shows Thailand attracts more FDI because 
Thailand offers a competitive advantage through a low-wage market.  On the other hand, 
the foreign portfolio investors do not consider the labour wage in Thailand but consider the 
value and yields of the capital market in Thailand.  Thus, the positive significant 
coefficient of the GDP Per Capita reflects a high purchasing power and market capability 
in both investing partners and Thailand.  This shows the potential of the capital market and 
also reflects the economic stability in Thailand.  As there is a high potential for the foreign 
investors, foreign portfolio investors from investing partners are interested in investing in 
Thailand.  These results are similar to the findings of Buch et al. (2003) and Limao and 
Venables (2001) about the positive relationship between the flows of foreign funds to 
domestic service or capital markets and GDP per capita.  The positive sign for the GDP Per 
Capita coefficient would signal a higher purchasing power in both investing partners and 
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Thailand.  This implies the existence of wealth effects.  The rising in purchasing power in 
investing partners and Thailand accelerates the expansion of the portfolio investment into 
Thailand.  Hence, GDP per capita in the investing partners and Thailand has a positive 
effect on portfolio investment in Thailand.  In comparison, if foreign funds are encouraged 
in order to produce overseas exports, the sign of GDP Per Capita coefficient should be 
negative due to the relatively low cost of labour in Thailand, which is consistent with the 
result in Table 6-1.   
 
GDP Growth Rate is positive in all models and significant at the 10% level of significance 
only in Model 3 when Distance is excluded.  However, the GDP Growth Rate is not 
significantly different from zero in Models 1, 2, and 4.  These results imply that GDP 
Growth Rates of the investing partners has no influence on portfolio investment in 
Thailand (see Model 4).  These results are slightly different from the FDI models (see 
Table 6-1).  This could be due to the indirect effect of the economic environment of the 
investing partners, whereas portfolio investment depends only on the strength of Thai 
economy and not on external conditions.   
 
The estimated geographical Distance coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance in Model 4.  Holding other factors constant, an increase in 
Distance by 1% would decrease the inflows of portfolio investment in Thailand by 4.0%.  
Based on the definition of geographical Distance by Bevan and Estrin (2004), Guerin 
(2006), and Portes and Rey (2005), distance may be a proxy for information costs in FDI 
and portfolio investment models rather than transport costs in the trade models.  Therefore, 
information costs of portfolio investment between the investing partners and Thailand are 
large and have negative effects on portfolio investment in Thailand.  Furthermore, portfolio 
investment decreases as the distance from Thailand increases.  A significant decrease in 
information costs has a positive impact on portfolio investment.  On the other hand, 
distance has a negative correlation with the flows of portfolio investment.  For example, 
Singapore and China (including Hong Kong) had the highest percentage of the inflow of 
portfolio investment into Thailand during 1980-2004 (see Table 2-5 in Chapter 2).  Both 
countries are familiar with Thailand’s culture and language although they do not 
communicate in the Thai language.  This familiarity reduces the information costs between 
Singapore, China, and Thailand.  The results are consistent with Portes and Rey’s (2005) 
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findings, that foreign investors prefer to invest in markets close to them.  This suggests that 
the distance is a significant factor in determining portfolio investment in Thailand.  
 
In addition to the information cost, Distance can be a proxy for financial and infrastructure 
systems.  The negative effects of distance on portfolio investment are also expected to be 
due to the differences in the respective countries’ regulations and financial systems and 
Thailand’s inferior qualities of infrastructure and communications.  The results in Table 6-
2 reveal strong evidence that portfolio investment does not follow the same pattern as FDI.  
However, Guerin (2006) suggested that portfolio investment follows the same pattern as 
FDI and that the Distance variable in FDI is more significant than in portfolio investment.  
Based on the Distance coefficients from Tables 6-1 and 6-2, portfolio investment is more 
sensitive to distance than FDI in Thailand.   
 
Trade coefficient is consistent with a priori hypothesised sign but is insignificant in Model 
2.  The Trade variable is somewhat unstable but it influences the portfolio investment with 
the regional integration variables in Models 3 and 4.  The Trade coefficients are positive 
and significant in Models 3 and 4 at the 5% level of significance.  Higher trade volume 
brings higher value of portfolio investment from investing partners into Thailand.  This 
result is similar to the FDI models (see Table 6-1) with a priori hypothesised signs.  This 
also suggests that portfolio investment flows are to some extent enhanced by trade.   
 
The estimated coefficients of the Exchange Rate variable have a positive effect on 
portfolio investment in Thailand, as priori hypothesised, and are statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance in Models 3 and 4.  However, the coefficient of Exchange 
Rate is statistically insignificant in Model 2.  The positive coefficient of the Exchange Rate 
indicates that an appreciation of 1% in the exchange rate of the investing partners against 
the Thai Baht will increase portfolio investment in Thailand by 1.2% (see Model 4).  The 
results show that portfolio investment is sensitive to changes in the exchange rate.  As the 
investing partners’ currencies appreciate, the cost of capital investment in Thailand 
becomes cheaper, thus increasing portfolio investment.   
 
The results also show that depreciation of the Thai Baht has a strong positive effect on 
portfolio investment.  Some investing partners such as Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, 
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Malaysia, Indonesia, Sweden, and South Korea (see Table 2-5, Chapter 2) are not 
interested in investing in the Thailand capital market due to the exchange rate instability.  
 
The Thai government initiated liberalisation of financial institutions under WTO 
commitments through the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) in 1993.  The 
BIBF enjoys several distinct tax privileges such as a 10% reduction on corporate income 
tax (from 30% previously), a 0% rate for specific business tax, interest income withholding 
tax, and no duties for investors who invest in Thailand (Siamwalla et al., 1999).  In effect, 
the BIBF has become a financial intermediary to the manufacturing sector, commerce, and 
banking and finance between foreign investors and Thai investors.  The volume of net 
capital inflows into Thailand surged from approximately US$ 2,400 million (US$ 1,294 
million on FDI and US$ 1,100 million on portfolio investment) in 1988 to US$ 21,888 
million (US$ 5,142 million on FDI and US$ 21,376 million on portfolio investment) in 
1997 (see Chapter 2).  In contrast, net inflows plunged to US$ 13,742 million (US$ 6,981 
million on FDI and US$ 6,761 million on portfolio investment) in 1998 (see Chapter 2) 
after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.   
 
The Wage Rate and Inflation Rate of the investing partners are included in Equation (5.6) 
to examine the relative impact of macroeconomic factors in investing partners over 
Thailand.  The Wage Rate estimates for portfolio investment in all models are negative, but 
their values are not significantly different from zero.  The results in Table 6-2 show that 
Wage Rate has no significant impact on portfolio investment in Thailand.  This may 
suggest that the wage rate of the investing partners did not affect capital outflows to 
Thailand during the years 1980-2004.   
 
The Inflation Rate is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance in Model 4, as 
priori hypothesised.  A high inflation rate in the investing partners indicates the presence 
of economic risk in their countries in the long-term (see Chapter 5).  A higher inflation rate 
may lead to an inducement in outward FDI from investing partners to consider investing in 
Thailand.  In addition, when foreign investors transfer profits back to their countries they 
would benefit if the inflation rate in their countries is high because the currency would 
have more value when converted to domestic currencies.  In this case, foreign investors’ 
profits are higher as a result of the appreciated exchange rates.  Therefore, the estimated 
coefficient of Inflation Rate shows that the inflation rate in investing partners has a 
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significant impact on the determinants of portfolio investment in Thailand during the years 
1980-2004 (see Model 4).   
 
Table 6-2 shows that the dummy variables, the membership in APEC and ASEM for 
investing partners and Thailand, are both negative and statistically significant.  APEC is 
negative and significant in Model 4 at the 5% level of significance, but it is insignificant in 
Model 3.  ASEM is negative and statistically significant at the 1 % level of significance in 
Models 3 and 4.  When investing partners and Thailand are members of APEC, there is a 
less significant impact on portfolio investment than when they are members of ASEM.  
 
APEC and ASEM coefficients were hypothesised as positive (see Chapter 5), but the 
results show negative signs.  The negative signs for the regional integration dummy 
variables are consistent with the results of Biessen (1991), Brenton et al. (1999), and Portes 
and Rey (2005). The negative results arise from the fact that investing partners depend on 
their own financial resources and their domestic capital markets.  In addition, the investing 
partners may delay their investment in Thailand until they achieve their objectives such as 
tax deduction or tax exemption from the government.  Hence, APEC and ASEM members 
have undoubtedly affected the investment of the capital markets in Thailand.  This 
indicates that the co-operation of APEC and ASEM membership as an integrated scheme 
determines the portfolio investment in Thailand.  This is consistent with the results of 
Cuevas et al. (2005), that the negative significant regional integration variables means an 
investing country would delay investment until the host country provides exceptional 
investment incentives.  The result may reflect that foreign investors may change their 
investment plan while making their investment decisions.  That is, depending on the 
investment environment, foreign investors may decide to invest in the manufacturing 
sectors instead of capital investment.  Investors in general preferred to invest in countries 
who are members of APEC and ASEM.  This may be because APEC and ASEM believe 
that direct investment can increase countries’ welfare and sustain economic growth to the 
host countries through the increase of job opportunities, skill improvement, technology 
transfer, and poverty reduction.  
 
The regional integration variables are negatively significant in the portfolio investment 
model (see Table 6-2), but positive in the FDI model (see Table 6-1).  The significant 
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negative signs of APEC and ASEM variables in Table 6-2 indicate negative impacts on the 
flows of portfolio investment into Thailand.  Foreign investors may shift their funds to 
direct investment such as the manufacturing sector because they can gain benefits from the 
APEC and ASEM agreements (see Table 6-1).  APEC and ASEM members focus more 
efficiently on reducing production and transaction costs, improving trade information and 
business policies in order to increase trade and to provide cheaper goods and services with 
more employment opportunities.  The APEC and ASEM achievement stem from the 
expanded economies and facilitates economic growth among members (Chadee and 
Schlichting, 1997).   
 
The overall results in Table 6-2 show that GDP, GDP Per Capita, Distance, Trade, 
Exchange Rate, APEC, and ASEM variables are important factors affecting the size of 
portfolio investment in Thailand (see Model 4).  The significant positive estimate of GDP 
is a basic specification of the economic determinant in the portfolio investment model.  
The coefficients of GDP Growth Rate and Wage Rate are not significantly different from 
zero in all models and do not have significant impacts on the amount of portfolio 
investment.  However, the negative significant coefficient of Distance indicates that 
portfolio investment is determined by the gravity factor. 
 
The Wage Rate variable is not significantly different from zero in all models.  The GDP 
Growth Rate is significant only in Model 3 at the 10% level of significance.  The Inflation 
Rate is significant only in Model 4 at the 10% level of significance.  The estimated 
coefficients of these three variables are small.  This shows that the economic status of 
investing partners does not appear to influence portfolio investment, and suggests that 
portfolio investment into Thailand is mainly driven by the internal economic status.  For 
example, there is a wealth effect due to the devaluation of the Thai Baht driving up the 
inflows of portfolio investment into Thailand.  Moreover, from the empirical results in 
Table 6-2, it is evident that portfolio investment in Thailand does not follow the FDI 
pattern.   
6.3 The Effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on FDI and Portfolio 
Investment in Thailand 
 
Before 1997, the strong economic growth and attractive stock returns in Thailand attracted 
foreign investors to relocate their funds to the financial and capital markets in Thailand.  
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Thailand was one of the countries in Asia which benefited from strong economic growth as 
the results of globalisation, international financial linkages, and expansion of production 
bases overseas from investing countries.  For example, the aggregate volume of net capital 
inflows into Thailand surged from US$ 6.4 billion in 1990 to US$ 26.4 billion in 1997.  
However, these net inflows fell to US$ 13.6 billion in 1998 after Thailand was badly 
affected by the Asian Financial Crisis in mid 1997.   
 
The financial sector was already weak before the floating of the Thai Baht on 2 July, 1997, 
and 58 finance companies were suspended in the second half of 1997 (Sussangkarn, 1999).  
The Asian Financial Crisis almost crippled Thailand economy.  The exchange rate 
depreciated from 25 Baht per US Dollar in December, 1996 to 52 Baht per US Dollar in 
December, 1997.  In addition, the gross domestic investment (GDI) decreased dramatically 
from US$ 76.2 billion, to US$ 50.7 billion and US$ 22.9 billion in 1996, 1997 and 1998, 
respectively (see Table 2-1).  However, the current account balance turned into a 
substantial surplus in 1998 after decades of negative.  The depreciation of the Baht has 
caused the export of manufactured products to increase dramatically while the level of 
import capital goods and materials dropped.  This led to the current account surplus.  
Consequently, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis might cause substantial changes in the FDI 
and portfolio investment in Thailand.   
 
In the second half of 1997, financial chaos erupted in the Thai economy.  Large amounts of 
short-term foreign debt was repaid which affected Thailand.  However, FDI and portfolio 
inflows remained positive; inflows in 1997 and 1998 to Thailand were similar to those of 
1996.  In 1998, however, they fell by 31.6% (see Table 2-1);  inflows became low or 
negative  because of the political instability and economic adjustment problems.  To test 
for the effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, this study includes dummy variables to 
represent the years of Asian Financial Crisis.  Following Perron (1989) and Zhou and 
Lall’s (2005) studies, we extended estimating Equations (5.5) and (5.6) by including Dt 
equal to one for 1997 and 1998, the years when the Asian Financial Crisis was at its peak 
(1997 and 1998).  Equation (5.10) captures the structural break for FDI models in 
Thailand.  Finally, the break for portfolio flows in Thailand can be captured by Equation 
(5.11). 
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6.3.1 Structural Break in FDI Models in Thailand 
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients of the extended Gravity Models which 
consist of the size of the market (GDP, GDP Per Capita, and GDP Growth Rate), the 
geographical Distance and the Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables (1997 and 1998).  
Model 2 expands the regression shown in Model 1 with additional economic environment 
variables such as Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, and Inflation Rate.  It examines the 
effects of investing partners’ economies on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  The APEC 
and ASEM variables are included in Models 3 and 4 to determine whether externalities 
generated by the regional integrations provide an additional impetus to the inflows of FDI 
into Thailand.  However, Model 3 differs from Model 4 by excluding the Distance variable 
to examine the gravity specification in the determinants of FDI into Thailand.  Hence, 
Model 4 shows the empirical results for all explanatory variables including the Asian 
Financial Crisis dummy variables. 
 
In general, the coefficients for all the variables (except the Asian Financial Crisis dummy 
variables) are consistent with the results in Table 6-1 (see Table 6-3).  When the Asian 
Financial Crisis dummy variables are added the results of the F-statistics and Breusch and 
Pagan tests fail to accept the null hypotheses of common intercept.  The Hausman test is 
used to test whether the FEM or REM is preferred.  The results of the Hausman test fail to 
accept the null hypothesis.  Therefore, all models that accept the FEM are significant at the 
1% level of significance.  The results show the FEMs are preferred to the random effects 
models (REM) as suggested by the Hausman tests.  However, Model 2 could not be tested 
using the Hausman tests because the data could not invert the Variance-Covariance matrix 
for the Hausman test.  This is because the variances are not constant and the covariances 
are not equal to zero under the assumptions of the random effects structure (Wooldridge, 
2002).  There might be concerns about multicollinearity between the Asian Financial Crisis 
dummy variables.  The correlation between the two Asian Financial Crisis dummy 
variables is not disturbingly high (see Appendix D).  The fact that the Asian Financial 
Crisis dummy variables are jointly significant suggests that each of the variables detected 
the existence of financial crisis asymmetries across countries.  Therefore, these regressions 
have to accept the fixed effects models which contain higher R2 values than the OLS 
regressions and show statistically significant group (country) effects.  The explanatory 
powers of all four models (R2) are very high, between 70%-72%, especially in Models 3 
and 4 which contain 72%. 
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Table 6-3: Determinants of FDI in Thailand Using Equation (5.10) 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
Model 1a 2 b 3 c 4 d 
GDP 4.4548*** 4.5761*** 4.0982*** 4.0982*** 
GDP Per Capita -3.6163*** -3.6130*** 
-3.1036** -3.1036** 
GDP Growth Rate .0263 .0702** 
.0822** .0822** 
Distance .3582 .1503 
- -.0391 
Trade - .0985** 
.1139** .1139** 
Exchange Rate  - -.4043* 
-.5223** -.5223** 
Wage Rate - .1102** 
.1194** .1194** 
Inflation Rate - .0765*** 
.0860*** .0860*** 
APEC - - 
-.3924 -.3924 
ASEM - - 
.6265** .6265** 
Dummy 1997 .1019 .0620 
-.1792 -.1792 
Dummy 1998 .8090** .8556** 
.6706 .6706 
Constant - - - 
 
- 
   
  
No. of observations 525 525 525 525 
Mean 2.0851 2.0851 2.0851 2.0851 
Std. Dev. 1.7950 1.7578 1.7429 1.7446 
Sum of squares 1604.58 1526.41 1497.49 1497.49 
R2 69.55% 71.04% 71.58% 71.58% 
Adjusted R2 67.96% 69.28% 69.80% 69.74% 
F-Statistics 43.75*** 40.38*** 40.06*** 38.73*** 
Hausman-test 29.43*** -e 35.63*** 40.31*** 
 FEM FEM FEM FEM 
Notes:  i. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
         respectively.   
   ii.  FEM is the fixed effects model. 
    iii.  1a Model 1 represents the basic specification of extended Gravity Model which  
includes GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, and Distance. 
    iv.  2b Model 2 represents the basic specification variables, the macroeconomic  
variables of the investing partners (Wage Rate and Inflation Rate) and the 
economic relationship variables between Thailand and investing partners 
(Trade and Exchange Rate). 
    v.  3c Model 3 includes APEC and ASEM but excludes Distance. 
   vi.  4d Model 4 includes all explanatory variables. 
vii. e Model 2 shows the regression which could not invert the Variance-
Covariance matrix for the Hausman test. 
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All variables in Table 6-3 have the hypothesised signs except Exchange Rate (Models 2, 3, 
and 4), Distance (Model 1), and APEC (Models 3 and 4).  However, Distance and APEC 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero at the 10% level of significance.  The 
coefficients of GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, Trade, Wage Rate, Inflation 
Rate, and ASEM have the hypothesised signs and are statistically significant.  Exchange 
Rate contradicts prior hypothesised sign but is statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance in Model 2 and at the 5% level of significance in Models 3 and 4.  There are 
three reasons for this contradictive hypothesised signs (see Section 6.1): (1) investors take 
advantage of importing components, parts, and raw material from overseas; (2) most FDIs 
go to non-industry sectors; and (3) increase the confidence of the Thai economic status in 
the lone term.  Therefore, the results for Exchange Rate show an opposite of the prior 
hypothesised sign. 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables are statistically insignificant in Models 3 and 
4.  Thus, the dummy variables of Asian Financial Crisis do not have a significant effect on 
FDI inflows into Thailand.  This suggests that the inflows of FDI into Thailand were not 
affected by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the economic depression during 1997-
1998.  Table 2-2 (Chapter 2) shows evidence that FDI inflows into Thailand grew steadily 
in 1997-1998 after the Baht was floated (US$ 3.9 billion in 1996, US$ 5.1 billion in 1997, 
and US$ 6.9 billion in 1998).  This could have been attributed to a large number of 
ongoing projects approved by BOI, which are long-term commitments.  The inflows of 
FDI into Thailand were stable during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  In order for the FDI 
to exit Thailand, the MNCs must either be sold or shut down, which would likely occur in 
time of severe recession and if foreign investors intend to leave Thailand permanently.  To 
check the robustness of the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, the 1999 dummy variable 
was included into the FDI models.  The result shows that the 1999 dummy variable has no 
impact on FDI.  However, if the Asian Financial Crisis has an effect on the FDI inflows 
then the FDI was withdrawn or deposited by foreign investors in Thailand in 1997 and 
1998 but these funds have been restored by 1999.   
 
The Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables are included in the models (see Table 6-3) 
and the results are similar to the results in Table 6-1 without significant changes of the 
coefficients’ magnitudes in all variables (except the 1997 and 1998 dummy variables 
which are presented in Table 6-3 only).  This may be because the Asian Financial Crisis 
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dummy variables have no significant effect on the FDI models.  The GDP and GDP Per 
Capita variables are highly significant to the inflows of FDI into Thailand in both a 
positive and negative direction, respectively, in all models (see Table 6-3).  Trade and 
Wage Rate are positive and significant at the 5% level of significance in all models.  
Inflation Rate has a positive effect on the flows of FDI into Thailand at the 1% level of 
significance in all models.  The estimated coefficients of Exchange Rate are negative and 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 5% level of significance in Models 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively.  The findings show that the ASEM agreement positively affects the 
determinants of FDI in Thailand at the 5% level of significance in Models 3 and 4.  The 
Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables are not significantly different from zero in Models 
3 and 4.  The results in Table 6-3 are consistent with those in Table 6-1.  This suggests that 
the Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables do not significantly affect the inflows of FDI 
into Thailand (see Models 3 and 4).  However, the significant Exchange Rate variable 
shows that the determinants of FDI in Thailand are sensitive to changes in the economic 
depression and the depreciation of Thai Baht during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
The estimated coefficients of GDP are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
of significance in all models.  This highlights the importance of investing partners’ and 
Thailand’s production capacities in encouraging the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  In 
addition, the positive sign on the GDP Growth Rate variable in Models 2, 3 and 4 shows 
the strength of investing partners’ economies positively affecting the inflows of FDI into 
Thailand.  As expected, the inflows of FDI into Thailand increase with GDP and GDP 
Growth Rate.  However, the negative coefficient on GDP Per Capita is consistent with the 
result in Table 6-1 and the hypothesis that Thailand is a labour-intensive country rather 
than a capital-intensive country.  This implies that when FDI invest in Thailand, they 
prefer a reduction in production costs through labour costs.  This implies that Thailand had 
shifted resources from traditional agriculture to labour-intensive manufacturing in the 
1990s (see Table 2-3). 
 
As more economic environment variables such as Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, and 
Inflation Rate are included in Model 2, the estimated results show all variables are 
statistically significant.  Thus, holding other variables constant, the inflows of FDI into 
Thailand are very responsive to the economic environment with respect to investing 
partners’ economies.  The results indicate that the financial crisis that burst in mid-1997 in 
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Thailand had ended by 1999.  The positive coefficient sign of 1998 dummy variable 
suggests that the crisis had encouraged the inflows of FDI into Thailand and perhaps had 
contributed to Thailand’s rapid recovery from economic depression.  The estimated signs 
for Distance contradict the hypothesised sign, but the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero.  The results from Model 1 show that GDP Growth Rate and Distance 
have no significant impact on the inflows of FDI into Thailand and the years 1997 dummy 
variable yields an insignificant relationship to the inflows of FDI into Thailand.   
 
The Distance variable, which is a part of the extended Gravity Model, is included in Model 
4 to test the effect of information or transaction costs on the inflows of FDI into Thailand. 
The results of Model 3 (without Distance variable) and Model 4 (with Distance variable) 
show similar results.  This indicates that the Distance in Table 6-3 has no impact on the 
inflows of FDI into Thailand.  It is evident that distance does not play an important role in 
FDI decisions by foreign investors even when the Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables 
are included in the model.  The investing partners and Thailand have different legal 
systems, culture, and infrastructure which do not significantly determine the inflows of 
FDI into Thailand.  As discussed earlier, distance is a proxy for information or transaction 
costs, therefore, either the information or transaction costs do not significantly affect to the 
FDI or FDI is not sensitive to the distance.   
 
The coefficients of the Trade variable are positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance in Models 2, 3, and 4.  This shows that trade between investing 
partners and Thailand has a positive effect on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  The 
results are consistent with the results in Table 6-1 and confirm that FDI and Trade between 
the investing partners and Thailand are complementary even when the Asian Financial 
Crisis dummy variables are included in the models.    
 
The estimated coefficients of Exchange Rate are negative and statistically significant at the 
10%, 5%, and 5% level of significance in Models 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  Compared to 
the Exchange Rate estimates in Model 2 in Table 6-1, the estimated coefficient of 
Exchange Rate is significant in Table 6-3 only when the Asian Financial Crisis dummy 
variables are included.  The negative sign of Exchange Rate is discussed in Section 6.1 and 
it shows that a depreciation of investing partners’ currencies against the Thai Baht, 
encourages the inflow of FDI into Thailand.  In Model 1 (see Table 6-3), the 1998 dummy 
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variable has a positive effect on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  This coincides with the 
Asian Financial Crisis in mid-1997.  In addition, both Exchange Rate and 1998 dummy 
variables are statistically significant, hence, suggesting a strong correlation between the 
exchange rate and the Asian Financial Crisis in Thailand.  Thailand floated the Baht in July 
1997; the surplus in the balance of current account generated an additional net foreign 
exchange inflow into Thailand of about US$ 2 billion per month (Sussangkarn, 1999).  The 
current account continued to be in surplus throughout 1998, with the accumulated surplus 
totalling about US$ 14.3 billion (see Table 2-1).  As the current account surplus 
accumulated, Thailand began to strengthen its exports and received US$ 7 billion of FDI in 
1998 (see Table 2-1).  Furthermore, the depreciation of the Thai Baht and the current 
account surplus regained market share for Thai products in the global market and reassured 
foreign investors of Thailand’s position to meet its world competitiveness.  Consequently, 
the massive amounts of FDI especially in 1998 helped the country to recover from the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
The coefficients of Wage Rate are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance in Models 2, 3, and 4.  The coefficients of Inflation Rate are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance in Models 2, 3, and 4.  This is 
consistent with the results in Table 6-1, suggesting the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in 
Thailand had no significant effect on the investing partners’ decisions to invest in 
Thailand.  Wage Rate and Inflation Rate in Table 6-3 indicate the macroeconomic climate 
of the investing partners.  Therefore, the results show that high labour wage and high 
inflation rate in investing partners can encourage outward FDI and increase FDI into 
Thailand.  In 1996-8, the minimum wage rate in Thailand was 157 Baht per day (TDRI, 
2003), which became cheaper after the depreciation of the Thai Baht in mid 1997.  This 
caused the wage rate in investing partners to become more expensive compared to 
Thailand’s minimum wage rate.  Therefore, the investing partners take advantage of this by 
increasing the outward FDI to other countries, such as Thailand and Indonesia, which were 
hit by the Asian Financial Crisis.  The findings support the hypothesis that wage rate has 
positive effects on FDI into Thailand.  This is consistent with Yilmaz’s (2001) findings and 
the results in Model 2 (see Table 6-1) that the determinants of FDI into Thailand are 
mainly driven by the economic status in the investing partners.   
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The effect of different forms of regional integration variables such as APEC and ASEM 
are tested in Models 3 and 4 (see Table 6-3).  The coefficients of the ASEM dummy 
variable are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance in Models 3 
and 4.  The results indicate that investing partners’ memberships in ASEM significantly 
influence FDI into Thailand which is consistent with the results in Table 6-1.  This is 
because Thailand can offer a gateway for investing partners to other economic integrations, 
such as ASEAN, APEC, DAE (Dynamic Asian Economies)12, and the Closer-Economic 
Relationship13 of which Thailand is a member.  Thailand has announced the Agreement on 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments to protect foreign investors in order to 
encourage and promote the open flow of investment into the country.  Moreover, Thailand 
has signed the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) with more than 40 nations worldwide 
(BOI, 2005) to stimulate development of technology and private investment among 
members.  Thus, the investing partners will choose Thailand as a production base to take a 
better position in global competitiveness after the elimination of investment and trade 
barriers among members.  In contrast, Thailand can improve its efficiency and diversity of 
investment.  However, the APEC variables are negative and statistically insignificant in 
Models 3 and 4.  This suggests that Thailand and investing partners’ memberships in 
APEC does not significantly influence the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  As discussed in 
Section 6.1, most of the investing partners in this study are members of ASEM, thus the 
APEC dummy variable has no significant influence on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.   
 
The results show the Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables are insignificant which are 
consistent with a priori expectation that the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had no significant 
effect on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  The Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables in 
both Models 3 and 4 are statistically insignificant and changed little from 1997 to 1998.  
The finding contradicts the results from Models 1 and 2.  When all explanatory variables 
are included, the results suggest that the collapse of Thailand’s economy in 1997 had no 
effect on the inflows of FDI into Thailand during 1980-2004.  This suggests there was 
strong confidence of foreign investors in Thailand’s economic recovery (in the long term) 
in the face of the economic crisis in 1997.  The flows of FDI were stable and mainly from 
Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the US (see Appendix A) since Thailand had enacted 
                                                 
12
 The DAE group is composed of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand (Stone and Jeon, 1999). 
13
 Closer-Economic Relationship is composed of Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. 
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the Alien Business Law in 1972 that allowed foreign investors into Thailand with 
considerable flexibility (see Chapter 2).  For example, the Treaty of Amity and Economic 
Relations between the US and Thailand allows American investors who wish to set up 
operations in Thailand will not be restricted by the government legislation (Julian, 2001).   
 
This result is consistent with findings of Siamwalla et al. (1999) that FDI was not at all 
affected by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the economic slump in Thailand.  
Furthermore, FDI increased in 1997 after the flotation of the Baht.  There were a huge 
number of ongoing projects with BOI and a number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
during the financial crisis period in 1997-1998.  The increase in FDI could reduce the 
turmoil in other capital units in Thailand caused by the crisis. 
 
In summary, the overall results in Table 6-3 show that the determinants of FDI in Thailand 
from 21 major investing partners are not affected by the Asian Financial Crisis dummy 
variables.  The results also suggest that the economic environment of investing partners 
contributed to the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  This confirms the results in Table 6-3 that 
the pattern of FDI into Thailand was not affected by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.   
 
FDI is a stimulating complementary investment in Thailand over time that was not affected 
by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  This result may be due to the cost-saving motive of 
investors in setting up production in Thailand which had unrestricted regulations for 
foreign investors.  Moreover, the Thailand government provided many benefits such as tax 
incentives and dispersing of information to foreign investors to improve the confidence 
further and induce greater inflows of capital into Thailand.  Furthermore, most of the FDI 
into Thailand are medium- and/or long-term plans that are not too sensitive to external 
factors.  The results in Table 6-3 show evidence of strong macro economies in investing 
partners which encouraged the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  
6.3.2 Structural Break in Portfolio Investment Models in Thailand 
This section presents the results of the estimated coefficients of the determinants of 
portfolio investment in Thailand during 1980-2004 with the Asian Financial Crisis dummy 
variables for the year 1997 and 1998.  The estimated results using Equation (5.11), which 
includes the Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables in Equation (5.6), are presented in 
Table 6-4.  Similar findings apply to the portfolio investment model in Table 6-2.  The 
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1997 and 1998 dummy variables were included in the Equation (5.6) in order to test the 
effects of the Asian Financial Crisis on the inflows of portfolio investment.  Model 1 
shows the estimated coefficients of the market size variables (GDP, GDP Per Capita, and 
GDP Growth Rate), geographical Distance and the Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables 
(1997 and 1998).  The model investigates the effects of economic status between investing 
partners and Thailand with the Asian Financial Crisis.  Model 2 is extended by including 
more economic variables in investing partners such as Wage Rate, Inflation Rate, and the 
economic connection variables between investing partners and Thailand such as Trade and 
Exchange Rate.  Model 2 examines the effects of economic status in investing partners and 
Thailand on the portfolio investment in Thailand during the Asian Financial Crisis.  
Models 3 and 4 include the APEC and ASEM variables to test the effects of different 
forms of economic agglomeration on portfolio investment in Thailand.  The Distance 
variable is included in Model 4 to test the impact of all explanatory variables including the 
Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables.  To check for robustness, Model 3 excluded 
geographical Distance in order to compare the results in Model 4 which includes Distance. 
 
When choosing between fixed and random effects, the F-statistics and Breusch and Pagan 
tests were used to test the null hypothesis of common intercept against the random effects.  
The Breusch and Pagan test rejected the null hypothesis in Models 1 and 2 (only the 
economic environment variables are analysed), thus, the FEM generates the most reliable 
results (see Table 6-4).  The addition of regional integration variables in Models 3 and 4 
were conducted through the random effects approach.  This is due to the Breusch and 
Pagan tests which rejected the null hypotheses of common intercept and the Hausman tests 
which accepted the null hypotheses of efficient random effects.  The random effects 
model’s estimated results revealed that time-specifics are appropriate.  The results in Table 
6-4 show that the models can explain 60-68% of the total variation in the determinants of 
portfolio investment in Thailand and the specification F-statistics are statistically 
significant at the 1% critical level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  130 
Table 6-4: Determinants of Portfolio Investment in Thailand Using Equation (5.11) 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
Model 1 a 2 b 3 c 4 d 
GDP 
-8.2742*** -8.2666*** 1.4972** 1.6442*** 
GDP Per Capita 12.0704*** 12.0673*** 1.4379** 1.7511*** 
GDP Growth Rate 
.0919 .1400 .1563* .1124 
Distance 
-8.0036 -8.1106 - -4.0297*** 
Trade 
- .1926 .2780*** .2815** 
Exchange Rate  
- .0724 1.0056*** 1.1296*** 
Wage Rate 
- -.0609 -.1045 -.0629 
Inflation Rate 
- .0753 -.0855 .0926 
APEC 
- - -1.2527 -2.0127** 
ASEM 
- - -2.5972*** -3.0836*** 
Dummy 1997 2.7170** 2.7630** 4.0026*** 4.0086*** 
Dummy 1998 2.5342** 2.5738** 3.1678*** 3.2001*** 
Constant 
- - -45.3857*** -18.8926** 
 
    
No. of observations 525 525 525 525 
Mean 
-3.7513 -3.7513 -3.7513 -3.7513 
Std. Dev. 4.9500 4.9497 6.3237 5.8283 
Sum of squares 12202.27 12102.82 20780.80 17847.90 
. R2 60.29% 60.61% 64.53% 68.17% 
Adjusted R2 58.22% 58.22% 63.70% 67.36% 
F-Statistics 29.08*** 25.34*** 23.70*** 24.96*** 
Hausman-test 17.36*** 21.81** 13.12 9.99 
 FEM FEM REM REM 
Notes:  i. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
         respectively.   
   ii.  FEM is the fixed effects model. 
   iii.  REM is the random effects model.  
   iv.  1a Model 1 represents the basic specification of extended Gravity Model which  
includes GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, and Distance. 
    v.  2b Model 2 represents the basic specification variables, the macroeconomic  
variables of the investing partners (Wage Rate and Inflation Rate) and the  
economic relationship variables between Thailand and investing partners 
(Trade and Exchange Rate). 
    vi.  3c Model 3 includes APEC and ASEM but excludes Distance. 
   vii.  4d Model 4 includes all explanatory variables. 
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The parameter estimates for the determinants of portfolio investment in Thailand during 
1980-2004 with the Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables (year 1997 and 1998) are 
presented in Table 6-4.  Overall, the estimated coefficients for all variables (except the 
Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables) in every model are similar both in sign and 
coefficient magnitude.  The estimated coefficients of GDP, ASEM, and the 1997 and 1998 
dummy variables are significant in all models (see Table 6-4).  Notwithstanding the 
hypothesised signs, Inflation Rate is insignificant in all models.  The Wage Rate variable 
has the opposite hypothesised sign but is insignificant in all models.  The Exchange Rate 
and Trade variables are positive and significant at the 1% and 5% level of significance, 
respectively in Models 3 and 4, but insignificant in Model 2.   
 
When the Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables are included in the models, the results in 
Table 6-4 are consistent with the results in Table 6-2 in all models.  In addition, the Asian 
Financial Crisis dummy variables in Table 6-4 are significant in determining the structural 
breaks in the portfolio investment model.   
 
The estimated coefficient of the GDP variable is negatively significant (see Models 1 and 
2) at the 1% level of significance but when the regional integration variables are included, 
it becomes positive (see Models 3 and 4).  As discussed in Section 6.2, the hypothesised 
signs of the GDP variables changes depending on whether it is the FEM (Models 1 and 2) 
or REM (Models 3 and 4).  APEC and ASEM are included in Models 3 and 4 and the 
estimated coefficients sign of GDP changed from negative to positive similar to Table 6-2 
results.  However, it was found that the GDP in both investing partners and Thailand has a 
significant effect on portfolio investment in Thailand.  The higher the value of GDP in both 
investing partners and Thailand, generally, represents a greater amount of the inflows of 
portfolio investment in Thailand (see Models 3 and 4).   
 
In Model 2, both GDP and GDP Per Capita remain significant at the 1% level of 
significance when the economic environment variables such as Trade, Exchange Rate, 
Wage Rate, and Inflation Rate are introduced into the model.  However, these variables 
have no effect on the model.  The result in Model 2 is similar to the result in Model 1.  
This suggests that Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, and Inflation Rate have no effect on 
the inflows of portfolio investment into Thailand.  This implies that the influences on 
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portfolio investment in Thailand could not be determined by the economic environment in 
investing partners.  
 
The inflows of portfolio investment into Thailand displayed a positive relationship 
between GDP, GDP Per Capita, Trade, and Exchange Rate (see Model 4).  These results 
are consistent with the results in Model 4 in Table 6-2.  For example, an increase in 
Exchange Rate by 1% will increase the portfolio investment in Thailand by 1.1%, 
assuming other factors are held constant.  The positive estimated coefficient sign on 
Exchange Rate is consistent with Model 4 in Table 6-2.  This suggests that the exchange 
rate has a positive effect on portfolio investment in Thailand, whereby the appreciation of 
investing partner’s currencies against Thai Baht will increase inflow of portfolio 
investment into Thailand.    
 
Distance has negative signs in all models but is significant only in Model 4.  As shown in 
Model 4, the distance between investing partners and Thailand seems to have a negative 
significance in foreign portfolio investors’ decision-making about Thailand.  Moreover, 
Distance also significantly affects the GDP Growth Rate and APEC (see Model 4).  It is 
evident that geographical distance between investing partners and Thailand is a significant 
resistance factor for portfolio investment into Thailand.  The inclusion of Distance in 
Model 4 increases the magnitude of most coefficients compared to the results in Model 3.   
 
The results confirm that APEC and ASEM are negative and statistically significant at the 
5% and 1% level of significance, respectively (see Model 4) which is a similar to Model 4 
results (see Table 6-2).  The negative sign on APEC and ASEM may be due to the main 
objectives of these regional integrations, which are focused on direct investment, but the 
results show that regional integrations significantly affect portfolio inflow patterns into 
Thailand.  Hence, APEC and ASEM will reconsider its members’ interests such as 
exchanging views on the global economic outlook and improving the principles and 
regulations in the financial sector to enhance investment opportunities amongst members.  
 
The 1997 and 1998 dummy variables are positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance in Models 1 and 2 and the 1% level of significance in Models 3 and 4.  
The result supports the hypothesis that the Asian Financial Crisis affected the inflows of 
portfolio investment into Thailand.  The Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables (1997 
  133 
and 1998 dummy variables) displayed positive impacts on the inflows of portfolio 
investment into Thailand.  The 1997 and 1998 dummy variables are positive and 
significant in all regressions that coincide with the Asian Financial Crisis.  This shows the 
break in the portfolio investment models which coincides with the Asian Financial Crisis 
on the 2nd of July, 1997.  The results indicate the positive effect of the Asian Financial 
Crisis on portfolio investment in 1997 that was sustained in 1998.  The 1997 dummy 
variable shows a positive impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on the portfolio investment 
in Thailand which means the inflows of portfolio investment into Thailand increased in 
1997.  Table 2-2 (Chapter 2) shows the dramatic increase in the inflows of portfolio 
investment into Thailand from US$ 7,261 million in 1996 to US$ 21,376 million in 1997.  
Furthermore, the 1998 dummy variable is positive and significant in the portfolio 
investment model (see Model 4).  This positive impact is also extended into 1998, by 
which time the crisis is highly correlated with the depreciation of Thai Baht.  The inflows 
of portfolio investment into Thailand in 1998 dropped from 150% from 1997 but the 
average inflows of portfolio investment in pre- and post-crisis (1980-1996 and 1999-2004, 
respectively) are less than the amount of inflow in 1998, which is US$ 6,761 million.  For 
example, Table 2-2 (see Chapter 2) shows the average inflows of portfolio investment into 
Thailand per year from 1980-1996 (pre-crisis) was US$ 2,418.53 million compared to US$ 
4,027 million in the post-crisis period (1999-2004).  The results in all models (see Table 6-
4) demonstrate that the effect of the Asian Financial Crisis had significant impact on the 
inflows of foreign portfolio investment in Thailand in 1997 and 1998.  The results indicate 
that the occurrence of the financial crisis that burst in mid 1997 in Thailand had significant 
impacts on the portfolio investment into Thailand. 
 
The coefficients of Wage Rate and Inflation Rate are not significant in any model (see 
Table 6-4).  However, the coefficients of the GDP, GDP Per Capita, Distance, Trade, 
Exchange Rate, APEC, and ASEM variables are statistically significant but vary in sign 
and magnitude in most models.  This implies that the inflows of portfolio investment into 
Thailand are not driven by the market size and income in the investing partners any more 
than by those in Thailand.  It suggests that the portfolio investment activity is different 
from FDI activity in Thailand.  The 1997 and 1998 Asian Financial Crisis dummy 
variables are positively significant in the portfolio investment model.  Between 1996 and 
1997 (pre and post the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis), the flows of portfolio investment into 
Thailand increased from US$ 7.3 billion to US$ 21.4 billion in 1997, an increase of more 
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than US$ 14 billion.  Conversely, FDI inflows to Thailand increased only US$ 1.2 billion 
from 1996 to 1997 (see Table 2-2).  Portfolio investment into Thailand responds 
significantly to distance and was affected by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.  The 
speculative assault on the Thai currency in July 1997 had a deteriorating impact on the 
economy and currency.   
6.4 Relationship between FDI and Industrial Categories across Thailand 
during 1980-2004 
 
This section discusses the industry-level and inward FDI from the 21 Thailand investing 
partners between 1980 and 2004.  Table 6-5 shows the results of FDI by industrial category 
for Thailand using Equation (5.16).  The coefficients of the GDP, Capital Stock, Inflation 
Rate, Exchange Rate, International Reserves, Wage Rate, Unemployment Rate, Current 
Account Balance, National Saving, ASEM and APEC variables for the nine industrial 
categories (industry, financial institutions, trade, mining and quarrying, agricultural 
products, services, investment, real estate, and others) are estimated using panel data for 
Thailand.     
 
The Durbin-Watson tests show no presence of autocorrelation (Greene, 2003).  All the 
industrial categories have relatively high explanatory power (R2).  The F-test failed to 
accept the null hypothesis that the estimated parameters for all categories are equal to zero 
(see Table 6-5).  
 
The estimated results of the inflows of FDI into Thailand in the industry category perform 
satisfactorily; there was a high R2 (95.21%) for all estimates (see Table 6-5).  GDP and 
Capital Stock are positive and significant at the 1% level of significance.  This shows that 
the inflows of FDI into the industry category are significant and positively affected by 
GDP and Capital Stock.  In addition, the Unemployment Rate is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance.  That means a high unemployment rate in 
Thailand exerts a positive influence on the inflows of FDI because it reflects availability of 
labour (labour quantity).  This is consistent with the findings of Roberto (2004) who shows 
that the labour market has a significant impact on FDI where high unemployment 
provinces in the Southern part of Italy have a greater attraction to FDIs than the Northern 
part.  Thus, foreign investors avoid scarcity of workers and the high number of 
unemployed makes Thailand potentially more attractive.   
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The results in the industry category also show that International Reserves and Wage Rate 
are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance.  Holding other 
factors constant, a 1% increase in Wage Rate in Thailand will decrease the inflows of FDI 
into the industry category by 7.72%.  This shows the sensitivity of changes in wages; a rise 
in labour costs in Thailand forces foreign investors to reduce production in Thailand.  This 
result is consistent with the findings of Milner et al. (2004), that cheap labour in Thailand 
encourages Japanese firms to set up plants in Thailand.  Similarly, Rubesch and 
Banomyong (2005) concur that the US investors’ use of Thailand as a production base for 
the automotive industry is encouraged by the lower wages paid compared to Mexico.  
Wage Rate, however, has the greatest impact on the inflows of FDI into the industry 
category in terms of elasticity compared to GDP, Capital Stock, International Reserves, 
and Unemployment Rate.  This also implies that the inflows of FDI into the industry 
category are import-substitution.  FDI in Thailand was an import-substitution (IS) industry 
especially in textiles and automobiles until the beginning of the 1970s and changed to 
export-oriented (EO) in the mid 1970s.  During the early stage of export, FDI in Thailand 
changed to light manufacturing industries such as clothing, toys, and footwear 
(Kohpaiboon, 2003).  Recently, Thailand’s abundance of labour became the main 
attraction for foreign investors in electronics and electrical goods and automobile 
industries.  Today, besides the Japanese investors, the US investors also set up automotive 
plants in Thailand.  According to Rubesch and Banomyong’s (2005) study, Thailand has a 
competitive advantage over Mexico in the same operation (finished seat covers).  Thailand 
achieved an average yield of 70% or 75% better than suppliers from Mexico with a better 
quality of leather.  However, most industries in Thailand are import-substitution FDI but 
they try to shift their policies to export-orientated FDI following Thailand government 
policy, which has promoted an export-oriented FDI since the 1970s (see Chapter 2).    
 
Hence, increases in GDP, Capital Stock, and Unemployment Rate encourage more inflows 
of FDI into the industry category in Thailand.  In contrast, a decrease in International 
Reserves and Wage Rate stimulate the inflows of FDI into the industry category in 
Thailand.  However, Inflation Rate, Exchange Rate, Current Account Balance, National 
Saving, and regional integration variables (APEC and ASEM) do not significantly 
influence the inflows of FDI into the industry category.  
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In the financial institutions category, the estimated coefficients of GDP, Inflation Rate, 
Current Account Balance, National Saving, and ASEM are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance, but Unemployment Rate is negative and 
significant at the 1% level of significance.  Capital Stock is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance which is similar to the Unemployment Rate.  
According to Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004a), a large increase in capital stock increases 
FDI, which in turn increases supply to the domestic market.  On the other hand, a negative 
relationship between FDI and capital stock shows FDI produces to serve overseas markets, 
thereby increase in number of exporters.  Furthermore, the authors found capital stocks as 
an important factor of production.  Foreign investments profit can be increased by reducing 
the cost of domestic capital or by increasing the profitability of domestic production 
combined with foreign output.  This promotes a country’s comparative advantage.  Hence, 
the estimated coefficients of Capital Stock in the financial institutions, trade, mining and 
quarrying, services, and others categories are negative and significant at the 1% level of 
significance.  Therefore, it can be concluded that the inflows of FDI into the financial 
institutions, trade, mining and quarrying, services, and others categories focus on export-
oriented production following the BOI’s objectives to promote Thailand as a production 
hub to its neighbouring markets (BOI, 2005).  The results also show that Exchange Rate, 
International Reserves, Wage Rate, and APEC have no significant impact on the inflows of 
FDI into the financial institutions category.  
 
GDP, Capital Stock, Inflation Rate, Exchange Rate, International Reserves, Wage Rate, 
and APEC are statistically significantly at the 5% level of significance in the trade 
category.  The negative sign on Capital Stock in the trade category is consistent with the 
financial institutions category.  This suggests that the trade and financial institutions 
categories focus on exports and do not rely on the domestic market.  Moreover, the 
Exchange Rate in the trade category has a positive effect on the inflows of FDI as a priori 
hypothesised and is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance.  The result 
shows that the depreciation of the Thai Baht has a strong positive impact on the inflows of 
FDI into the trade category.  Holding other factors constant, a 1% decrease in the exchange 
rate of the Thai Baht will increase the inflows of FDI into the trade category by 5.06%.  
Wage Rate in the trade category also has a positive impact on the inflows of FDI.  This 
suggests that the inflows of FDI into the trade category is sensitive to changes in the Wage 
Rate; the inflows of FDI into the trade category increases when minimum daily wage rates 
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in Thailand increase.  This could be due to the higher costs of production and therefore 
FDI attracts investment in the trade category rather than the industry category, which 
recruits fewer workers to reduce production costs. 
 
The negative coefficient of APEC in the trade category is consistent with the results in 
Tables 6-2 and 6-4.  According to Biessen (1991) and Brenton et al. (1999) findings, the 
negative results indicate that foreign direct investors rely on their own financial resources 
and supplies.  Furthermore, Portes and Rey (2005) suggest that the negative results arise 
from the FDIs which delay investing in the host country until they achieve their aims after 
negotiations with the host country’s government such as promotional privileges or tax 
incentives.  In Thailand, the exemptions from tariffs or non-tariff and investor-protection 
provisions to foreign investors are offered by the BOI.  Negotiations on removing tariffs 
were implemented under the preferential trade agreements after the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis and particularly after the Thaksin government took office in 2001 (Sally, 2007).  In 
2003, trade between Thailand and India were relatively small.  For example, India 
accounted for 0.8% of Thailand total exports and 1.16% of Thailand total imports.  The 
low level of trade between Thailand and India led to the elimination of tariffs on 82 items.  
This led to enhanced trade between the two countries resulting in an increase of 113.9% of 
exports from Thailand to India.  In addition, Japan is Thailand’s biggest merchandise-
trading partner.  To maintain a positive relationship with Japanese investors, Thailand 
enacted the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) in 2006.  The 
agreement covers trade in goods and services, investment, trade facilitation and economic-
cooperation in education, human-resources development, tourism, and technology (Sally, 
2007).  This shows that foreign investors may take positive or negative action to invest in 
Thailand depending on the conditions and the benefits they will gain from the negotiations.  
 
The mining and quarrying category has high production costs with large numbers of 
workers; therefore, Capital Stock, Exchange Rate, and Wage Rate were expected to have 
significant impacts on this category.  As hypothesised, Capital Stock is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance.  In addition, Exchange Rate, Wage 
Rate, and APEC are positive and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance.  
The inflows of FDI are most sensitive to Wage Rate and increases investment in the 
mining and quarrying category when wages in Thailand rise.  Similarly, in the trade 
category, the results show that depreciation of the Thai Baht has a positive effect on the 
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inflows of FDI into the mining and quarrying category.  The Exchange Rate is important in 
determining FDI in the mining and quarrying category due to the costs of labour.  The FDI 
in the mining and quarrying category needs to hire skilled labour, which is more expensive 
than unskilled labour.  This increases the cost of production to the FDI.  To reduce the 
production cost, the FDI prefers a depreciation of the Thai Baht which decreases the 
production costs in Thailand and increases profits from the low prices for exports to the 
global market.  Thus FDI is sensitive to the Exchange Rate changes.  The coefficient of 
APEC is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance.  This occurs 
for three reasons.  First, the result implies that FDIs invest in APEC member countries to 
export to APEC members’ markets through improved market access (Elek, 1992).  Second, 
FDIs can improve Thailand’s domestic markets in Thailand with their investment 
resources, such as offering skill training programmes, transferring useful know-how, 
enhancing job opportunities, and improving national revenues.  In addition, FDIs with their 
technology and advanced R&D are able to use the natural resources more efficiently 
compared to domestic investors.  Third, FDIs gain advantages from trade exemptions such 
as the elimination of tariff or non-tariff under the APEC agreement amongst members.  
Therefore, most FDIs in this category come from APEC members such as the US or Japan.   
 
Thailand is an agricultural-based country with up to 40% of the total labour force involved 
in agriculture in 2003 (BOT, 2004).  However, foreign investors have never focused on 
this category as shown by the small number of applications for promotional privileges 
from the BOI.  For example, 0.5% of the total FDI received promotional privileges from 
BOI during 1980-2004 (see Table 2-3).  There may be two reasons for this.  First, 
agricultural-based industrial production has never attracted investors due to the unreliable 
price of agricultural products in the global market and the high risk of unpredictable and 
uncontrollable factors such as weather.  Second, it may be because the Thai government 
has set up a policy to control price and quantity in some agricultural products such as rice 
and sugar to export to the global market.  If the investors would like to export, they need 
government authorisation before exporting to importers under the government list.  In 
Thailand, there are very few successes in agriculture that are not involved with or 
subsidised by the government.  For example, Thailand used the Rice Office to keep the 
price of rice as low as politically possible (Rock, 2002).  The price of rice in Thailand is 
guaranteed by the Thai government to be as low and stable.  In addition, the government 
intervenes by implementing a variety of taxes on the price of rice that increase when there 
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is a shortage of rice in the markets, and decrease when there is an excess of rice supply.  
Table 6-5 shows Capital Stock on the inflows of FDI into the agricultural products 
category is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance.  The Wage 
Rate, Unemployment Rate, and ASEM are negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level of significance.  A negative and significant Wage Rate variable in the agricultural 
products category indicates that the inflows of FDI are greater in locations with relatively 
low labour costs.  This result suggests that Wage Rate has the greatest impact on the 
inflows of FDI in terms of elasticity compared to other categories.  Holding other factors 
constant, a 1% increase in the Wage Rate in Thailand will decrease the inflows of FDI into 
the agricultural products category by 10.47%.  Even the FDI in the agricultural products 
category does not produce goods to export, but wage rate is one of the production costs.  If 
the cost is high then the price will be raised and cannot compete in the domestic market.  In 
addition, the positive coefficient sign on Capital Stock in the agricultural products category 
suggests that foreign investors prefer to invest in agricultural products in Thailand to serve 
the domestic market rather than for export.  GDP, Exchange Rate, and APEC have no 
impact on the inflows of FDI in the agricultural products category (see Table 6-5).   
 
The services category shows that GDP and Inflation Rate are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance (see Table 6-5).  In addition, the Current 
Account Balance is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance and 
Wage Rate and APEC are positive and statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance.  The results in the services category demonstrate that GDP is the most 
important factor for inflow of FDI in terms of elasticity.  The GDP elasticity on the inflows 
of FDI in the services category is 9.98 compared to Capital Stock (-7.39), Inflation Rate 
(0.08), International Reserves (-.91), Wage Rate (2.57), Current Account Balance (.01), 
and APEC (.66).  The Capital Stock coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance.  This is consistent with Egger and Pfaffermayr’s (2004a) 
findings that the negative sign on Capital Stock reveals an export-oriented strategy for FDI 
and it is an important factor in production that fosters a country’s comparative advantage.  
This suggests that the inflows of FDI into the services category are serving the external 
markets.  Sally (2007) also reports that the FDI from the US is the main investor to invest 
in the services category in Thailand.  The FDIs from the US are making very ambitious 
demands in negotiations and investment in this category since Thailand announced the 
Master plan for Telecommunications Development in 1997 to arrange the liberalisation of 
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basic telecommunications services by 2006 (Sally, 1999).  This increased the inflows of 
FDI in the services category from less than 3% of the total of FDI per year to 7% and 12% 
in 1997 and 2002, respectively (see Table 2-3).  Moreover, the Thai government has 
attracted more inward FDI by improving transportation and infrastructure systems under 
the Eastern Seaboard Programme to build a new deep sea port, rail way, and cargo airport 
in the Eastern part of Thailand in the 1990s.  This may attract more inflows of FDI into the 
services category, more than in the late 1990s to the 2000s, which allow foreign investors 
to fully own buildings and land in the industrial estate.  This estate provides advanced 
technologies and superior infrastructure to foreign investors to service or ship overseas.  
The coefficient of APEC in the services category is positive and statistically significant at 
the 10% level of significance.  This is related to the fact that most foreign investors in this 
category come from the US, which is a member of APEC, as is Thailand.  Therefore, the 
US takes advantage of the APEC membership by investing in Thailand.  The Exchange 
Rate, Unemployment Rate, National Saving, and ASEM do not have a significant effect on 
the inflows of FDI into the services category.  
 
In the investment category, GDP, Exchange Rate, International Reserves, and National 
Saving are negative, but Capital Stock, Wage Rate, and Current Account Balance are 
positive and statistically significantly at the 5% level of significance.  The inflows of FDI 
into the investment category are sensitive to changes in Capital Stock followed by 
Exchange Rate.  For example, a 1% increase in Capital Stock in the investment category 
will increase the inflows of FDI by 25.85%, and a 1% depreciation of the exchange rate 
decreases the inflows of FDI into the investment category by 21.33% (see Table 6-5).  The 
results suggest that foreign investors investing in the investment category in Thailand 
focused on the domestic market.  Therefore, FDIs prefer a strong Thai Baht, which reflects 
the strength of the Thai economy and the increase in demands and purchasing powers of 
consumers in Thailand.  Moreover, Wage Rate has a positive and significant effect on the 
inflows of FDI into the investment category.  A higher wage rate shows a higher income 
and implies higher welfare and higher power purchasing power for consumers in the 
domestic market.  When the quality of life in Thailand increases, the inflows of FDI may 
focus on investing in the investment category rather than other categories.  However, the 
total of the inflows of FDI into the investment category is very small and its total value has 
not been greater than US$ 1 million since 1992 (see Table 2-3).  Inflation Rate and the 
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regional integration dummy variables (APEC and ASEM) appear to have no significant 
effect on the inflows of FDI into the investment category.  
The value of the inflows of FDI into the real estate category was very high before the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis.  For example, Table 2-3 shows that the inflows of FDI in the real 
estate category was 8.27% in 1992 and increased to 28.54% the following year and 
remained at this rate until 1996 before decreasing to 2.25% in 1997 and 0.41% in 1998 
(BOI, 2005; BOT, 2005).  The results show GDP, Capital Stock, International Reserves, 
and APEC are positive and statistically significant at the 5% or lower level of significance.  
On the other hand, the coefficients of Inflation Rate, Wage Rate, Current Account Balance, 
and National Saving are negative and statistically significantly at the 10% level of 
significance.  Wage Rate is found to be the most important factor in determining the 
inflows of FDI with an elasticity of -7.48.  Holding other factors constant, a 1% increase in 
labour wage in Thailand will decrease the inflows of FDI into the real estate category by 
7.48%.  This may be due to high demands and the numbers of workers required to build 
the buildings.  Most foreign investors who invest in the real estate category in Thailand 
focused on foreign customers.  The foreign investors prefer a short-term investment to a 
long-term investment in order to earn higher revenue and avoid the possibility of economic 
unpredictability such as exchange rate volatility and political changes.  Most foreign 
investors in this category are from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan (see Appendix A).  
These foreign investors represent highly influential participants in the real estate category.  
However, after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the number of the inflows of FDI into the 
real estate category reduced dramatically to 0.41% in 1998 and remained less than 2% of 
the total of the inflows of FDI in the following years.  
The results for the inflows of FDI into the others category show that GDP, Capital Stock, 
International Reserves, and National Saving are important in determining the inflows of 
FDI into Thailand.  Inflation Rate, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, Unemployment Rate, 
Current Account Balance, ASEM, and APEC do not influence FDI in the others category.  
  
Table 6-5 shows that the inflows of FDI into nine industrial categories: industry, financial 
institutions, trade, mining and quarrying, agricultural products, services, investment, real 
estate, and others, are sensitive to changes in Capital Stock.  Capital Stock has the greatest 
impact on the inflows of FDI into the investment category compared to other categories 
  143 
with an elasticity of 25.85.  GDP has a positive and significant impact on all categories 
except on the mining and quarrying and the agricultural products categories but is negative 
in the investment category.  The financial institutions category is not sensitive to wages, 
while Wage Rate has a negative impact on the inflows of FDI into the industry, agricultural 
products, and real estate categories.  The rise in labour wages in Thailand would cause the 
inflows of FDI to decline.  However, Wage Rate has a positive impact on the inflows of 
FDI into the trade, mining and quarrying, services and investment categories.  Only three 
categories, trade, mining and quarrying, and investment, are impacted by the Exchange 
Rate.  When FDI is export-oriented, the Exchange Rate is found to be positive and 
significant, such as in the trade and mining and quarrying categories.  On the other hand, 
the Exchange Rate has a negative impact on import-substitution FDI such as FDI in the 
investment category.  Only the inflows of FDI into the financial institutions category are 
not impacted by International Reserves.  The numbers of workers and unemployment rate 
have significant impacts on the inflows of FDI into the industry, financial institutions, and 
agricultural products categories.  Inflation Rate, Current Account Balance, and National 
Saving have no significant impact on the inflows of FDI into some categories such as the 
industry and mining and quarrying.  However, the financial institutions, trade, mining and 
quarrying, services, and others categories are promoted as export-oriented production by 
the Thai government.  The strategy of the inflows of FDI into this group takes advantage of 
the abundance of labour and lower wages in Thailand in order to reduce production costs.  
This is considered an efficiency-seeking FDI, whereas the inflows of FDI into the industry, 
agricultural products, investment, and real estate categories complement the import-
substitution FDI focusing on the domestic market.  Even some industries in Thailand are 
promoted to be export-oriented such as electronics/electrical products and textile, but the 
overall image of the industry category is one of import-substitution. 
 
From the results, it can be concluded that the financial institutions, trade, mining and 
quarrying, services, and others categories are vertical FDI and the others are horizontal 
FDI.   In integration networks, FDI in Thailand may offer attractive operating 
environments for export-oriented FDI in an efficiency-seeking strategy: low wage rates 
and the number of workers.  Thus, FDI builds production networks in Thailand in response 
to such factors to gain overall efficiency.  Import-substitution FDI is determined by market 
size, growth and attractiveness of the domestic market (Thai economy), such as GDP and 
capital stock and the investment climate.  Import-substitution FDI does not enter into 
  144 
competition with other countries.  Zhou and Lall (2005) suggest that an import-substitution 
FDI offers attractive investment opportunities; this is not a threat to other markets if the 
domestic market is also attractive.  FDI will focus on the domestic market instead of 
producing for export.  On the other hand, an efficiency-seeking FDI invests to serve 
external markets where direct competition is possible.  This is called an export-oriented 
strategy, which is the preference for FDI in Thailand (BOI, 2005) 
   
ASEM has a significant impact on the financial institutions and agricultural products 
categories.  APEC has a significant impact on more categories than ASEM, such as in the 
trade, mining and quarrying, services, and real estate categories.  This is consistent with the 
results in Section 6.1 that regional integration has a significant influence over the inflows 
of FDI into Thailand but less than the country characteristics.  Thailand is a member of 
APEC and ASEM and could take advantage of these agreements to attract investors into 
the country.   
6.5 Summary of the Findings 
 
The results of the extended Gravity Model show that GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth 
Rate, Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, Inflation Rate, and ASEM all have a significant 
impact on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  However, Distance and APEC do not have 
significant impacts on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  This implies that FDI in Thailand 
is significantly influenced by its 21 investing partners and is supply-side driven by the 
investing partners.  The results also suggest that the economic environment of the 21 
investing partners influence on the inflows of FDI into Thailand.   
 
When the Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables are included in the FDI model, the 
results show that the Asian Financial Crisis has no significant impact on the inflows of FDI 
into Thailand.  This suggests that FDI was not affected by the Asian Financial Crisis from 
1997 to 1998.   
 
The GDP, GDP Per Capita, Distance, Trade, Exchange Rate, APEC, and ASEM are 
important factors influencing the portfolio investment model.  The results show that GDP 
Growth Rate, Wage Rate, and Inflation Rate are not significant in influencing the inflows 
of portfolio investment into Thailand.  The results also show that Distance is negatively 
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and significantly related to the size of portfolio investments.  This indicates that 
information costs have a greater influence on portfolio investment than on the FDI model.  
APEC and ASEM negatively affect the determinants of portfolio investment in Thailand, 
while APEC and ASEM have positive impacts on the FDI model.  This means foreign 
investors readily shift their funds to Thailand’s capital markets immediately after they 
receive their negotiated exemption incentives from the Thai government.  The results also 
suggest that the inflows of portfolio investment into Thailand are mainly driven by the 
Thai economy and are not influenced by the economic status of the 21 investing partners.   
 
The Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables positively impact the inflows of portfolio 
investment into Thailand during 1997-1998.  The results indicate that the Asian Financial 
Crisis in mid-1997 increased total foreign portfolio investment in Thailand.  The results 
suggest that the activity of foreign portfolio investors is different from the activity of 
foreign direct investors.  The inflows of FDI into Thailand were more stable than the other 
form (such as portfolio investment) of foreign investment flows during the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis.  This indicates that portfolio investment in Thailand does not follow the 
FDI pattern.   
 
In terms of industrial category, the results suggest that the inflows of FDI into Thailand are 
both an export-oriented investment and import-substitution investment, which is both a 
market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI respectively.  The export-oriented FDI are in 
the financial institutions, trade, mining and quarrying, services, and others categories.  The 
industry, agricultural products, investment, and real estate categories act as import-
substitution FDI in Thailand.   
 
The results show that Capital Stock is an important factor for all the FDI categories: 
industry, financial institutions, trade, mining and quarrying, agricultural products, services, 
investment, real estate, and others.  However, in the case of investment and others 
categories, the Capital Stock is found to have a greater impact on the inflows of FDI in 
terms of elasticity.  The Exchange Rate has positive effects on an export-oriented FDI but 
negative effects on an import-substitution FDI.  However, only three categories: trade, 
mining and quarrying, and investment, are affected by Exchange Rate.  For the industry, 
agricultural products, real estate, and others categories, Wage Rate has a negative impact 
when the amount of labour wage is decreased with an increase in the total of the inflows of 
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FDI in these categories.  In the industry, financial institutions, and agricultural products 
categories, Unemployment Rate has a significant impact on the inflows of FDI.  The 
Current Account Balance has a positive effect on all industrial categories but a significant 
impact on the financial institutions, services, investment, and real estate categories.  The 
Inflation Rate has a negative impact on the real estate category, which is an import-
substitution FDI, but a positive impact on the financial institutions, trade, and services 
categories, which are export-oriented FDI.  ASEM has a significant impact on the financial 
institutions and agricultural propducts categories.  APEC has a significant impact on the 
trade, mining and quarrying, services, and real estate categories.  This shows that the 
regional integration has a significant influence on the inflows of FDI into Thailand. 
 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the study, including the empirical results and the study 
issues that emerged.  Section 7.1 discusses the conclusions drawn from the empirical 
models.  Section 7.2 discusses the policy implications of the research findings.  Section 7.3 
identifies the limitations of the study.  Section 7.4 discusses the contribution of the thesis 
results and findings and Section 7.5 provides suggestions for future research.  
7.1 Summary and Empirical Findings 
 
Thailand has been a significant recipient of FDI among developing countries over the last 
30 years, and has recorded rapid and sustained growth rates in a number of different 
industrial categories.  Thailand has shown a clear policy transition for foreign investment 
over time from an import-substitution regime to an export-oriented regime.  Before the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis (1985-1996), Thailand had the fastest growing level of exports 
in manufactured goods among Asian economies.  Therefore, FDI plays a significant role in 
the Thai economy.  Thailand has been pursuing different foreign investment policies at 
different times depending on the development objectives and economic situation in the 
country.  Thus, an understanding of the determinants of FDI is an important element for 
motivating and attracting more FDI into Thailand.  In addition, it is important for the Thai 
government to promote and develop programmes to attract FDI into Thailand.  
 
The objectives of this study are to compare and contrast the Eclectic Paradigm, Resourced-
Based Theory, and Business Network Theory concepts relating to the determinants of FDI; 
to evaluate the determinants of FDI and foreign portfolio investment flows into Thailand; 
and to study the effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on the pattern of FDI and 
foreign portfolio investment inflows in Thailand.  In addition, this study also investigates 
the relationship of FDI inflow, as classified by industrial category in Thailand.   
 
The literature on Eclectic Paradigm, Resourced-based Theory, and Business Network 
Theory is reviewed thoroughly in Chapter 3.  The Eclectic Paradigm provides the 
analytical basis for an international production and foreign investments.  Its concept is 
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based on three factors: ownership, location, and internalisation.  This is expected to assist 
researchers and businesses to identify the nature of FDI through global competitiveness; to 
investigate the effects of FDI on the host country and its competitive advantages; to 
develop the FDI policies for governments (host and home countries); to sustain economic 
prosperity; and to respond to the changes to competitive conditions in the industrial 
sectors. 
 
The Resource-Based Theory explains the knowledge and performance indicators in the 
FDI model.  The theory is applied at the firm-level, which possesses resources and 
capabilities such as financial, physical, human, and organisational resources.  FDI develops 
the Resource-Based Theory as an effective strategy to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantages and to develop its capabilities and resources to attain a better performance.  
The Resource-Based Theory suggests FDI successfully makes the transition from resource-
based industries to high technology industries.  
 
The Business Network Theory in FDI maintains the relationships between firms such as 
strategic alliances, joint ventures, and buyer-supplier partnerships.  This theory has 
promoted the framework of relationships between firms or countries for FDI to analyse the 
resources in foreign markets and to sustain the competitive advantage (i.e., technological 
know-how and management expertise).  FDI gains economies of scale and scope, improves 
operational efficiency, reduces numbers of competitors and barriers, and increases growth 
over the long term.  
 
To answer to research objectives two and three, an extended form of the Gravity Model 
derived from the conventional Gravity Model is utilised to examine the determinants of 
FDI and portfolio flows in Thailand with the panel data covering the time period of 1980-
2004 and 21 major investing partners.  In addition, this study has investigated the impact of 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on FDI and portfolio investment in Thailand.   
 
The explanatory variables in the FDI and portfolio investment models include GDP, GDP 
Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, Distance, Trade, Exchange Rate, Wage Rate, Inflation 
Rate, regional integration dummy variables (APEC and ASEM), and the Asian Financial 
Crisis dummy variables (1997 and 1998).  The regression results support the claim that the 
extended Gravity Model specification can be used to determine the inflows of FDI and 
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portfolio investment into Thailand from Thailand’s 21 investing partners.  In addition, the 
extended Gravity Model describes the impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on the 
inflows of foreign portfolio investment.  In the portfolio investment models, the two-way 
random effects model is more plausible and gives more robust results than the one-way 
fixed effects model based on the results of the Hausman test.  However, the one-way fixed 
effects model is appropriate for the FDI inflow models. 
Table 7-1 presents the summary of the estimated results of the FDI and portfolio 
investment models.  The FEM is preferred in the FDI model while the REM is preferred in 
the portfolio investment model. This is because the FDI model is not affected by the time-
specific element and the Asian Financial Crisis did not affect inflows of FDI into Thailand.  
As a result, the FEM is appropriate for the FDI model.  However, the portfolio investment 
model is significantly affected by a time-specific element where inflows of portfolio 
investment into Thailand increase dramatically during the Asian Financial Crisis (see 
Figure A-1, Appendix A).  As a result, the REM is preferred in the portfolio investment 
model.    
 
Most of the coefficient signs in the FDI and portfolio investment models are opposite 
except for the GDP and Trade variables.  This result suggests that the determinants of FDI 
and portfolio investment in Thailand are not the same.  Table 7-1 summarises the estimated 
results of FDI and portfolio investment models as follows:  
 
 The model suggests that market sizes in both Thailand and the 21 investing partners 
played a significant role in determining the level of FDI in Thailand.  This implies that 
the inflows of FDI into Thailand are influenced by the investing partners. 
 GDP, GDP Per Capita, Trade, Exchange Rate, Distance, APEC, and ASEM are found to 
be significant in the portfolio investment model.  The model shows the inflows of 
portfolio investment are influenced by the economic situations of investing partners and 
the stable growth of Thailand’s economy.  
 Trade has positive impacts on both the FDI and portfolio investment models.  This 
implies a complementary relationship between trade and foreign investment in both the 
investing partners and Thailand. 
 Distance, which is a proxy of information and transaction costs, has a significant impact 
in the portfolio investment model, but is insignificant in the FDI model.  The result 
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indicates that a decrease in information and transaction costs will increase the inflows of 
foreign portfolio investment into Thailand.  This shows that distance impacts the FDI 
and portfolio investment models differently. 
 
Table 7-1: Variables Affecting the Determinants of FDI and Portfolio Investment in  
                   Thailand 
 
Variables FDI Portfolio Investment 
GDP (+) (+) 
GDP Per Capita (-) (+) 
GDP Growth Rate (+) (0) 
Distance (0) (-) 
Trade (+) (+) 
Exchange Rate 
 (-) (+) 
Wage Rate (+) (0) 
Inflation Rate (+) (0) 
APEC (0) (-) 
ASEM (+) (-) 
1997 (0) (+) 
1998 (0) (+) 
 FEM REM 
Note:  1. (+), (-) and (0) represent positive, negative, and no significant effect,  
     respectively. 
  2. FEM and REM represent fixed and random effects model, respectively.  
  3. The summary of FDI model is based on Model 4 (see Table 6-3). 
 4. The summary of portfolio investment model is based on Model 4 (see Table 6-4).   
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 The exchange rate in the orthodox context of the Gravity Model is expected to produce 
either positive or negative effects depending on export/import or inflow/outflow of 
investment (Cortes Rodriguez, 2002; Dascal et al., 2002).  For example, the 
appreciation of a country’s currency against other currencies reduces the countries’ 
exports (in terms of trade) and/or inflows of FDI, and depreciation of the currency 
stimulates the country’s exports and/or inflows of FDI (Bersgtrand, 1985; 1989).  In this 
study, the exchange rates in FDI and portfolio investment models yield an opposite sign.  
As shown in the FDI model, the inflows of FDI have been negatively affected by the 
exchange rate due to the appreciation of the Thai Baht, therefore, investors import parts, 
components, and raw materials for their production processes in Thailand.  This 
suggests that FDI relies on overseas parts, to be available for production to commence.  
Thus, an appreciation of Thai Baht raises the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  In contrast, 
exchange rate has a positive impact on the inflows of foreign portfolio investment.  The 
results show that a depreciation of the Thai Baht tends to increase foreign portfolio 
investment in Thailand. 
 The variables capturing the investing partners’ economies such as GDP growth rate, 
wage rate, and inflation rate are significantly and positively related to FDI.  This implies 
that the inflows of FDI into Thailand are driven by the economic status of the investing 
partners.  The state of the investing partners’ economies can be understood to stimulate 
much of the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  Furthermore, the results show that the 
investing partners with stronger economies tend to invest in larger amounts.  
 ASEM has a positive and a negative influence on FDI and portfolio investment models, 
respectively.  However, APEC has no impact on the FDI model but it has a negative 
impact on the portfolio investment model.  In addition, it should be noted that most of 
the regional integration dummy variables are negatively related to the FDI and portfolio 
investment in Thailand.  This indicates the existence of delays in the inflows of foreign 
funds into Thailand until the Thai government offers promotional privileges demanded 
by the foreign investors.  This indirectly shows the co-operation of Thailand’s investing 
partners have an influence on government policies in Thailand.  In addition, foreign 
investors will invest in Thailand if the perceived profitability of their capital is secured 
with protection from the Thai government.   
 The portfolio investment model shows that the Asian Financial Crisis had a strong 
influence on foreign investment decisions.  The Asian Financial Crisis dummy variables 
show positive impacts on the portfolio investment model in 1997 and 1998.  However, 
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the crisis has no impact on the FDI model.  This shows the importance of a healthy and 
stable economy in Thailand to attract and sustain the inflows of foreign portfolio 
investment into the country.   
 FDI inflows into Thailand during 1980-2004 are supply-side driven by the investing 
partners’ economies.  In contrast, the portfolio investment in Thailand during the same 
period is driven by both Thai and the investing partners’ economic situations. 
 
The determinants of the inflows of FDI in nine different industrial categories in Thailand 
during 1980-2004 are summarized as follows (see Table 7-2): 
 
 The results suggest that the industry, agricultural products, investment, and real estate 
categories are promoted as import-substitution FDI.  On the other hand, the financial 
institutions, trade, mining and quarrying, services, and others categories are promoted as 
export-oriented FDI.   
 Exchange rate is an important determinant of the inflows of FDI in different industrial 
categories.  Exchange rate has a negative impact on import-substitution FDI, but a 
positive impact on export-oriented FDI.  The negative impact on import-substitution 
FDI indicates that import-substitution FDI focuses on production to cater to the 
domestic market rather than external markets.  In contrast, the positive impact on 
export-oriented FDI suggests that FDI takes advantage of the low price of goods in the 
global market generated from the depreciation of the Thai Baht.   
 Capital stock has a positive impact on import-substitution FDI, but a negative impact on 
export-oriented FDI.  This shows that foreign investors in the industry, agricultural 
products, investment, and real estate categories are influenced by the numbers of capital 
stocks in Thailand, such as land, building, and fixed assets.   
 Inflation rate in Thailand has no impact on the inflows of import-substitution FDI, with 
the exception of the real estate category.  Inflation rate affects exchange rates 
negatively.  For example, inflation rate negatively impacts foreign investors who wish 
to transfer profits back to their countries.  Conversely, the risk of exchange rate changes 
does not significantly influence import-substitution FDI.  This may be because foreign 
investors only wish to supply their products to Thailand and reinvest their production in 
Thailand.  Export-oriented FDI such as the financial institutions, trade, and services 
categories, are strongly influenced by the inflation rate.   
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 Wage rate has a negative impact on import-substitution FDI.  A low domestic labour 
wage can reduce the production costs and the prices of goods in the domestic market.  
The Thai government attracts the inflows of FDI into the industry, agricultural products, 
investment, and real estate categories, to increase the income for people in the country.  
On the other hand, a positive impact of wage rate is found in the trade, services, and 
investment categories, which recruits fewer workers than the industry and agricultural 
products categories.  This shows that FDI in trade, services, and investment categories 
benefit workers and derive higher value-added activities or productivities from their 
workers.  
7.2 Policy Implications of the Study Findings 
 
The findings of this study have important implications for policy makers in Thailand, 
foreign investors and domestic investors.  The findings yield some suggestions for policy 
makers to enhance the attractiveness of a host country, promote and develop programmes 
in order to attract more foreign investors and to sustain economic development. 
 
With respect to regional integration and the inflows of foreign investment into Thailand, 
the empirical findings can help the government to identify structural differences and how 
to satisfy the needs of foreign investors.  However, Thailand had faced political instability 
with coups d’état, which occurred three times during the study period: 1981, 1985, 1991, 
and the latest in 2006.  This can be an impediment to attract more FDI.  The Thai 
government should make a concerted effort to reduce the political negative impact on 
potential foreign investors.  Governmental agencies such as BOI, BOT, the Ministry of 
Commerce, and the Ministry of Industry should design and implement “friendly” 
investment policies to promote both foreign and domestic industries in Thailand and to 
improve the investment climate to sustain FDI and stimulate economic growth.  
 
Thailand had enjoyed remarkable capital flows in the 1980s until the first half of the 1990s 
but signs of economic instability appeared thereafter.  Since the establishment of BIBF in 
1993, FDI in the real estate category got into trouble in 1994 after the collapse of the FDI 
financial institutions category in 1992 (see Table 2-3).  At the beginning of 1996, the 
Thailand economy was heading towards a crisis with speculative attacks from hedge-funds 
speculators in November and again in February and May of 1997 (see Siamvalla et al., 
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1999).  The main turning point came with a significant drop in export growth rate.  This 
drop was due to the lack of technical, managerial, and organisational understanding in 
attracting and sustaining foreign investments.  In September 1996, this situation became 
worse due to stagnate real estate and the external funds used to repay foreign financial 
institutions.  According to the empirical results, the inflows of foreign portfolio investment 
depended on the health of Thai economy.  The Thai government and BOT should reduce 
the information and transaction costs, negotiate with investors’ governments, increase the 
number of trades, and minimise the Thai Baht volatility.  Stable monetary policy and 
financial stability in Thailand would increase the numbers of foreign portfolio investors 
into the country.  The results suggest that the relative economic performances in GDP per 
capita and trade of the 21 investing partners determines the levels of capital inflows into 
Thailand.  The booming economic activity in the economies of the investing partners 
changes the flows of FDI into Thailand.  Therefore, the Thai government must be prudent 
and proactive in attracting more FDI into Thailand by improving investor confidence and 
investment climate.  
 
The results also show that the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis positively affected the amount 
of capital inflows, but did not affect FDI.  For example, portfolio investments were 
positively affected by the depreciation of the Thai Baht during the financial crisis because 
portfolio investors enjoyed lower transaction, information, and capital costs.  Foreign 
investors who engaged in exporting finished goods and components into the global market 
enjoyed improved price competitiveness as a result of the depreciated Thai Baht.  The 
results suggest that most FDI production is export-oriented, especially in the trade 
category.   
 
In contrast, the empirical results show that an appreciation of the Thai Baht increases the 
inflows of FDI into Thailand.  This shows fixed investment such as machinery, installation, 
raw materials, and components which are imported from overseas, is the major area of 
investment for foreign direct investors.  Consequently, Thailand is faced with a choice of 
either strengthening or weakening against all investing partners’ currencies.  Policy makers 
should consider more carefully whether FDI or portfolio investment, is the more suitable to 
the Thai economy at the time.  However, the FDI theory suggests that FDI can reduce the 
unemployment rate, transfer new and advanced technology and increase the GDP of the 
country.   
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Table 7-2 shows the effects of the inflows of FDI classified by nine industrial categories 
across Thailand during 1980-2004.  Import-substitution is Thailand’s main strategy for 
stimulating economic development, which encourages industrial growth within the country 
by reducing import of goods and services.  In contrast, an export-oriented strategy is an 
economic policy to accelerate the industrialisation process of Thailand through exporting 
to improve national income and productivity.  Separating FDI strategy into two parts such 
as import-substitution and export-oriented is a better way for the Thai government to 
improve the production growth rate and to examine the direction of FDI in the future.  The 
role of FDI differs in terms of the investment strategies of the Thai government compared 
to foreign investors.  The global market may need a larger focus on export-oriented FDI to 
design and supply products and services, whereas a domestic market focuses on import-
substitution FDI.  International customers differ from domestic customers and product 
design can be changed to match differences in product expectations and the income level 
of customers.  Specific FDI for either domestic or international customers can ensure the 
highest possible returns on capital resources and profits.  At the same time, it is well 
understood by the Thai government that by establishing promotional privileges, it can 
attract appropriate FDI to either import-substitution or export-oriented production. 
  
There is another way to improve the attractiveness of Thailand and encourage FDI into 
Thailand.  Improving the investment environment and standard of services is essential to 
enhance Thailand’s image.  A (more) stable investment environment can be built up via 
government agencies such as the Ex-Im Bank, BOI and BOT, and/or private sector 
agencies such as commercial banks, transportation, and high-technological companies.  
Good governance should be used to manage and supervise FDI to ensure that investments 
are sustainable.  
 
According to the empirical results, local suppliers attract more FDI.  Therefore, the Thai 
government should aim to increase the numbers of local suppliers and hence increase FDI.  
Linkages between FDI and domestically owned firms are important to Thailand, because 
the skilled, informational, behavioural, and cultural gaps between FDI and local supplier 
firms are often referred to as the main impediments to any investment relationship between 
the foreign investors and Thailand.  FDI in the same industry category may source their 
inputs differently.  For example, Japanese and American investors show differences in 
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their sourcing behaviour.  Thailand and Japan have a closer relationship and similar culture 
compared to the US but if Thailand would like to attract American investors, the Thai 
government has to assist potential local suppliers to improve their capacities to meet the 
US and other investors.  The Thai government should set up a national database of 
potential local suppliers to match FDI with local suppliers.  This is because it is difficult 
for local suppliers to arrange procurement networks with foreign investors by themselves.  
For example, in the 1990s, Japanese investors were particularly interested in supporting the 
autoparts and electrical/electronics parts industry in Thailand.  Therefore, the Department 
of Industrial Promotion (DIP) in Thailand formed a master plan to support both industries 
called the “Study on Industrial Sector Development – Supporting Industries in the 
Kingdom of Thailand” (Lauridsen, 2004, p. 576).  This plan was conducted in six parts: 
policy and legislation, technology upgrading, market development, financial support, 
upgrading of management, and investment promotion.  As a result of this plan, most of the 
Japanese investment that flowed into Thailand was concentrated in the automotive and 
electrical/electronics parts industries, which enhanced the trading relationship between the 
two countries.  Consequently, the success of these industries attracted a large number of 
foreign investments, which would have otherwise flowed into Thailand’s neighbouring 
competitors.  The master plan has continued to support the automotive sector in Thailand 
and this has attracted US investors to establish General Motors (automotive industry) in 
Thailand in 1997 because of the comprehensive automotive policy of the Thai government.  
Without this policy, investors may have invested in other countries instead of Thailand.  
 
During the Asian Financial Crisis, the government tried to integrate macroeconomic 
policies and financial sector reforms without addressing the local suppliers’ problems.  In 
late 1998, foreign investors had increased their stakes in the financial sector, which had a 
great influence on the Thai government.  This led the Thai government to seek out a new 
sector which could strengthen economic growth in Thailand.  Therefore, local suppliers are 
an important economic resource for Thailand to improve its investment climate.  Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005) argued that export-oriented production should 
be supported by using local knowledge and technology to promote Thai products.  In 
addition, promotion of low interest loans to local suppliers through state agencies and 
commercial banks was launched to support the local suppliers financially.  BOI supported 
Thai-owned suppliers with the promotional privileges programme that was offered to only 
foreign investors.  Japanese agencies such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
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(JICA) used their financial leverage with low interest rates to support industries in 
Thailand.  In addition, the World Bank also supported local suppliers with high interest 
rate loans.  These examples show a strong relationship between the Thai government and 
external organisations which show how the Thai government helped to improve local 
production to assist the economy recovery from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  Thus, the 
supporting industries and investment (both internal and external environment) policy can 
increase the investment environment in Thailand and may increase the inflows of FDI into 
Thailand.  In order to increase and sustain FDI in Thailand, the Thai government and its 
related agencies should continue to seek local products and parts and ensure that they are 
difficult to duplicate.  Improvements in the support for local suppliers such as labour 
training, technological assistance and marketing, should also be improved.  
 
The quality and value of FDI needs to be improved.  Concerns before, during and after the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis should be addressed.  The results show that the determinants 
of foreign portfolio investors depend on the health of Thai economy because changes in 
Thai financial and political structure can negatively affect the inflows of portfolio 
investment.  At the beginning of 2006, an increased US current account deficit and the 
prospect of a weakening dollar prompted funds to move into Asia including Thailand.  In 
December 2006, BOT announced that 30% of capital reserves would now require 30% of 
foreign exchange reserves for all new foreign currency inflows into Thailand, to manage 
what would otherwise be an uncontrollable amount of external funds into the country.  
Every investor who wished to invest $100 would be allowed to convert only $70 into Thai 
Baht to invest in the Thai market, while the remaining $30 would have to be deposited into 
an interest-free account.  The purpose of this directive is to tighten restrictions on local 
financial institutions.  Unfortunately, the BOT actions showed a lack of understanding of 
investor sentiments and knowledge of how international investors form expectations and 
react to various control measures.  This caused a decrease of more than 100 points of the 
SET index in one day.  This policy not only affected the Thailand stock market but it also 
weakened the Thai Baht and shook public and investor confidence.  This BOT policy 
showed political uncertainty.  However, this did not cause all foreign investors to panic and 
pull out of Thailand immediately.  Since January 2007, all new FDI and portfolio 
investments have been excluded from these measures.  Recently, BOT has relaxed the 
regulation of 30% of capital reserves by allowing FDI to deposit with financial institutions 
abroad without the need to seek approval.  Furthermore, the results show foreign investors 
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prefer to invest in countries with a high degree of openness, low tariff barriers and 
conductive investment climate.  Therefore, our findings show foreign investors have more 
bargaining power, such as indirectly influencing some of the countries’ trade policy.  Our 
results also support the findings of Cuevas et al. (2005) that an investing country would 
delay investment until the host country provides exceptional investment incentives.  
Providing more generous incentives to foreign investors may be the only way to maintain 
and attract FDI into Thailand.  
 
The empirical results suggest that the inflows of FDI are driven by investing partners’ 
economic situations but the Thai government can take the initiative to increase the inflows 
of foreign investment.  Understanding the behaviour of FDI and impulsive investment in 
Thailand are necessary.  For example, the results show regional integration dummy 
variables positively affect the FDI models.  This implies foreign investors would like the 
Thai government to reduce the trade and investment barriers and improve the investment 
climate amongst members.  Thus, investment and trade agreements, whether implemented 
unilaterally or bilaterally, will enhance potential investment flows between Thailand, 
investing countries and the region.  In addition, in terms of investment promotion, it is 
important for Thailand to establish trade agreements, such as bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and free trade agreements (FTA), to extend linkages to other regions to increase 
inflows of FDI. 
 
To attract more capital inflows, Thailand needs to stabilise the macroeconomic 
environment, facilitate financial development and steadily liberalise the financial sector 
with caution.  Thailand has abundant labour and resources, which are basic requirements 
for FDI.  Therefore, increasing the confidence of investors is the most important task for 
the Thai government.  In addition, trade agreements are important factors in attracting FDI 
into Thailand.  Export-oriented production is promoted in Thailand with product 
distribution as the main objective for investors.  Promoting Thailand as a first choice for 
FDI includes removing trade and investment barriers to promote the free flow of goods, 
services, and capital.   
 
Economic variables such as exchange rate, GDP, capital stock, and wage rate have 
significant effects on the level of FDI in our findings.  As discussed in Chapter 5, Thailand 
is endowed with abundant labour.  The results show high wage rates deters FDI while a 
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high unemployment rate attracts FDI, especially in industrial categories such as general 
industry, agricultural products, and real estate categories.  This suggests that the Thai 
government should make sure that labour wages remain competitive and increase training 
opportunities to increase workers’ productivity to support a move from an import-
substitution to an export-oriented economy in the near future.  A high inflation rate 
indicates a weak currency which discourages investors.  However, the results show the 
inflation rate in Thailand affected export-oriented FDI such as financial institutions, trade, 
and service categories.  The inflation rate does not show significant results with the inflows 
of import-substitution FDI.  An increase in the inflation rate implies a decrease in the 
purchasing power of domestic customers which redirects FDI to produce products for 
overseas where the inflation rate is stable.  Excessive inflation may be caused by large 
government expenditure.  Therefore, policy makers should consider these issues when 
implementing and introducing new FDI policies.   
7.3 Limitations of the Study 
 
There are limitations in this study pertaining to the data set, the estimation techniques, and 
the variables used.   
 
 The sample size used in this study is limited to the number of investing partners on the 
information provided by the BOT.  Although the data set includes more than 90% of 
total FDI inflows from the 21 investing partners, some investing partners such as India 
and Taiwan and Thailand’s neighbours such as Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, and 
Cambodia are excluded due to a lack of available information.  A comparative study 
among Thailand’s neighbours, especially ASEAN members would improve the research 
results.  
 In addition, 16 out of 21 investing partners in this study are members of ASEM but only 
nine are APEC members.  This may lead to biased estimates of the impact of regional 
integration on the inflows of FDI and portfolio investment. 
 The models in this study do not consider political measures, human capital endowment, 
government expenditures, and investment risks.  This is because this study focused on 
the economic relationships between Thailand and its investing partners.  However, some 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation rate, exchange rate, unemployment rate, and 
wage rate can be influenced by government policies and political changes.   
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 In addition, it is difficult to quantify political risk due to the lack of available 
information from some investing partners such as China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and 
Belgium.  Janeba (2002) examined the political risk in the FDI automobile industry in 
Western and Eastern European countries.  The author’s results showed that political risk 
can deter the inflows of FDI into developing countries of Eastern Europe, but is not 
significant in developed countries of Western Europe.  In this study, 17 out of 21 home 
countries are considered as developed countries, so political risk is not an issue.  
However, the models in this study are generally comparable to the Gravity Models used 
in other studies. 
 Data was collected from various sources which contained a variety of definitions and 
restrictions according to the different facts and data criteria.  Therefore, the findings 
need to be interpreted with caution since they are based on data that in some instances 
may not be accurate.  This may over- or under- estimate the determinants of FDI and 
portfolio investment.  Given this qualification, this study has further explained the 
effects of investing partners and Thailand’s GDP, GDP per capita, exchange rates, 
trades, investing partners’ wage rates, and some other variables as determinants of FDI 
and portfolio investment.  There can be problems with the models where the data are 
taken from a number of sources and have to be converted into other countries 
currencies.  Such conversions could mitigate the findings due to differences in exchange 
rate conversions.  For example, some of the data has been converted from Euro, such as 
Austria, Belgium, etc. from 1999 to 2004 to their individual currencies and converted to 
Thai Baht.  
 The multicollinearity problem in Equations (5.5), (5.6), (5.10), and (5.11) occurred 
when all explanatory variables were divided into two groups (Thailand and investing 
partners).  To eliminate the multicollinearity in the models, GDP and GDP per capita 
variables of both Thailand and the investing partners were multiplied together in order 
to test the effects on their market sizes and the inflows of FDI and portfolio investment 
into Thailand.  It is difficult to separate the data between the 21 investing partners and 
Thailand because the panel data used in the study has repeat observations over time (25 
years in this study) for the set of variable used in all models.  Furthermore, this result is 
difficult to invert the Variance-Covariance matrix for the Hausman test.  This is because 
under the assumptions of the random effects structure, the variances are not constant 
and the covariances are not equal to zero (Wooldridge, 2002).  There might be a 
concern about multicollinearity between these variables.  The wage rate, inflation rate, 
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and GDP growth rate were analysed using data only from the investing partners.  Thus, 
the model output can explain the inflows of FDI and portfolio investment as being 
influenced by investing partners’ economies, but not by the Thai economy.  
 The choice of 1980 as a beginning year for data was appropriate at the time the data set 
ended (2004).  Twenty-five years would provide a more accurate picture with more 
information for the FDI and portfolio investment models.  If the models had started at 
an earlier base year, the accuracy would have improved.  However, the objective of this 
study is to provide an indication of determinants of FDI and portfolio investment and 
effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on FDI, which is included this time, therefore, 
these issues are not absolutely critical.   
 The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis may bias the results since the Thai government floated 
the Baht during the same year.  The empirical result shows that the collapse of the 
financial system in 1997 did not affect the inflows of FDI into Thailand.  The additional 
major economic and political changes such as the coups d’état (1981, 1985, 1991, and 
2006) could change the study findings.  This would of course involve considerably 
more data collection, which is not always feasible, particularly for Thailand.  Such 
political and economic changes may cause structural changes to either the inflows of 
FDI or portfolio investment into Thailand.  This is because the interim government has 
to follow the military guidelines, which can decrease investors’ confidence in the long 
run. 
 The SURE model (Equation 5.16) includes most variables at the national level such as 
wage rate, inflation rate, and unemployment rate.  The number of variables in each 
category employed in the SURE model is generally small compared to other SURE 
studies.  Therefore, it is not possible to isolate the impacts or effects of a single category 
from the variables.  In view of this, there may be some concerns about the effect of bias 
on the ‘omitted’ variable, especially the agricultural products category to avoid 
autocorrelation and the overfitted problem by dropping some variables such as inflation 
rate, international saving, current account balance, and national saving variables.  The 
dropping of these variables may help to explain the implications of the empirical results.  
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7.4 Contribution to the Literature Review 
 
Previous studies on FDI focus on how factors such as exchange rates, trade, and GDP 
affect the firm-level decisions (see Chandprapalert, 2000; Deichman, 2004; Gao, 2005).  
The aggregate-level in prior FDI studies has been ignored.  In addition, there is no 
empirical research that systematically compares FDI and portfolio investment and FDI 
across industries at the aggregate-level.  This study employs the extended Gravity Model to 
determine the inflows of FDI and portfolio investment into Thailand.  The extended 
Gravity Model has been frequently used to examine the movement of FDI across countries 
(Buch et al., 2003).  However, previous Gravity Model studies have largely ignored some 
of the macroeconomic factors such as inflation rate, GDP per capital, GDP growth rate, 
and wage rate.  This study includes macroeconomic factors such as trade, exchange rate, 
national income, wage rate, regional trade and investment associations such as APEC and 
ASEM, and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  The empirical models in this study present 
more robust results in explaining the supply (from the original country) and demand (from 
the recipient country) factors affecting the inflows of FDI and portfolio investment into 
Thailand.   
 
Previous researches show a positive relationship between regional trade and investment 
associations and the inflows of foreign investment.  However, the findings of this study 
show that regional trade and investment associations have negative impacts on the inflows 
of FDI and portfolio investment.  This implies that the investing partners would delay their 
investment until the host country (Thailand in this case) provides exceptional investment 
incentives to meet their investments demand (see Biessen, 1991; Brenton et al., 1999; 
Portes and Rey, 2005).  The results of this study clearly explain the influence of 
international asset flows.  The international markets are not frictionless because countries 
have different demand and supply characteristics, which heavily influence their 
international transactions.  This can show a different scheme of the regional associations.  
Therefore, the wider range of knowledge may provide worthy guidance to the researchers 
dealing with similar problems in the future.   
 
The extended Gravity Model can be successfully implemented to determine the flows of 
investment across countries.  However, the results of our study show that the extended 
Gravity Model does not necessarily perform better in analysing inflow FDI than portfolio 
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investment.  The Breusch and Pagan test is used to test the null hypothesis of common 
intercept.  The results of the Hausman test in our study show that the FEM performs better 
than the REM in the FDI model, but the REM is more suitable for the portfolio investment 
model.  This is because the REM model yields specific effects in each individual investing 
partner.  Consequently, the portfolio investment model reveals that time-specific are 
appropriate but the FDI model is not significant to the specific time. 
 
Finally, this study examines the inflows of FDI across industrial categories using the 
SURE methodology.  This is the first attempt to incorporate the regional integration such 
as APEC and ASEM into the model.  The results show APEC and ASEM significantly 
impact the inflows of FDI across industrial categories.  The inclusion of the regional 
integration dummy variables provided another alternative in improving the overall fit of 
the model in this study.  Moreover, this suggests that other external factors can be viewed 
and integrated as a measure of foreign activities.  This may yield alternative explanations 
of a transaction links between countries.  
7.5 Suggestions for Future Study 
 
To improve the study models and results, this section suggests some recommendations for 
further studies.  There are very few studies that examine FDI and portfolio investment in 
Thailand using the Gravity Model.  Research on FDI and portfolio investment in Thailand 
has increased in recent years but many questions still remain unanswered.  In this study, 
the extended Gravity Model is used to determine the inflows of FDI and portfolio 
investment into Thailand from 21 investing partners during 1980-2004.  The following 
section provides some areas that could be of interest for future study.  
 
Empirical studies on FDI appear to focus on the developed countries (both host and home 
countries).  Future studies on the determinants of FDI could focus on home and host of 
developing countries in different regions such as FDI flows between Thailand and the 
Latin American Countries.  This is to investigate the FDI trend in these two regions and to 
consider the possible factors affecting the flow of FDI into these countries with similar 
economic structures, such as low labour costs, same level of technology, similar natural 
resources, but different culture.  It may be useful for policy makers in the two regions to 
develop their FDI environments to complement each other.  In addition, the results may 
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improve the relationship between Thailand and the Latin American countries, such as 
protecting the unfair and inequitable treatments in their dealings with other foreign 
investors from the developed countries.  FDI studies can also be expanded with reverse 
causation in the context of Thailand or other developing countries situations such as 
investment climate, trade barriers, and regional integration on FDI.  This may provide a 
preliminary analysis of investment barriers and motivations for the inflows of FDI into 
Thailand or other developing countries.   
 
Future studies should compare the pre- and post-devaluation situation in developing 
countries that may have experienced devaluation or financial crises.  Future studies could 
also investigate whether there are any changes in the correlation between domestic and 
foreign investments.  According to the findings of this study, it could be beneficial to both 
domestic/foreign investors and policy makers, who are concerned with strategies, 
production plans, and promotion of FDI incentives in the future to study conditions pre- 
and post- devaluation in developing countries.   
 
Beside economic factors, political and social factors should be also considered in order to 
capture an in-depth analysis of these variables on the inflow of FDI and other capital flows.  
Future studies could analyse the effects of the relationships between Thailand and other 
governments and domestic/international firms.  The results could be used to compare 
Thailand’s investment policies and practices with those of other countries, which could 
provide a basis for upgrading Thailand’s investment performance.  Regional and/or 
national social factors such as changes in education, legislation in the workplace, improved 
healthcare, changes in local people’s attitudes, population growth, and income distribution 
can be integrated into future studies.  This could improve the government’s social policy 
aimed to maximise the benefits from FDI to increase the nation’s welfare.  
 
Future research should also consider enlarging the Gravity Model by including external 
environment variables such as administrative, academic and business communities, law 
and legal, technology, and stakeholder environments.  The knowledge of new technologies 
and trends may be distributed and transmitted by international trade and foreign 
investment.   
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Apart from the two regional integration dummy variables included in this study, future 
research should consider adding other economic integration regions, such as Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreement (FTA), into the models.  This 
includes investigating the impacts of BITs and FTA on FDI in Thailand or other host 
developing countries.  In addition, it would be interesting to employ other variables such as 
transmission channels like freight rates, transaction fees, or restriction of monetary 
transfers.  This will be useful for policy purposes. 
 
The extended Gravity Model can be used to estimate the total volume of bilateral trade 
between Thailand and the 21 investing partners.  Moreover, the extended Gravity Model 
can be used to study Thailand’s trade and investment relationships with similar Southeast 
Asian countries (Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines) by using a specific 
industry framework to develop results.  A comparative study between Thailand and its 
neighbours may be useful for policy makers and government agencies to develop FDI 
strategies and to attract more FDI into the region.  In addition, the extended Gravity Model 
can be developed by using quarterly or semi-annual data and can be improved with specific 
goods and services such as the wine industry and wood products.  This is considered useful 
for investors and policy makers in specific manufacturing sectors. 
 
It would also be useful to examine the inflows of FDI in different kinds of industry, for 
example, automotive and parts, textile, electronics and electrical products, chemical and 
pharmaceutical products, and rubber products.  Considering these inflows would help 
domestic investors, foreign investors, and policy makers to understand the nature of the 
industries better, as they would be able to measure the level of resources between each 
industry.  The studies of specific industries would allow policy makers to develop better 
strategies to attract greater inflow of FDI into Thailand.  Similar studies in other industries 
would enable investors and policy makers to measure the level of resources in order to 
extend product lines and increase investment. 
 
Finally, future research should consider modelling, for example, governance of host and 
home countries, capital market development, special concessions/privileges for (foreign) 
investors, environmental regulations, and factors that may be significant drivers of foreign 
investment. This will provide more robust policy inferences. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B-1: Data Sources 
Variables Unit Source 
GDP Billion US$ “UN’s World Investment Directory”, 
“OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment 
Statistics Yearbook”, “UNCTAD 
Handbook of Statistics”, “Central 
Intelligence Agency World Factbook”, 
National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB),  
GDP Per Capita US$ “UN’s World Investment Directory” 
GDP Annual Growth Rate Percent “UN’s World Investment Directory”, 
World Resources Institute 
GDP each category Million Baht National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) 
Inflation Rate Percent “UN’s World Investment Directory”, 
and Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
FDI inflow to Thailand Million US$ Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
Portfolio Investment inflow to 
Thailand 
Million US$ Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
Trade Million US$ Bank of Thailand (BOT), IMF’s 
International Statistics, and “IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics 
Yearbook” and UN Statistics Division 
Capital each category Million Baht National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) 
FDI each category Million US$ National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) 
Distances between capital cities Miles website (www.indo.com/distance) 
Wage US$ Board of Investment (BOI) 
Unemployment Rate  Percent “UN’s World Investment Directory”, 
and Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
ASEM 1 or 0 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
APEC 1 or 0 Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation 
(APEC) 
Exchange Rate Thai Baht Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
Current Account Balance Million US$ “UN’s World Investment Directory”, 
“OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment 
Statistics Yearbook”, and “Central 
Intelligence Agency World Factbook” 
Net National Saving  Million US$ National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) 
International Reserves Million US$ IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics, and “IMF’s Direction of 
Trade Statistics Yearbook” 
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Table B-2: Data Description 
   
Variable Descriptive 
GDP based on GDP in national currency and the exchange 
rate projections provided by the country 
 
GDP Per Capita converting GDP in local currencies to US Dollars and 
then dividing GDP by the total population 
 
GDP Annual Growth Rate a different between a current year of GDP and the 
GDP previous year in percentage 
 
GDP each category GDP in each industrial category 
 
Inflation Rate annual percentage change averages for the year, not 
end-of-period 
 
FDI Inflow to Thailand total amount of inflows from 21 investing partners 
into Thailand  
 
 
Portfolio Investment inflow to 
Thailand 
total of transaction involving in equity securities, debt 
securities in the forms of bonds, notes, money market 
instrument and financial derivatives from 21 investing 
partners to Thailand  
 
Trade total amount of imports and exports between investing 
partner i and Thailand in US Dollar 
 
Capital each category net capital stock in each industrial category  
 
FDI each category FDI in each industrial category 
 
Distances between capital cities geographic distance between capitals of investing 
partner i and Bangkok, Thailand 
 
Wage (in Equations (5.5), (5.6), 
(5.10), and (5.11)) 
the minimum wage rate per day in each investing 
partner 
 
Wage (in Equation (5.16)) the minimum wage rate per day in Thailand  
 
Unemployment Rate  age 15 years and over but do not work or have no 
permanent job  
 
ASEM and APEC memberships of both investing partner i and Thailand  
 
Exchange Rate (in Equations 
(5.5), (5.6), (5.10), and (5.11)) 
a ratio of Thai Baht and investing partner i’s currency  
 
Exchange Rate Thai Baht per US Dollar 
 
Current Account Balance sum of trade balance, service and transfer account, and 
current transfer 
 
Net National Saving  total national saving of Thailand 
 
International Reserves foreign assets held or controlled by the BOT which 
consists of monetary gold, special drawing rights, 
reserve positions in the Fund, and foreign exchange 
assets 
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Table B-3: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Extended Gravity   
                   Models 
 
Variable  Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Endowment variables      
Log of FDI Inflow LnFDIit 2.09 3.17 -13.82 8.29 
Log of Portfolio 
Investment Inflow 
LnPRTit -3.75 7.66 -13.82 9.11 
Log of Exchange Rate  LnXit  1.31 2.10 -4.27 6.16 
Log of GDP Ln(GDPit*GDPt) 10.17 1.66 5.95 14.47 
Log of GDP Per Capita Ln(CAPit*CAPt) 16.53 1.51 12.24 18.68 
GDP Growth Rate GDPGRit 3.39 3.31 -13.10 15.20 
Log of Trade LnTRADEit 7.09 2.43 1.14 22.51 
Inflation Rate INFLit 4.56 5.15 -1.00 58.00 
Log of Wage Rate LnWGEit 6.26 3.10 0.20 16.60 
Log of Distance LnDISit 8.21 0.70 6.61 9.08 
 
     
Dummy variables      
APEC APECit 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
ASEM ASEMit 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Note: The number of observations is 525. 
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Table B-4: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Determinants of FDI into  
Thailand by Categories 
 
Variable Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Endowment variables     
Log of FDI in Industry 8.41 1.18 6.13 11.18 
Log of FDI in Financial Institutions 9.89 1.52 7.04 12.08 
Log of FDI in Trade 9.31 1.70 6.67 12.00 
Log of FDI in Construction 7.69 0.84 6.36 9.60 
Log of FDI in Mining and Quarrying 7.60 1.26 5.61 11.34 
Log of FDI in Agricultural Products 4.81 1.35 2.01 6.98 
Log of FDI in Services 7.91 1.46 5.79 10.54 
Log of FDI in Investment 2.16 6.72 -4.61 10.12 
Log of FDI in Real Estate 7.74 1.82 4.67 10.00 
Log of FDI in Others 2.56 7.02 -6.91 10.37 
Log of GDP in Industry 13.40 0.91 11.87 14.62 
Log of GDP in Financial Institutions 11.54 0.94 9.93 12.76 
Log of GDP in Trade 12.90 0.70 11.67 13.80 
Log of GDP in Construction 11.66 0.74 10.29 12.74 
Log of GDP in Mining and Quarrying 10.66 0.84 9.32 12.07 
Log of GDP in Agricultural Products 12.57 0.41 11.94 13.21 
Log of GDP in Services 12.69 0.72 11.44 13.63 
Log of GDP in Investment 11.35 0.78 10.03 12.60 
Log of GDP in Real Estate 11.40 0.61 10.33 12.15 
Log of GDP in Others 12.00 0.79 10.46 13.00 
Log of Capital in Industry 13.71 1.12 11.90 15.13 
Log of Capital in Financial Institutions 11.60 0.62 10.64 12.47 
Log of Capital in Trade 13.38 0.62 12.44 14.23 
Log of Capital in Construction 12.01 1.20 10.05 13.49 
Log of Capital in Mining and Quarrying 11.26 1.01 9.40 12.56 
Log of Capital in Agricultural Products 13.12 0.65 12.15 14.12 
Log of Capital in Services 13.47 0.81 12.15 14.53 
Log of Capital in Investment 14.26 0.96 12.70 15.60 
Log of Capital in Real Estate 14.18 0.94 12.44 15.27 
Log of Capital in Others 11.50 0.95 9.83 12.75 
Inflation Rate 4.63 4.14 0.30 19.70 
Log of Exchange Rate  3.36 .25 3.03 3.80 
Log of International Reserves 12.85 1.29 10.98 14.51 
Current Account Balance (Baht) 32184.89 245664.78 -364320.00 591606.00 
Log of Net National Saving  12.96 0.92 10.80 13.94 
Log of Wage 10.57 0.41 9.89 11.06 
Unemployment Rate 2.88 0.76 1.55 4.50 
Dummy variables     
APEC 0.64 0.49 0 1 
ASEM 0.36 0.49 0 1 
Note: The number of observations is 25. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C-1: Comparison of FEM and REM for Models 1 and 2 of the Determinants of  
 Portfolio Investment in Thailand Using Equation (5.6) 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
Model 1 a 1 b 2 c 2 d 
GDP 
-8.0049*** .6114 -7.9135*** .7706 
GDP Per Capita 11.9400*** 1.9179*** 11.8131*** 1.6535*** 
GDP Growth Rate 
.0694 .1021 .1216 .1743* 
Distance 
-8.0795 -2.2991 -8.1476 -2.3023* 
Trade 
- - .1906 .2132 
Exchange Rate  
- - .2418 1.1070*** 
Wage Rate 
- - -.0258 .0126 
Inflation Rate 
- - .0781 .1104* 
APEC 
- - - - 
ASEM 
- - - - 
Constant 
- -23.1334* - -21.1535** 
 
    
No. of observations 525 525 525 525 
Mean 
-3.7513 -3.7513 -3.7513 -3.7513 
Std. Dev. 4.9906 7.6612 4.9918 7.6613 
Sum of squares 12453.16 14260.51 12359.28 12673.72 
R2 59.47% 52.27% 59.78% 57.58% 
Adjusted R2 57.53% 51.89% 57.51% 56.90% 
F-Statistics 30.57*** 12.80*** 26.33*** 10.17*** 
Hausman-test 15.56*** 15.56 21.48*** 21.48 
 FEM REM FEM REM 
Notes:  i. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
         respectively.   
   ii.  FEM is the fixed effects model. 
   iii.  REM is the random effects model.  
   iv.  1a and 1b Models represent the basic specification of extended Gravity Model 
which include GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, and Distance. 
v.  2c and 2d Models represent the basic specification variables, the 
macroeconomic variables of the investing partners (Wage Rate and Inflation 
Rate) and the economic relationship variables between Thailand and investing 
partners (Trade and Exchange Rate). 
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Table C-2: Comparison of FEM and REM for Models 1 and 2 of the Determinants of  
 Portfolio Investment in Thailand Using Equation (5.11) 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
Model 1 a 1 b 2 c 2 d 
GDP 
-8.2742*** .5116 -8.2666*** .6770 
GDP Per Capita 12.0704*** 1.8542** 12.0673*** 1.5921*** 
GDP Growth Rate 
.0919 .1177 .1400 .1861** 
Distance 
-8.0036 -2.0819 -8.1106 -2.0490* 
Trade 
- - .1926 .2168* 
Exchange Rate  
- - .0724 1.0628*** 
Wage Rate 
- - -.0609 -.0111 
Inflation Rate 
- - .0753 .1093* 
APEC 
- - - - 
ASEM 
- - - - 
Dummy 1997 2.7170** 2.9260*** 2.7630** 2.9276** 
Dummy 1998 2.5342** 2.0572* 2.5738** 1.8583 
Constant 
- -23.1056* - -24.3120** 
 
    
No. of observations 525 525 525 525 
Mean 
-3.7513 -3.7513 -3.7513 -3.7513 
Std. Dev. 4.9500 7.6612 4.9497 7.6613 
Sum of squares 12202.27 13781.89 12102.82 12386.52 
R2 60.29% 53.87% 60.61% 58.54% 
Adjusted R2 58.22% 53.32% 58.22% 57.71% 
F-Statistics 29.08*** 31.67*** 25.34*** 26.78*** 
Hausman-test 17.36*** 17.36 21.81** 21.81 
 FEM REM FEM REM 
Notes:  i. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
         respectively.   
   ii.  FEM is the fixed effects model. 
   iii.  REM is the random effects model.  
   iv.  1a and 1b Models represent the basic specification of extended Gravity Model 
which include GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate, and Distance. 
v.  2c and 2d Models represent the basic specification variables, the 
macroeconomic variables of the investing partners (Wage Rate and Inflation 
Rate) and the economic relationship variables between Thailand and investing 
partners (Trade and Exchange Rate). 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
Table D-1: List of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
LFDI Log of FDI 
LPRT Log of Portfolio Investment 
LGG Log of GDP 
LCC Log of GDP Per Capita 
GDPGR GDP Growth Rate 
LDIS Log of Distance 
LTRA Log of Trade 
LX Log of Exchange Rate 
WAGE Wage Rate 
INFL Inflation Rate 
ASEM ASEM 
APEC APEC 
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